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The contemporary turn to traditions in social and

political theory, exemplified in the works of Alasdair

MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, can be distinguished from
other forms of traditionalism by the emphasis placed on a

critical engagement with traditions.

In critical tradition-

alism traditions are understood to embody debates and dis-

agreements over their meaning, their scope, and their validity.

It is argued that a turn to traditions offers the pos-

sibility of a politics in which the history and experience
of past generations mattered.

I

also show that a politics

with remembrance enhances the rationality of political
action.

I

argue that neither Walzer nor MacIntyre

adequately concern themselves with the issue of how we are
related to traditions and to the past.

How is it that we

ought to find ourselves "in" a web of traditions?

In Edmund

Burke's concept of inheritance we find an articulate view of
how one might understand oneself as part of a tradition.

examine to what extent Burkean living in tradition is compatible with a critical appropriation of tradition.

My

interpretation stresses the strong emotional resonance of
v

I

the term "inheritance" and the way in which it is a reflec-

tion of family life.

I

conclude that criticism "within the

family" may be subject to various difficulties,
the fear of offending the "fathers"; but

I

including

also argue that

Burke's understanding of practical politics and the need to
keep the language of justice from becoming platitudinous
goes some distance toward mitigating these difficulties.

I

pursue the question of our relationship to traditions a bit
further when

I

discuss Milan Kundera

1

s Un bearable Lig h tness

of Being and Alfred Doeblin's Ka rl a nd Rosa.

Kundera chal-

lenges the turn to traditions with his notion of kitsch.

Doeblin challenges the view developed in the dissertation
that our recollection of deceased relations (our dead ances-

tors for instance) may mediate a relationship to the past
that is also critical.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

ABSTRACT
Chapter
1

INTRODUCTION

2

EDMUND BURKE AND THE DILEMMAS OF ENGAGING TRADITION

3

THE TURN TO TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
THEORY

1

... 35

86

4

LIVING OUR INHERITANCE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

138

5

CONCLUSION

160

BIBLIOGRAPHY

168

CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
Recently, Bruce James Smith complained of the absence
of historical recollection within contemporary politics,

citing our failure to create "true and lasting passions" as
a cause of the disappearance of New Left and progressive

politics.

^

His point is well taken.

At stake is more than

the failure to learn from the experiences of past progres-

sive movements.

When we no longer remember the goals of the

civil rights movement for instance, our political sense of
self is diminished and clouded.

are as political beings.

We know less about who we

The past contains clues to our

identity as well as a record of tactics, struggles, and
errors in judgment.

Furthermore, the rationality of politi-

cal action is endangered if we no longer believe that future

generations will take up the goals and projects we have
begun to complete.

Political activity rarely attains its

end in a once and forever fashion.

Political action re-

quires that future others acknowledge our sacrifices and the
value of our politics--in short, that they remember us.
we are remembered,

it

If

is likely that we will be remembered

in connection with tradition.

Those traditions will be

experienced by future generations, if they are experienced
at all, as something that comes to them from the past.

The

rationality of political action is also clearly diminished
when politicians can get away with reducing our collective

experience to a set of symbols that they manipulate at

.

.

2

will.

A sense of history is vital to making good
political

decisions
As

I

hope to make clear throughout this dissertation,

what motivates the seemingly disparate parts is a dilemma

affecting the attempt to have
"remembrance".

a

politics which includes

Remembrance is a recollection of history in

the broad sense of including the traditions,

practices,

the events that have shaped traditions, and a

sense of our being linked with the past.
identities,

the social

Our personal

the projects or obligations that we affirm are

rooted in a sense of history.

Remembrance instills a poli-

tical sense of self, an orientation and set of issues for

politics
A politics in which traditions have a place will poten-

tially be a politics containing a degree of social solidarity and consensus which in turn can support collective

action and political discourse.

By providing a common

language and a set of ideals, traditions link individuals to
a common world.

Politics operates with a historical sense

of how the present shape of politics and issues informing it

are linked to the past.

A

politics of traditions promises

that debate over genuine political issues will take the

place of the politics of self-assertive individuals.
longer will

I

merely assert my interests in politics;

allow those interests to be brought into question ."

3

No
I

will

The

individual preferences of economic man, accepted as given by

3

economic theory, are opened up to scrutiny when they are

interpreted as elements of traditions.
The two theorists that

I

will discuss in the next

chapter agree that rational action and political discourse

depend upon a sense of traditions.

According to MacIntyre,

those who place themselves beyond our inherited traditions

are without a coherent moral view.

Ethical obligation is

sustained and developed when the self understands its historical roots.
ses emotions,

Cut off from history the self merely expresit

For Walzer,

"emotes".
if we take away our traditions we deprive

ourselves of the concrete terms of justice and turn the
quest for justice into abstract speculation.

Both MacIntyre

and Walzer are traditionalist without being political con-

servatives.

They understand traditions as embodying debates

that require our participation.

Traditions are significant

terms of discourse and political identities and not the

language that renders political discourse and debate un-

necessary

.

It is important to distinguish the traditionalism of

recent political theory from our ordinary notion of tra-

ditionalism.

Understanding traditions as embodied social

arguments and debates, as results of conflicts that are

essentially problematic and open to revision, is the essential thrust of the contemporary turn to traditions.

3ut

this thrust is unappealing to the traditionalist for whom
the apparent naturalness of tradition is crucial.

ihe

:

4

traditionalist in this sense of the term believes
that
reflective awareness complicates traditions and necessarily

undermines their appeal.

First of all. traditions seen in a

problematic light would be incapable of providing a fixed
and secure identity— something that leaves no doubts or

questions

.

Secondly,

the apparent naturalness of tradi-

tions, which lends traditions a sense of being more than

humanly created artifacts,

is

undermined when we see them in

terms of a debate.
The recent attention within political theory to the
idea of traditions

I

describe as a turn to traditions.^

I

do not wish to discuss why the turn to traditions arose.

Both Walzer and MacIntyre understand their respective work
as a response to the abstract, ahistorical theorizing of

recent liberal theory, especially the theory inspired by

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice

.

I

will offer here an ab-

breviated argument which attacks the abstract image of the
self frequently presented in liberal theory

5
.

Frithof

Bergmann argues that
...an act is free if the agent identifies with the elements from which it flows; it is coerced if the agent
disassociates himself from the element which generates
This means that identification
or prompts the action.
is logically prior to freedom, and that freedom is a
Freedom is a function of idenderivative notion.
tification and stands in a relationship of dependence
If an identificato that with which a man identifies.
tion is present, the corresponding freedom appears.
The primary condition of freedom is the poss e ssion of
an identity, or of a self--f reedo m is the acting out of
that identity .*5
Ony emphasis)

The notion of negative freedom by emphasizing "freedom from"

over "freedom to do or be something" lends support to a

^

.

5

nihilistic sense of self.

If

the self is possessed only of

a sense of being free from emotions,

reasons, and desires—

this would truly be an unencumbered self ~-f reedom would lie
in actions affirming its distance from emotions,

and reason.

If

feelings,

such an "individual" actually existed, he

would be the Underground Man of Dostoevski

.

The possession of a particular social identity, or of

social identities, is critical for the rationality of actions and the exercise of freedom

8
.

The emphasis on sub-

mitting social identities and the traditions they encapsulate to discussion distinguishes the contemporary turn to

traditions from the view that only an assigned place in a
social hierarchy with specific duties and responsibilities
saves us from nihilistic anarchy.
This dissertation does concern itself with a potential

difficulty within the critical traditionalism of the recent
Is our location within and attachment

turn to traditions.

to traditions as straight forward as Walzer and MacIntyre

seem to imply?

As we shall see, MacIntyre and Walzer treat

our link to traditions simply as a matter of recognizing who
we really are.

We really know the reality of traditions but

we are, especially intellectuals, bewitched by abstract

notions and blinded by modern, abstract accounts of moral

agency and self.

I

argue that the turn to traditions does

itself harm by treating our location within traditions as
tradidevoid of any intrinsic difficulties for a critical

tionaiism

The turn to traditions misses a significant

.

6

problem for a critical traditionalism.
Pericles

'

I

want to turn to

funeral oration as a way of introducing this

problem
It is interesting that Pericles chooses the occasion of

a funeral oration for recent battle dead to remind Athenians

of their finest virtues and of their obligation to Athens.

The address to those who mourn a son or father expands to

include the entire city.
in particular must,

What can be said to the mourners

it seems,

embrace all Athenians.

We

immediately understand why.
Pericles links their deaths to the ancestors of all
Athenians:
it

"I

shall begin with our ancestors [who] handed

[our country] down free to the present time by their

valor... our fathers spared no pains to be able to leave
their acquisition to us of the present generation."

The

fallen Athenian soldiers have done the same for living

Athenians and their descendants.

So clearly, Athenians owe

something to their ancestors who "spared no pains" for them
(who suffered for them) and to the dead soldiers who gave

their lives for Athens.
ing of the fathers'

We can imagine how Pericles'

evok-

sacrifice added more weight to the

burden of the survivors.

For how can they possibly repay

those who died and sacrificed themselves for Athens?

Of

the dead Pericles says:

.each of them individually received that renown which
never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that
in which their bones have been deposited, but that
noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be
eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed
.

.

7

or story shall fall for its commemoration.
have the whole earth for their tomb ... 9

For heroes

They have the whole world for a tomb (our world is their
provided, of course, that they are remembered for what

tomb)

they did and for what their sacrifices made possible.

For

the mourners gathered (and for the dead they are gathered

before) Pericles delivers a tribute to the city of Athens,

celebrating her history, her greatest qualities, and her
most significant achievements.

The apparent point is that

the Athenian traditions must be continued.

this of us.

Our dead require

The collective narrative of Athens must include

a chapter that makes sense of this most recent sacrifice and

loss

.

I

am suggesting that an obligation to the dead can

locate us in traditions.

Out of an obligation to the Athen-

ians who gave their lives for Athens comes the demand that

their sacrifice be made intelligible.

The task of justify-

ing their sacrifice and ameliorating the sense of loss

brings Athenians closer to their traditions as the question
of the meaning of Athenian way of life is forced upon them.

The force the dead exert can have a very positive

influence on politics if W. Lloyd Warner is correct and
their deaths "become powerful sacred symbols which organize,
direct, and constantly revive the collective ideals of the

community and nation

."

10

If we

understand this to mean that

and
the traditions are neither forgotten nor simply repeated

imitated,

then traditionalism is critical.

hand, war veterans (and their organizations,

On the other
the VFW and

.

8

American Legion) are notably intolerant of innovation in
American traditions.

We can see why.

They look at events

only from within the perspective of their dead comrades and
their time ignoring the history and experience we have

accumulated since their deaths.

Being true to the dead

means remaining within their understanding of the traditions
they died for.

11

Altering and reconstructing the tradition

appears disloyal.

Of course,

one wants to say that one

ought to be loyal to the point of the tradition and not to
the specifics which took shape under a particular set of

circumstances.

The meaning of a tradition is clarified in

time and every tradition reguires reinterpretation.
dead, however, can speak in a demanding voice.

1

O

The

In Chapter

Four we will discuss the attempt of Friedrich Becker to

remain loyal to the dead of WW1
that makes up for their deaths.

.

Becker cannot do anything
He finds no satisfactory

way of acting on his strong sense of obligation to those who
died in the carnage of WW1

.

However, his sense of obliga-

tion forces him to critically assess the political traditions,

the popular morality, and the educational system of

Germany
I

would not say that a critical traditionalism is

doomed to forever falter at the sepulchers of the ancestors
and war dead.
ficulty.

At this point

I

On the positive side,

heightened.

want only to note this dif-

remembrance is obviously

Repaying the dead draws us into traditions as

die?
we seek an answer to the questions: For what did they

.

,

9

For what ideals did they die?

deaths?

Who is responsible for their

Guilt is no doubt a factor.

We know for whom they

died

Joseph Amato, the author of Guilt and Gratitude

,

ex-

perienced first hand a political debate over remembering the
Viet Nam war.

esting way.

Amato characterizes the debate in an inter-

Whereas the legionnaires found judgment in

their father's eyes, the professors felt judged by their

imagined children's eyes.

The latter were motivated by

guilt of the sort "that calls on one to serve mankind" and a

changing world.

Gratitude affirming "the worth of maintain-

ing present relations" motivated the former.

Moreover,

gratitude "points backward in time toward first gifts"
forming exclusive attachments involving, even demanding,
trust, affection, obedience, and subservience."

We will want to see whether gratitude for "first gifts"

demands our subservience to the fathers.

If

it does then

critical traditionalism must be wary of locating itself in

traditions through a sense of gratitude for what our fathers
and our ancestors have given us--lest the dead bury the

living and those yet unborn.
As Amato himself would agree,

the ideal is some kind of

combination of guilt with gratitude, of the prospective and
retrospective casts of mind.

Edmund Burke seems to be

expressing such a synthesis when he says, "people will not
look forward to posterity who never look backward to their

ancestors".

Burke's surprising statement implies that we

10

will not feel the eyes of the children on us unless we turn
to our ancestors.

The meaning of the backward turn toward

the ancestors is the theme for the chapter on Edmund
Burke.

An additional example of the difficulties that may

plague a critical traditionalism can be found in the differing reactions to President Reagan's visit to Bitburg

cemetery in West Germany.

Sheldon Wolin is correct in

calling the President's visit a celebration of amnesia at
the expense of memory 14
.

Reagan did, however, provoke a

storm of conflicting remembrances, which showed that the

experience of remembrance, even of the same event, can cause

disharmony and conflict.
The visit to a German military cemetery set the tone

and determined the outcome of the event so that the in-

clusion of a concentration camp did little to alter the

significance of Reagan's visit to Germany.

As Geofrey

Hartman put it, "Bitburg recalled nothing but common sacrifice and a shared code of military honor."

The emotions on

the German side (in fairness there were a variety of re-

actions) were quite understandable and were capably ex-

pressed by Dregger

,

the floor leader of the Christian Demo-

cratic Union, who stated amidst the calls for cancelling the
visit to Bitburg, that a cancellation "insults my brother
and his fallen comrades.

Ever loyal to his brother and

to the fallen "Kameraden" Dregger had obvious trouble under-

standing the point of the protests against the visit.

He

1

1

merely wanted to honor his brother and the other young
Germans who died.
We can recognize Dregger s position in our Vietnam
1

veterans who protest that they have been forgotten and that
the value of their sacrifice has been denied.

But Helmut

Kohl's notion of reconciliation as a kind of generalized
grief of all for all who have died and suffered obliterates

history by making everyone a victim and setting aside the

question of guilt.

From the perspective of Jews who lost

members of their family in the death camps, generalized
grief with the enemy, the murderer, must seem preposterous
and insulting to the memory of their dead.
The speech of the German President Kurt von Weizsacker
in which he without hesitation maintained that reconcil-

iation is possible only with a remembrance of the consequences of NAZISM and acceptance of responsibility for them puts
If our

Germans like Dregger in an uncomfortable position.

recollection stretches past the memory of our lose of

a

loved one, grief over the dead gives way to questioning the

conduct of all those who participated in the NAZI regime.
It turns out that these dead german soldiers

fathers and brothers

— cannot

— our

sons,

be respected as “men of uncom-

mon wisdom" to borrow from Burke.

Nor can they be respected

as soldiers who gave their lives for a worthy ideal.

It

is

not surprising then that Weizsacker in his speech directs

emphasis away from the question of guilt to the present

responsibility of all Germans (no matter what their parents

t

12

did during the war) to accept and deal with the past.

Weizsacker tells Germany, "we are all affected by its consequences and liable for it..."

Fur thermore--and this is

meant to alert all Germans to the significance of their

history--he explains, "whosoever closes his eyes to the past
cannot see the present."

In other words,

Germany if you

want to understand the present, know your history!

One

wonders if knowing the present will ever be as compelling

motivation as serving the dead.

a

That the act of mourning

rivets us to the dead is demonstrated by the Jewish reaction.

When reading Menachem Rosensaf

1

s

account of the

memorial services held at Bergen-Belsen one is struck by the

passion behind his conviction that the dead will not be
abandoned.

Weizsacker ends his historic speech with a

realistic sense of the difficulties involved in a remem-

brance which remains true to history:

"On this 8th of May,

let us face up to the truth as well as we can." 17

To quickly summarize my argument up to this point,

I

am

arguing that critical traditionalism must squarely face the

ambiguity of the emotional forces that impel one to look
backward toward the ancestors, to the traditions of the
community and the collective narrative.
are drawn to the past,

On the one hand, we

to our collective history and our

traditions when we experience it as the world of our
fathers, as the world that our friends and close relations

made sacrifices for.

The past is no longer insignificant,

history is no longer "bunk".

The examples of Bitburg and

13

war remembrances raise doubts as to whether a traditionalism

which is interwoven with recollections of intimate relations
can ever be a critical traditionalism.
In the case of Edmund Burke we see that his notion of

what it is to act justly helps to give his traditionalism a

critical edge.

Thus he overcomes to some degree the un-

critical element intrinsic to a sense of the past mediated
by familial and intimate attachments.

In Chapter Three

I

will show the significance of local attachments of family

and friends, the "little platoon", for understanding the

character of Burke's attachment to the past.

The idea of

inheritance, the most important concept for understanding
his view of tradition,

is not a legal

term so much as it is

an expression imbued with the bonds of affection and obliga-

tion that define, sustain and reflect the intimacy of family
life.

At times Burke articulated a position which was not a

conservative version of traditionalism.

Burke's demand that

we enlarge our sense of morality and be constantly aware
that the present always contains novelty suggests an open-

ness and capacity for self criticism.

Nevertheless, any

assessment of Burke must take into account the difficulties
a

traditionalism mediated by intimate relations pose for

criticism.

I

was initially attracted to Burke because of

his more compelling relationship to traditions.

MacIntyre

and Walzer not only fail to consider the foundation of a

traditionalism

— how

we turn toward the past

but that they

often show a desire to take up our "inheritance" from Burke.

14

For Instance, both theorists want a concept
of community

united across time.

A

historically aware political com-

munity is central to the theories of both theorists.
Burke's description of a "partnership" binding past, present
and future generations is justly famous and quite clear as
to what

is

involved in a partnership of generations.

If

there is an unacknowledged dependence on the thought of

Burke within the theories of MacIntyre and Walzer then

problems in Burke's thought may affect the success of their
own projects.
I

bring the dissertation to an end with a chapter that

develops more fully the problematic relationship to traditions that

I

suggest in the course the dissertation charts.

My focus will be on two novels, The Unbearable Lightness of

Being by Milan Kundera, and Karl and Rosa by Alfred Doeblin.
Both writers concern themselves with the meaning and mean-

inglessness of history and our problematic relationship to
With their help,

history.

I

hope to be able to explore in

more concrete detail how the past comes down to us and what

motivates a turn to traditions.
Thus far

I

have assumed that traditions present them-

selves effectively only in the recollection of our intimate

relations
tions.

—a

recollection which forces us to turn to tradi-

The traditionalism of war veterans, of survivors of

the holocaust,

and of surviving sons and daughters can be

best described as a turn to the past mediated by a recollec-

tion of intimate relations.

Given the potential difficul-

15

ties of this window on the past, we ought to ask whether a

turn to traditions might be carried out in some other way.

Although

I

do not pursue this question systematically,

do explore the possibility of alternative sources of

I

critical traditionalism when

I

consider the recent work of

Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre.

I

argue that neither

MacIntyre nor Walzer give a satisfactory account of our

relationship to tradition and the explanations they do give
of our situatedness in traditions are unsatisfactory.

Both

theorists largely ignore how we relate to traditions.

Weizsacker offered a simple and direct alternative to
the above that we should consider.

Recall that he did not

attempt to provoke a sense of guilt; he claimed only that
Germans will not understand their present unless they turn
He appealed to the idea that the consequences

to the past.

of Germany's past must be addressed by all Germans,

guilty and innocent alike.

the

All Germans must live with the

consequences of German history.

The turn to traditions

requires nothing more than, say, a desire to understand the

present

— which

is a task that,

presumably, most of us are

adequately motivated to undertake for quite ordinary
reasons.

However, we see immediately that the neat solu-

tion fails to work.

What are the consequences of WWII that
Ihe

Germans should perceive in contemporary Germany?

accusation that Germans perpetrated great crimes

Would Germany be adequately

certainly one such consequence.

dealing with those accusations

is

if

present day Germans in-

16

sisted that

it

other words,

was another Germany which was at fault?

In

the accusations against Germany assume that

there is a connection between present and past Germany.

If

Germans felt no sense of responsibility for the past, no

connection to the world of their fathers, they would miss
the enormity of what had happened.

German culture and

society as a whole (across time and including the present)

would not receive critical attention.

Furthermore,

it

would

be assumed by these new Germans that since the NAZI era is

past accusations against Germany are anachronistic.

clusion,

if we subtract a sense of deep connection

In con-

(perhaps

mediated by guilt) between NAZI Germany and modern Germany,
the only legacy from WWII for Germans really to consider is

German prosperity.

Weizsacker however, clearly wants

Germany to recognize it special responsibility for the

suffering WWII caused.
It is even more important for Germans to understand why

their culture and traditions were so easily appropriated by
NAZISM.

A prerequisite for this analysis is a willingness

to turn to those traditions with an open mind and question-

ing attitude.

For example,

it would be very easy for

Germans to insulate contemporary Germany from criticism by

sharply distinguishing the culture of NAZISM from that of

contemporary Germany.

Here the fathers would end up harshly

judged but the children

— and

criticism 20
.

their world

— would

escape

It is also likely that Germans might seek to

world
lessen the guilt of their fathers and of the cultural

.

17

they were a part of.

Instead of a critical assessment of

German traditions, external factors
the severe depression, etc.
of the rise of NAZISM.

— might

— Treaty

of Versailles,

be highlighted as causes

In both cases we do not find an open

and questioning attitude toward the past.
It would be tempting to think that what is needed is

detachment and that detachment would enhance rationality and
understanding.

If

war veterans would only put their memor-

ies of their comrades aside, they would understand why the

war was wrong.

If

Germans would only forget about their

guilt and focus on the question of what contributed to the
rise of NAZISM,

then the truth would be discovered.

In

other words, a politics of remembrance requires nothing more
than the hard edged discipline of science.

The ideal rela-

tion to traditions is nothing more or less than the rela-

tionship holding between a scientist and his object of

study
We are not related to traditions in the same way a

scientist is related to his field of research.

Our politi-

cal and social identities are internally related to tradi-

tions.^

The relationship of the scientist to the idea of

science or to the tradition of conducting research in his

particular field is the appropriate analogy.

Detachment

from science is not a virtue we would recommend to a budding

scientist.

Similarly, we expect that an artist must be

devoted to his art in order to perform his work well.
German detached from the moral issues of WWII would not

A
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bother with the difficult task of understanding the root
causes of NAZISM.

Detachment from moral issues ironically

makes their resolution less likely because the motivation
and the sense of responsibility to do something are lost.
It

is for this reason that

I

hold that the question of the

character of our location (or situatedness) in traditions is
so fundamentally important.

involvement

— or

engagement.

We need not detachment, but
At the same time,

the relation-

ship to traditions must not preclude the critical under-

standing of traditions.

Reasoning about traditions must

remain possible because otherwise the turn to traditions

becomes nothing more than mere traditionalism.

Hans-Georg Gadamer deals with the issue of the relation
to traditions extensively in Truth and Method 22
.

The hermeneutical experience is concerned with what has
been transmitted in tradition. This is what is to be
experienced.
But tradition is not simply a process
that we learn to know and be in command of through
experience; it is language, ie. it expresses itself
like a "Thou".
A "Thou" is not an object, but stands
It would be wrong to think
in a relationship with us.
that this meant that what is experienced in tradition
is to be taken as the meaning of another person, who is
a "Thou".
Rather, we consider that the understanding
of tradition does not take the text as an expression of
life of a "Thou", but as a meaningful content detached
from all bonds of the meaning individual, of an "I" or
Still, the relation of the "Thou" and the
a "Thou".
meaning of experience in this case must be capable of
contributing to the analysis of the hermeneutical
For tradition is a genuine partner in
experience.
communication, with which we have fellowship as does
the "I" with a "Thou".

Gadamer further clarifies the character of the "Thou" when
we truly engage traditions in dialogue.

It

is not a rela-

tionship in which we seek to know the "Thou" as an object as
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we would when trying to predict the behavior of another.

Nor is it a relationship in which we understand the "Thou"

solely in our own terms and language.

Here we have ignored

the differences of the "Thou" by hastily constructing an

interpretation.

The "highest type of hermeneutical ex-

perience", the most proper relationship to traditions, "is
the openness to tradition possessed by effective-historical

consciousness.

On the personal level this type of ex-

perience is a genuine human relat ionship--a true "belonging
together", where each person is willing to listen to the
other.

At the level of hermeneutical experience openness

requires that we acknowledge our own "historical ity"

We

.

too stand within a tradition and not from a privileged

position above and superior to mere traditions.

The sense

of equality permeating the relationship supports the idea

that what is different may have something to say to me 24
.

Instead of assimilating or comparing traditions from the
past,

let myself experience tradition by being open to the

I

claim to truth emerging from my encounter with tradition.

Gadamer describes such openness as a "readiness for experience." 2 ^

In a personal friendship we might describe

openness as a willingness to let the other take the initiative

.

My interest here is not in judging the validity of

Gadamer

1

s

philosophical hermeneutics.

The criticisms of

assimilation and of distancing ourselves from traditions
seem persuasive to me.

What interests me and concerns this

20

dissertation is the importance an ethically
constituted
relationship has for a proper location in traditions.

if

Gadamer is correct, then the "I"-"Thou" is a prerequisite
to
having a critical traditionalism, a traditionalism able to
engage traditions in a dialogue and debate.

My main point

in briefly discussing Gadamer is the light shed on the

significance of the attitude with which we approach traditions.

How traditions are passed on--what they mean--will

depend on how we receive them.

Burke's notion of "inheri-

tance" functions in his thought much like the "I-Thou" of

true friendship functions in Gadamer s philosophy of her1

meneutics.
way.

"Inheritance" reveals traditions in a certain

The important questions are:

the traditions of the past?

criticism within that type of

How are we located in

What are the possibilities of
"

locatedness"?

The first

question might be thought as a question of what motivates
our taking up a particular attitude toward traditions, or

what conditions the attitude we take toward the past.

second question,

I

The

will attempt to answer by discovering

what constraints our attitude toward the past may exercise
over us.

MacIntyre recognizes the significance of how we

approach traditions when he cites the "virtue of having an
adequate sense of traditions to which one belongs of which
confront one" as one of the most important virtues.

(See

Chapter Three.)
The relevance of my dissertation for the debates and

projects of recent political theory is evident.

There has

.
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been a great deal of talk about the need for a revival
of
the democratic traditions and public philosophy embedded
in

our republican traditions and manifested in many of our

political institutions.

My work may clarify what is really

involved in a turn to traditions.

And more generally,

the

difficulties faced by the contemporary turn to traditions
affect any theory that depends on "remembrance"

,

the capa-

bility of people to look backward and see the relevance of
the past for the present

For example,
of how Rawls

if one

accepts Amy Gutmann

1

s

clarification

justifies the principles of his theory, Rawls

like MacIntyre and Walzer depends on a lively sense of the

past as a means of sustaining and creating the common sense

convictions which undergird the theoretical principles of A
Theory of Justice

.

If

it

is not an unencumbered self

that

provides an Archimedean point for justification, but rather
the "history and traditions embedded in our public life",

then whether or not MacIntyre and Walzer' s turn to traditions falters has ramifications extending beyond the ques-

tion of the validity of the contemporary turn to traditions.^®

According to Gutmann

'

s

contextual ist interpreta-

tion of Rawlsian liberal theory, our willingness to maintain
a commitment

to current social practices

in nature--for example,

(which are ethical

"equality of educational oppor-

tunity,

careers open to talent, punishment conditional on

intent)

lies at the base of the defense of liberal rights

and the idea chat we ought to treat others as "autonomous
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moral agents."

It

is

precisely the tenuous hold ethical

practices have on us that leads MacIntyre and Walzer to
attack the image of an asocial, unencumbered self that

liberalism seems to present to the world.

Gutmann may be

correct, MacIntyre and Michael Sandel may misconstrue liber-

alism and Rawls in particular.

However,

I

believe that the

emotivist self attacked by Maclnytre and the unencumbered
self which is the target of Sandel' s work are reflections of
real life expressions in contemporary culture.

They are

indicative of a prevailing ignorance, reluctance, or refusal
to consider the relevance of our history.

The debate over affirmative action can help us assess
the potential significance of the turn to traditions for

contemporary political discourse.

Much of that debate has

revolved around the issue of whether it is fair to treat

individuals as members of groups.

Should white males who

are living in a time which legally forbids racial and sexual

discrimination and who may find discrimination morally wrong
suffer disadvantages in order to rectify the discrimination

women and minorities have suffered in the past?

Neither the

beneficiaries of affirmative action nor the individuals who
find their careers curtailed because of affirmative action

were directly involved in the acts of discrimination which

rationalize the policy of affirmative action.

The concept

of group identity across time is therefore essential to

believing that affirmative action is a reasonable response
to the

injustice of past discrimination.

Take away the

.
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notion that individuals bear particular social identities
linking us to the past and affirmative action becomes at
best a deeply puzzling notion.

Common is the view that

affirmative action is "reverse discrimination" and an assault on individual freedoms and rights.
...The essence of liberalism has always been a concern
with the welfare, rights and responsibilities of individuals gua individuals not the masses or classes or
other such linguistic abstractions.
Furthermore,
although there has been disagreement among liberals as
to what social arrangements might best liberate individual capacities, no disagreement exists with the
thesis that illiberal means, means that impose avoidable injustices on individuals, cannot achieve just
ends
...[if] a white male [he] is "guilty" of job discrimination because other white males have so discriminated
and therefore reparations are justified and required-something seems peculiar. We find no concern for the
What the person did as a person is irindividual
His gender and race in some mysterious way
relevant.
render him guilty of offenses and deserving admittedly
unfair treatment 27
,

.

.

.

.

Indeed, according to an individualistic concept of the self,
it is a

mystery as to how white males can be held respon-

sible for actions they did not commit.

If

responsibility

is

not being asserted by proponents of affirmative action, what

reasons justify penalizing white males for past wrongs?

Proponents of affirmative cannot deny that the interests of
white males are harmed 28
.

One can justify harming their

interests if one can establish a linkage between past and

present which implicates and holds white males responsible
as a group for discriminatory practices.

reasons,

For a number of

29
this task would not be an easy one
.

Clearly,

constitutive of our
we accepted our inheritance as partly
own world,

the past history of legally sanctioned

if
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discrimination and the present situation of inequality would
be continuous.

It would then make sense to argue that the

problems of our father's generation are moral obligations
the sons must live up to.

In other words,

if the self were

at least partially constituted by social identities carrying

the history of the nation, references to obligations of
a

particular group would not be mysterious.
person" would not be "irrelevant".

What "I did as a

The "I" understood in a

social sense includes social aggregates that have a history.
"I

am a (white) American" entails responsibility for the

present day consequences of past discrimination and racism

because
Ideally,
I

identify with the history of white America.

I
I

not only identify with the moments of glory, but

accept the ambiguous nature of my her i tage-- i ts ethical

dilemmas and moral complexities.
The dependence of many of the arguments for affirmative

action on a sense of responsibility that is historical in
nature is easy to show.

In The Lengthening Shadow or

Slavery: A Historical Justification for Affirmative Action
for Blacks in Hig her Ed ucatio n we find the assumption that

"acting justly in the present and future" demands that we
not only recall the past but that we also feel a respon-

sibility for it 30
.

We find no mention of the problem of how

individuals removed from the experience of discrimination
will assume responsibilities for the past.

Court cases show

a similar dependence on individuals accepting responsibility

for the past.

A discussion of the history of discrimination

.

1
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seems to act as a justification for affirmative action.

No

additional reasoning is deemed necessary.
...Basic self-interests of the individual must be
balanced with social interests, and in circumstances
where blacks have been discriminated against for years,
there is no alternative but to require that certain
minorities be taken into consideration with respect to
specific minority percentage of the population in a
3
given area
.

It

.

is one thing to agree to the abstract notion that we have

a social

tion.

interest in combating the effects of discrimina-

Once we move to the area of prescription the task of

justifying the necessary costs illuminates the problematic

character of the relation of the individual to history.
Moral arguments that rely on appeals to history face the
same difficulties the turn to traditions must overcome.

Someone who is capable of understanding the present as

bearing the legacy of discrimination is a person who is

actively involved in history.

History

is

real.

The self

finds itself in a world constituted by the legacy of dis-

crimination and racism.

More is involved than an acknowl-

edgment of the consequences discrimination left behind.

The

justification of policies that must impose costs on others
as a means of effectively dealing with the legacy of dis-

crimination requires that we discover important aspects of
our selves in a relationship to the past.

Otherwise poli-

cies impinging negatively on ourselves are easily resisted.
The issue here is one of what instills a commitment to

social change.

Social policy generally and affirmative

action in particular has faltered because of a lack of
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political commitment.

We see in the policy of affirmative

action how the lack of connectedness to history by undermining commitment further undermines social policy.

Any

policy addressing the legacy of racial discrimination which
imposes costs faces these same difficulties.
A turn to traditions might also raise issues that

complicate achieving certain social ends such as eliminating
the legacy of discrimination.

It is clear from the debate

over affirmative action in higher education that the tradi-

tional autonomy of the university is believed by some to be

threatened by a federally enforced policy of affirmative
action.

Competing traditions are called into play because

nearly every member of a university has at least two social
identities.

He or she is an American (in most cases) and a

member of a particular university with its own traditions,

including the highly prized tradition of autonomy.
to traditions may not simplify political choices.

The turn

Alasdair

MacIntyre as we shall see fully expects role conflict.

Even

though choice is not made easier, the turn to traditions is
an important step toward bringing out the full dimensions of
the issue in question.

Sheldon Wolin argues that we sell our birthright, our
inheritance and historical i ty

,

because we wish to be re-

lieved of the burden of coming to terms with the ambiguities
of our inheritance.
a new beginning,

"Contract" carries with it the idea of

but moreover, a new beginning that begins

by erasing the past.

In America our frequent talk (it must

27

be frequent because history always takes place, we are

constantly making mistakes and becoming "dirtied") of new
beginnings "absolves us of past wrongs", "washes us clean",
and renders us innocent 32
.

It even makes a certain sense of

equality possible--str ipped of our past we can all enter the
future linked arm in arm.

Hence the lack of involvement in

the past is experienced not as a loss but as a relief, a

feeling of freedom, a feeling of unfettered possibility,

which makes hypothetically a type of community possible.

It

is only an illusory community because it depends on denying

the on-going reality of our concrete relationships.

Inter-

estingly, Wolin clarifies the difference between birthright
and contract with a reference to Richard Hooker 33
.

...Wherefore as any man's deed past is good as long as
he himself continueth; so the act of a public society
of men done five hundred years sithence [sic] standeth
as theirs who presently are of the same societies,
because corporations are immortal; we were then alive
in our predecessors, they in their successors do live
still
.

.

.

The rejection of our birthright does more than mark a break

with the historical community, it alters the context of
political action.
problematic.

Again, both words and deeds are made

Words puzzle because we are no longer engaged

with the traditions of the past and political acts become
ever more perilous because they have lost their enduring

significance.

Without the possibility of our deeds living

on in our descendants political acts make little sense.

The rejection of ahistorical individualism brings one back
to immortal society and a Burkean partnership of genera-

.

tions.

As for Hooker,

requ ire that we
so for Burke deeds

community
grave in our immortal
"continueth" beyond the

.
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NOTES
'Bruce James Smith, Politics and Remembrance Republican
themes in Machiavelli, Burke, and Tocqueville, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), pp 262-268.
In the
republican tradition we find that the "founding" is the
basis of remembrance the source of "energizing symbols,
images and memories" --and as a consequence the place to
which political actors return for "warmth and inspiration".
Smith believes that in our own time "the legend of the
founding has lost its vitality." However, he ends his book
with a plea for the "the building and rebuilding of institutions capable of preserving and enlarging historical selfconceptions in which citizens come to see themselves as
carrying the burdens and possessing the possibilities of
stories of which they are a part." Smith turns to a notion
of narrativity reminiscent of MacIntyre.
The theoretical
political task becomes one of enabling institutions to
support a setting for the narration of political life.
Smith does not address that task in any concrete manner.
The issue behind his call for new institutions is the very
How are we
same issue at the center of this dissertation:
located in traditions?
:

.

—

2

Henry F. Beechhold writes that in order to combat our lack
of a "practical historical perspective" we need "political
See his "The Presidential Campaign was a
literacy"
Chilling Indictment of American Education", The Chronicle of
Higher Education (December 7, 1988), sec. B, p. 2.
.

,

2I

am not endorsing this view of contemporary politics, it
See Jeffrey
sees the contemporary situation too starkly.
Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988) for a
corrective to MacIntyre's portrayal of contemporary liberal
politics
The movement for "cultural literacy" is part of this turn
though E.D. Hirsch certainly includes more
See his
than what we would call traditions from the past.
ComCultural Literacy (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).
plaints about the lack of historical awareness of Americans
And so are recommendations that we take
are quite common.
seriously our history. On a philosophical level, the turn
to traditions is a move away from epistemology to hermeneutics, a move from a philosophy of mind to the "hermeneutic
space of communicative practice". See Calvin Schrag, "Subin Hermeneutics and Decons truction
jectivity and Praxis"
State
eds. Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman (Albany, New York:
Rorty,
Richard
and
University or New York Press, 1985),
Princeton
P hilosophy and the Mirror of Natu re (Princeton:
understand
to
quest
The
7.
University Press, 1979), chapter
what is
judge
to
order
in
subject
the essence of the knowing
4

to traditions,

,

,

,

30

*n

V

S n0t knowledge is replaced with viewing
conversation
as "the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be

understood" which philosophers have without much success
attempted to break out of in order to see "social practices
of justification as more than just such practices".
(Rorty,
pp. 389-390.)
Instead of epistemology we have a history of
differing social practices of justification, some philosophical some not, all of which make up a "conversation of
mankind" that we ought to continue rather than attempt to
bring to an end.
"Edifying philosophy seeks to keep the
conversation going rather than find objective truth" .( Rorty
p. 377)
Philosophy the way Richard Rorty sees it has no
choice but to turn to the traditions or voices that make up
this conversation of mankind.
Rorty is concerned with how
philosophy, in particular epistemology, has acted as a
gatekeeper inhibiting the conversation.
Similarly, Calvin Schrag, writing in response to the
"death of the subject", argues that we can understand human
subjectivity and possibly restore it only against the "backdrop of conversation, habits, skills and institutional
involvements that line the hermeneutic space of communicative praxis... we cannot escape one's praxis— one's linguistic and institutional engagements". (Schrag, p. 27)
Even as one suspends theoretical judgments about oneself one
must "in the meantime continue to speak, act, work, play,
and assume social roles"
Given the critique of the subject
levied by deconstruction we must search through and work
with the traditions that shape our linguistic and institutional engagements.
As we shall see, like MacIntyre and
Walzer, "praxis" is deemed to be inescapable.
In political discourse, besides the recent work of
MacIntyre and Walzer, Charles Taylor, William M. Sullivan
and Ronald Beiner evince an approach that can be termed a
turn to traditions.
Taylor argues that mainstream social science operates
under an ontology that restricts meaning to individual
subjects who may have converging subjective reactions but
who may not share in a belief and have intersub jective
meanings.
In thus sub ject ivizing meaning, social science
excludes the "possibility of the communal", "the subject who
See Charles Taylor,
can be a "we" as well as an "I".
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in Understanding
and Social Inquiry Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy, eds
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 122For his appraisal of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue
123.
see his "Justice after Virtue" in Michael Benedikt and
Kritische Methode und Zukunft der—AnRudolf Burger eds.
thropoloqie (Wien: W Braummuel ler 1985) p.28. Community is
constituted by intersub ject ive meaning which is located in
Although Taylor's advocacy of
the practices we share.
interpretation is largely made in an argument over what
constitutes an adequate explanation of human action, one may
infer that political and moral argument occurs around the
of
intersub ject ive meanings our sharing in the traditions
.

.

,

(

,

.

,

,

.
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social practices makes possible.
If we fail to stand in
traditions we shall not be able to participate in communal
lif e

In a somewhat similar vein, William M Sullivan's
argument for the priority of social relationships over the
liberal notion of essentially unrelated individuals seeking
to realize private goals turns to the traditions of civic
republicanism as a way of resuscitating a civic outlook.
William M. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p.179.
By
awakening "a living sense of the social and historical
relationships within which we stand", we will become reconnected to the tradition of civic republicanism. What
Sullivan seems to have in mind is a renewal of political
protest movements.
Populism and more recently the Civil
Rights movement are all episodes in the civic republican
tradition which have residues in our present day social and
historical relationships.
The goal of Political Judgment
(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983) is the disclosure of a faculty of
judgment that every human being can be said to have in some
way, which Ronald Beiner conceives as that faculty "by which
we situate ourselves in the political world without relying
upon rules." Attunement, "a tacit grasp of the concrete
situation" [see his chapter on Gadamer
developed from
practical experience with the matter at hand, is emphasized
in place of a justified set of rules that one applies to a
situation. (For instance see Rawls' A Theory of Justice .)
The possibility of a public judgment (as opposed to subjective judgment) lies in the fact that there are public
things, "a common tradition and shared history, public laws
and obligations to which all are subject, common ideals and
Therefore,
meanings."
(Beiner, p.131, p.134, and p.141)
want
or the way
public judgments "concern not merely what I
of life 1^ desire, but rather entail intersub jective deliberation about a common life (how we should live together)."
Arguments about the common life and justifications of our
political judgments take the form of narratives that draw on
Without
our common experience, our history and traditions.
public things we have no public realm.
In summary Taylor, Sullivan and Beiner all share a
conviction that intersub ject ive meaning is embodied in
practices, in our concrete political and social world and
that argument, deliberation and justification ought to
In some sense each
proceed from these concrete particulars.
defends the position that the individual is antecedently
social and that the image of the free, unencumbered individual is radically at odds with our relationship to social
They make it clear that democratic politics dereality.
pends on the existence of public things and that publicness
results from sharing a history of social practices or traditions
.

.

,

]

.

,

.
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5

®
1 am re f er ing to the unencumbered
self of Rawls
and the contentless self of "negative freedom".
See
Frithjof Bergmann, On Being Free (Notre Dame, Indiana and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
Along similar lines Charles Taylor has argued that the liberal notion
of negative liberty is often coupled to freedom for selfdependence, or autonomy, giving rise to a "situationless
freedom".
Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975)
p.560.
,

bergmann, On Being Free

,

p.37.

7

The underground man experiences his thoughts, feelings, and
desires as something foreign to himself, as something he
cannot identify with nor affirm.
His identity consists
solely of a "mere point" surrounding by a "swarm of elements" craving an outlet.
By resisting them he affirms his
self as a mere point.
Being something, affirming a
thought, acting on a desire would contradict his contentless

free self.
one’s own free unfettered choice, one’s own caprice,
however wild it may be, one’s own fancy worked up at
times to frenzy is that very "most advantageous advantage" ... What man wants is simply independent choice,
whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may
lead
Fyodor Dostoevski, Great Short Works of Doestoevski (New
York: Harper and Row, 1968). See also Bergmann, On Being
Free Chapters One and Two.
,

—

,

Q

I am assuming that we would call the underground man
irrational despite the fact that his capriciousness is an
In a
attempt to put into action the emptiness of his self.
peculiar way his behavior evinces instrumental rationality.

^Thucydides
p

.

103

,

p

.

,

The Peloponnesian War

,

(Modern Library,

1951),

107

10 W.

Lloyd Warner, "An American Sacred Ceremony", The
American Life, Dream and Reality (Berkeley, 1962), pp

.

5-6.

^It

is also possible that the grief felt at having lost a
buddy is a more important reason for their refusal to engage
traditions within a debate.

^The power of political speech that refers to the sacriIn the NAZI
fices of life during war is truly impressive.
on the
playing
Hitler
we
see
Will
he
of
t
Triumph
film.
recent war
their
toward
felt
gentians
obligation
feelings of
that
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he
when
audience
his
incites
Hitler
dead.
away.
passed
really
not
have
fathers
and
sons
Germany's dead
by
Nazism
and
Deutschland,
in
nation,
They exist in the
reviving Deutschland will bring the dead back home.
,
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1

See Joseph Anthony Amato, Guil arid Gratitude
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p.19.

.

(Westport,

14

Sheldon Wolin, "Contract and Birthright", Political
Theory, vol.14, no 2 (May 1986), pp. 179-193.
.

5

1

Geofrey Hartman, ed
Bitburq in Moral and Political
Perspective
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1977).
See the Introduction.
.

,

,

1

"We Must Look Truth Straight In the Eye", President Kurt
von Weizsacker, Bitb u rg and Beyond ed Ilya Levkov, (New
York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1987).
.

,

17 See
1

his article in Ilya Levkov, ed

.

Bitburg and Beyond

,

.

8

Ignorance of our present world obviously interferes with
accomplishing any goal I seek.
A desire to act at all in
the world motivates me to understand it.
I am drawing a
simple picture for heuristic purposes of one element in
Weizsacker' s historic speech.
I intend no criticism of
Weizsacker
1

For a study of the German debate over this question see
Charles S. Maier, T he U nmasterable Past (Cambridge and
London: Harvard University Press, 1988)
pn

2

Their world is historically related to the Third Reich.

1

A craftsman has the tradition of his craft, an artist his
art, a German--the collective narrative of Germany.
pO

^Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth an d Method (New York: Crossroad
Publishing Company, 1982).
See especially Section Three of
Chapter Two of Part Two.
,

,

23 Hans-Georg Gadamer,

Publishing Company,

Truth and Method
p.324.

24 Gadamer,

Truth and Me thod, p.324

2

Truth an d Method

Gadamer

,

,

(New York: Crossroad

1982),

p 325
.

,

®Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism", Phiand Public Affairs XIV, no 3 (summer, 1985), 308osophy
l
322.
John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory:
The Dewey Lectures 1980", T he Jo urn al of Philos ophy, LXXVII,
Michael Sandel Liberalism and
515-72.
Sept ., 1980
no. 9
Cambridge University
(Cambridge:
the Limits of Ju stice
Press
1982
2
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Lee Nisbet, "Affirmative Action A Liberal Program?",
(Buffalo:
Barry Gross editor, Reverse Discrimination
Prometheus Books, 1977).
2

,
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28

See Miro M. Todorovich and Howard A. Glickstein, "Discrimination in Higher Education: A Debate on Faculty Employment", in Barry Gross, ed., Reverse Discrimination pp.37,

40

.
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CHAPTER

2

EDMUND BURKE AND THE DILEMMAS OF ENGAGING TRADITION
Int roduce la n

Burke may have a more compelling explanation of our

situatedness in traditions than contemporary political
theorists have been able to provide us with.

believe he

I

makes a contribution toward resolving the issue of how the
past can address our present without dominating us.

The

essential question is whether the relationship to tradition
we find in Burke is traditionalist in the conservative,

uncritical sense or whether Burke's perspective is compatible with and supportive of a critical traditionalism.
In considering the thought of Burke we do best to focus

on his concept of inheritance, his critique of rationalism,

his criticisms of historical inquiry, and his critical

commentary on the "Popery Laws".
argue,

"Inheritance",

is an emotionally loaded term,

nurtured within the family.

I

shall

drawing on emotions

"Inheritance" pulls us toward

the past and compels us to face the future.

Filial piety

places me before the world of my father; the natural obligation to my children forces me to consider the consequences
for their future of what

I

do in my present.

By attacking

rationalism Burke dismisses a certain type of criticism and
thus clarifies his own view of critical inquiry.

The argu-

ment against using arguments drawn from history as precepts
of arguments over public policy demonstrate the distinctive-

ness of Burke's retrospective turn to the past.

Burke's

—

.
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criticism of the "Popery Laws" and his comments on the task
of critical commentary go a long way towards clarifying the

critical edge of his traditionalism.
I

mention Burke in connection with "dilemmas of engage-

ment" because my thesis is that we will not find an unam-

biguous and untroubled relationship to tradition in the
thought of Burke.

Whereas MacIntyre and Walzer assert a

relationship to traditions and intimate that within traditions lies a hidden vitality, our reading of Burke will

suggest that our relation to the past may be characterized
by turmoil and tension.

I

am not suggesting that the pre-

sence of tension and moral complexity in our relation to

traditions undermines the turn to traditions.

Taking

seriously and facing up to the complexity of moral reality
and not fleeing it for a easier, more secure and restful
life is no doubt more than half the battle.

A political

discourse capable of recognizing the ambiquity of our political inheritance will shape a politics that avoids nostal-

gia as it builds on the past.
The ideas of a partnership of generations and an immortal society--in short the idea of a historically constituted

community, a community that looks backwards and forwards

unabashedly embraced by Burke also resonate in the work of
MacIntyre and Walzer.

It seems likely that Burke can help

us determine the ingredients of a partnership that binds

generations

.
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Perhaps the most compelling reason for turning to the
thought of Edmund Burke is his ambiguous position on whether
it is appropriate or even possible to inquire into the

meaning of traditions.

He can be read and often is read as

having reiterated the position of the common law lawyers of
the 17th century who maintained that custom or tradition has
its justification by virtue of its long usage.

antiquity of custom conferred legitimacy.

1

Alasdair

MacIntyre seems to accept this reading of Burke.
dismisses Burke with the statement,

Showing the

MacIntyre

"when a tradition be-

comes Burkean it is always dying or dead"

2

He understands

Burkean position to be one that rejects the possibility of
reasoning about traditions.

Burkean traditions are beyond

the reach of reason and are essentially stable over time.
In contrast, MacIntyre argues that a vital tradition em-

bodies "continuities of conflict" and an argument about the
good the tradition seeks to realize.
In a similar vein,

Bruce James Smith makes a strong

case for reading Burke as someone who sought a "return to
the premodern mind"

tion."

3

,

a

"mind free from memorable innova-

In Smith's estimation Burke sought to rid "politics

4
of the deed and deny to men remembrance."

Custom,

far from

being constituted by remembrances of the past, owed its

effectiveness to the decay of memory and its quality of

originating in a time out of mind.

Awareness of the changes

customs undergo breaks the spell of continuity with the
past, with the world of our fathers.

Once the seams of the

:
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web are revealed and we are no longer oblivious to
the

history of traditions tradition can no longer rest on a
habit of deference.

Arguments about the meaning of tradi-

tions then become significant, as does the possibility of a

political deed, a departure from precedent.

Smith empha-

sizes the fear Burke had of ambitious men (and modernity's

release of ambition) to the extent that Burke's project is

understood as primarily designed to constrain the possibilities of political action.

His goal was to place action "in

the presence of the canonized fathers"--so that "the spirit
of freedom... is tempered with an awful gravity ".

5

We shall

begin then with an interpretation of Burke which places him
in the tradition of the common lawyers and their celebrated

"ancient constitution".

Burke and the Ancient Constitution
J.G.A. Pocock characterizes Burke's ant i -rat ional ism as

denying individual reason the ability to understand the
process by which institutions and laws slowly adapt to

changing conditions

5
.

The process of change is a rational

process that we, however, cannot fully comprehend with our
individual reason.

Pocock argues that Burke did not develop

his position simply in reaction to the rationalist political

theory of his day.

His thought has roots in the common law

view of the basis of English law.

Pocock begins his

analysis with one of the most cited passages from Burke's
corpus

7

The third head of right, asserted by the pulpit of the
Old Jewry, namely, the right to form a government by

,
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ourselves', has, at least, as little countenance from
any thing done at the Revolution, either in precedent
or in principle, as the two first of their claims.
The
Revolution was made to preserve our ant ient indisputable laws and liberties, and that ant ient constitution
of government which is our only security for law and
liberty.
If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of
our constitution, and the policy which predominated in
that great period which has secured it to this hour,
pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in
our acts of parliament, and journals of parliament, and
not in the sermons of the Old Jewry, and the afterdinner toasts of the Revolution Society.
In the former
you will find other ideas and another language.
Such a
claim is ill-suited to our temper and wishes as it is
unsupported by any appearance of authority. The very
idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough
to fill us with disgust and horror.
We wished at the
period of the Revolution
and do now wish, to derive
all we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers
Upon that body and stock of inheritance we have taken
care not to inoculate any cyon alien to the nature of
the original plant.
All the reformations we have
hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of
reference to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded,
that all those which possibly may be made hereafter,
will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent,
authority and example.
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta.
You will see that Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of
our law, and indeed all the great men who follow him,
to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of
our liberties.
They endeavor to prove, that the
ant ient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was
connected with another positive charter from Henry I
and that both the one and the other were nothing more
than a re-affirmance of the still more antient standing
In the matter of fact, for the
law of the kingdom.
appear to be in the right;
authors
these
part,
greater
lawyers mistake in some
the
but
if
always;
perhaps not
still the more
position
my
proves
particulars, it
powerful preposthe
demonstrates
strongly; because it
minds of all
the
which
with
session towards antiquity,
people whom
the
all
of
and
our lawyers and legislators,
and
filled;
they wish to influence, have been always
considering
in
the stationary policy of this kingdom
their most sacred rights and franchises as an inheritance
,

.

.

Burke asserts that the English as a matter of habit justify
their laws with appeals to their history which they accept

and treat as their inheritance.

He does not claim that

0

"
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English law can in fact be .justified with appeals to their
antiquity.

The "spirit of the constitution" is the English

"prepossession" towards the constitution.

The "stationary

policy" of the English is their willingness to defer to

antiquity which Burke explains with the concept of inheritance.

Rather than quarrel with the common lawyers

Burke desires above all to distance his view of the Revolution of 1688 from the interpretation given to it by John
Locke.

The revolution was emphatically not conducted, as

John Locke claimed, on the basis of the principle that the

people have the right to "erect a new form... as they think
good.

8

In the second paragraph,

Burke gives a qualified

endorsement to the habitual regard the English have for
their laws and liberties.

However, he distances his own

view of the antiquity of English law from that of the
lawyers, which expresses some doubt over their understanding.

The "prepossession" toward antiquity is not rationally

defended in exactly the way the lawyers think.

3

Burke,

however, seems to agree in general with the historical

arguments of the common lawyers.
constitution.

Precedent supports the

In a speech written but never delivered Burke

stated in no uncertain terms that the English constitution
is

"a prescriptive constitution;

it

is a

constitution whose

sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind".

1

In this passage Burke rejects the idea that historical

analysis supports the constitution in the way envisioned by

2

.

.
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the common lawyers 11
.

As proof Burke offers the observation

that disputes over the origin of institutions and laws are
"not yet concluded, and never near becoming so".

Arguments

about the origin of a law can never give law an authoritative basis.

If this is so,

what then secures the institu-

tions of government and the rights of Englishmen?

"Pre-

scription" entails a presumption in favor of any "settled

scheme of government against any untried project, that

nation has long existed and flourished under it."

a

Burke

does distinguish prescription from presumption by showing
that they have differing grounds of authority in the human

Clearly,

mind.

the presumption for a settled scheme

captures only part of the rationale encompassed in prescription.

Burke goes on to state that a settled scheme of

government which is in good working order

is

far better than

"any sudden and temporary arrangement by actual election"
In other words,

we ought to respect our inherited laws more

than the results of our conscious efforts to devise laws, at
least as long as we are flourishing under our inheritance.
If

presumption tends to suggest we ought to subject our

inheritance to some sort of utilitarian measure:
"flourishing" or have we stagnated or declined?

Are we

Prescrip-

tive authority rests ultimately on a reverence for The

wisdom embodied in our inheritance.
reverence

It

is not an irrational

1

and
...a nation is not an idea of only of local extent,
ot
idea
an
is
it
but
individual momentary aggregation;
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continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers
and in space.
And this is a choice, not of one day, or
one set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice;
it is a deliberate election of ages and generations; it
is a constitution made by what it ten thousand
times
better than choice, it is made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and
moral, civil and social habitudes of the people, which
disclose themselves only in a long space of time.
It
is a vestment, which accommodates itself to the body.
Nor is prescription of government formed upon blind,
unmeaning pre judices--f or man is a most unwise and a
most wise being.
The individual is foolish; the
multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act
without deliberation; but the species is wise, and when
time is given to it, as a species it always acts right.
Here Burke seems to believe that the wisdom embodied in the

nation is inscrutable to our reason.
the vestment fit the body?

We can only ask, does

From Pocock's extended analysis

we can conclude that the arrival among radical reformers of
the idea that the constitution needed to return to its

original principles and the endless debate engendered by an

emphasis on original principles forced Burke to reconsider
the possibility of historical inquiry.

(The problem with

historical analysis will be taken up in the section on

historical inquiry.)

In conclusion,

Burke rejected both

natural right theories and arguments that turn on finding

original meanings.

Where does that leave social criticism?

Let us begin by examining his argument against rationalism,
a

particular type of criticism.
Burke and the Critique of Rationalism
Burke wrote in opposition to a way of thinking about

politics that has been characterized in our day as "rationalism ". 13

Burke described wrong-headed political thinking

with a variety of expressions.

The terms "abstract",

:
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"theoretical",

"mechanical",

"mathematical", and "meta-

physical" are sprinkled throughout his works, always

denoting misconceived politics.

14

His criticisms boil down

to the following claims:

The great advantage of abstract thinking, which is

!•)

simplicity,

is

realized only when we severely restrict what

2.

comes before the mind's eye.

However,

"abstract perfection"

is a "practical defect" because human affairs are neces-

sarily intricate and the "objects of society are of the
3.

greatest possible complexity." 15
)

Abstract reasoning takes us out of our feelings;

thinking abstractly is a state of mind in which our feelings
are distanced.

Ironically, when we distance ourselves from

our feelings we invite in socially destructive passions.
)

Burke describes the process of abstraction as "the

infinite void of the conjectural world."

17

The infinity of

the life of abstract thought is at odds with the practical

nature of politics.
The first claim raises the issue of the nature of

political reality while the second and third claims challenge the view that political judgment requires neutrality
or "distance"

from the subject of political questions.

three are obviously related.

reality

is

because

is because political

"complex" that the practice of considering human

affairs abstractly is harmful.
claim.

It

The

We shall focus on the first

Theoretical reason leads us into a blind alley
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All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded
on compromise and barter.
We balance inconveniences;
we give and take; we remit some rights that we may
enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens
that subtle disputants. °
If our

institutions, social practices and even our virtues

are founded on compromise, then the search for abstract

principles will turn up nothing but evidence of theoretical

contradiction and the failure to put ideals fully into
practice.

Clearly, political institutions and virtues are

ambiguous achievements, moral conflict
"goods")

lies at their core.

conflict of

(a

Their benefits and their

contribution to human happiness require striking a positive
balance in a situation that only offer a mix of negative and

positive consequences.

The achievement of something purely

good is not possible.
Burke is arguing more than just the view that because

political institutions have developed incrementally over a
long period they are necessarily admixtures of good and
evil,

a complicated structure of numerous attempts,

often

working at cross-purposes, to solve historically specific
problems.

The impurities of politics,

the necessity of

political compromise, cannot be blamed.
There is not, there never was, a principle of government under the heaven that does not in the very
pursuit of the good it proposes, naturally and inevitably lead into some inconveniences, which makes it
absolutely necessary to counterwork and weaken the
application of that first principle itself.
,

There is, by the essential fundamental constitution of
things a radical infirmity in all human contrivances;
and the weakness is often so attached to the very
perfection of our political mechanism that some defect

—

.
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in i t--something that stops short of its principle
something that controls, that mitigates, that moderates
it— becomes a necessary corrective to the evils that
the theoretic perfection would produce.
It

is not by historic accident

complex.

that institutions are

The explanation for the infirmity of our con-

trivances lies ultimately in the irreducible complexity of
social and moral reality.
Not surprisingly,

the difficulties of political action

amidst complexity is an argument for respecting settled
schemes.

Since experience of social complexi ty--of what

causes conveniences and inconveniences-- is the only source
of social knowledge,

given the individual's inability to

experience very much, we ought to avail ourselves of the
"general bank and capital of nations, and of ages

."

20

This critique of our reasoning powers fits in rather
well with his notion of prescriptive authority.

One

wonders, where does this leave our minds, our active powers
of reason?

Is doing justice simply a matter of conforming

to the requirements of the traditions

— that

general bank of

nations and of ages?
We can put Burke's traditionalism in proper perspective
if

we examine some of the traditions he so much admires.

What Burke celebrates as the wisdom bequeathed to us from
our ancestors includes a set of institutions that allow for

change

O

1

Nothing is more beautiful in the theory of parliament
than that principle or renovation, and union of
in our changes we are never
permanence and change
wholly old nor wholly new;... there are enough of the
the
old to preserve the unbroken traditionary chain of
.

.

.

t
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maxims and policies of our ancestors, and the law and
custom of parliament; and enough of the new to invigorate us and bring us to our true character by
being taken fresh from the mass of the people; and the
whole, though mostly composed of old members, have,
notwithstanding, a new character ...( my emphasis)
,

Elsewhere he writes in a similar vein that;
...there is a perpetual treaty and compromise going on,
sometimes openly, sometimes with less observat ion
i
will always be a matter of curious investigation to
discover the secret of this mutual imitation. ^2
.

.

.

"Mutual imitation" refers to how each part of the constitu-

tion limits and controls the others.

Although we cannot

penetrate the "secret" we reap the benefits of having

politics in which treaty and compromise occur.
words,

a

In other

the wisdom of our ancestors is evident in the

beneficial consequences their institutions produce for us.

Explaining how and why

it

works is not necessary in order to

appreciate the wisdom the institution encourages.
The theory of parliament is a process in which the old
and new mix to form a renewal of the traditional.

Here we

have an interpretive process in which the "old"

addressed

and confronted as well as the "new".

is

At least within

parliament we do not merely appreciate the benefits that
have been given to us by way of inheriting a constitution.
We come to know that wisdom,

ancestors.

the maxims and policies of our

It alone does not give us our

"true character".

Some sort of synthesis of traditions and the present is

suggested, otherwise a union of "permanence and change"

would not be possible.

The complexity of human affairs

derails "rationalism" but it does not prevent us from
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learning something about the "bank of ages".

His under-

standing of how parliament works to blend the old with the
new shows us that questions about the meaning of traditions
must be raised.

His incremental understanding of reform

saves him from having to know the bank of ages in complete
detail.

The "house" has been built; we never need to

rebuild from the foundation up.

That Burke is aiming for

some kind of synthesis of the past and the present in order
to appropriately apply traditions comes out clearly in his

criticism of the use of history in political argument.
Burke and the Critique of Historical Inquiry

Burke states clearly that historical inquiry, defined
as the attempt to cull lessons from history which may then

be applied to current events,

is not to be confused with

Having wisdom requires primarily the ability to

wisdom.

meet the challenges of exceptional situations.

Someone who

sees the present in terms of recurrences is not likely to

address adequately a new problem or situation.

emphatically put

it,

As Burke

"God forbid that we should attempt to

be wise by precedent."

Burke juxtaposed to a knowledge of

history the notion that the true principles of politics are
those of "morality enlarged ". 23

These principles "are not

formed out of events and characters, either present or

"History is a preceptor of prudence not of prin-

past."

ciples

"
.

Where do principles come from?

Not from history,

although history has something to teach us about prudent
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action.

History informs prudence but prudence requires more

than a history lesson in order to be wisdom--which is to say
that the wisdom of our ancestors is not accessible to us

when we strive to imitate them.

We cannot copy down their

wisdom, codify it, and then apply it.

Principles are

"living" and productive", whereas case studies culled from a

study of history are "dead things" which have little bearing
on the aspects of contemporary life which are unique 24
.

Prudence in new cases can do nothing on grounds of
retrospect.
A constant vigilance and attention to the
train of things as they successfully emerge, and to act
on what they direct, are the only sure courses.
However, not everything is in flux.

Prudence combines "the

principles of original justice with the infinite variety of
human concerns

."

25

Circumstances perpetually variable, dissecting a moral
prudence and discretion, the general principles of
which never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct
fitting on such occasions 26
*.

Thus the principles of original justice never vary and yet

they are "living and productive".

The principles of

original justice are also the principles of an enlarged
morality.

In this latter sense justice is both productive,

open to change and "constant".

General principles are

inadequate guides to just and wise action but still have

significance because of their relation to experience of the
past.

Principles are inadequate because they are unrelated

to novel events.

As we have noted above, Burke grew disenchanted with

political debate which took its bearings from a reading of

^

.

49

history, particularly when a reading of history was
used to

assert the original intent of an institution, a social
practice, or tradition.-^

Frequently Burke's alleged

restrictive notion of epistemology is cited.

We simply

cannot know the grounds and the reasons constituting the

wisdom of our inheritance 28
.

In the following passage Burke

notes a negative consequence of the tendency to look

backwards into the past for wisdom.

He sharply attacks

"historical patriotism" for its indolent
ness

s

imple-minded-

.

...many a stern republican, after gorging himself with
feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths
and of our true Saxon constitution, and discharging all
the splendid bile of his virtuous indignation of King
John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied to
the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives
a full

in

He goes on to add,

"historical patriotism" is a "thing[s] of

wonderful convenience"

.

The historical patriot in his

reverie sleeps through the important concerns of the day.
In his action the stern republican is no different from the

most abject servant of the kingdom.

The traditionalist

loves the past without being able to see the relationship of

past to present.

He is blind to the differences that

distinguish the present from the past.

The traditionalist

fails to see the relation of present to the past because a

nostalgia for the past takes the place of "a constant

vigilance and attention to the train of things as they

successfully emerge."

Although Burke firmly links an

awareness of the present to understanding the past

,

^he look
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backwards,

is not a turn to a history book of

recorded

happenings, nor is it a set of case studies, a list of
precedents, or maxims handed down to us.

Rather, Burke's

turn backward toward the past is an introspective turn

towards the prejudices that structure our self-understanding.

Looking backwards to the ancestors amounts to placing

our inherited concepts, categories, and tradit ions--our pre-

judgments in Gadamer

1

s

sense— under the pressure

of an

inquiry that attends closely to newly emerging events.

Looking backward to the ancestors requires that we renew the

question of what is right and just (this is the meaning of
the imperative that we enlarge our sense of morality)

.

We

must also be oriented toward receiving that question and

understanding the answers our ancestors gave.

Being pulled

toward the world of one's ancestors is a prerequisite to

"looking backward ". 30

Elsewhere Burke warns that the preference for things
old and for the past is often the result of comparing the

faults of the present age which lie right before us to an
ideal image of the past whose problems are conveniently

forgotten.

3

^

Burke is,

I

think, making a distinction that

the turn to traditions must consider.

To look back searchingly for the wisdom of the past is
not the key to actions that are "practical" and are grounded
in our inheritance.

The penchant for history,

for finding

blind
truth and "right" in the lives of our ancestors, can

theoretical
us just as surely as the infinite conjectures of

.
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reason.

In interpreting Burke we must face squarely a

particular dilemma: respect for the gift of our inheritance
necessitates a presumption that our ancestors had wisdom but
that this wisdom is both incomplete and inactive if we

passively accept the gift.

The arguments of Bruce James

Smith and Paul Lucus which stress Burke's antipathy to
inquiry into our inheritance are off the mark for two
reasons.

Burke's notion of inheritance contains the

ingredients of an orientation towards the past which is not
0^

traditionalist.

Burke's concept of justice is not an

apologia for tradition.

In fact his notion of justice

demands that we put pressure on our traditions.
Burke's frequent uncompromising statements on prescriptive authority ("the sole basis of our constitution") ought
to be read against the backdrop of statements which run in

the opposing direction.

To cite just one example, Burke

sometimes explains what he means by "prescription" in very
He links belief in prescription to a just

practical terms.

political order, valuing the consequences of the belief
higher than the question concerning its truth.

33

am in trust religiously to maintain the rights and
properties of all descriptions of people in the
possession which legally they hold; and in the rule by
I do
which alone they can be secure in any possession.
a
as
or
man,
a
as
either
liberty
not find myself at
trustee for men, to take a vested property from one
man, and to give it to another, because I think that
the portion of one is too great, and that of another
too smal 1
The calling of men by the names of "pampered and
luxurious prelates", etc., is in you no more than a
mark of your dislike to intemperance ... but in others it
It is often used to
is used for other purposes.
I

.

.

.
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extinguish the sense of justice in our minds, and
natural feelings of humanity in our bosoms.
Burke is not merely citing religious faith on behalf of

prescription.

He is linking an attitude of mind,

that of

respecting the possessions of others to our sense of
justice,

implying that those who do not respect the property

of others also falsely accuse others of being "pampered"

The enemies of property endanger the sense of justice within
the community.
of prescription,

justice.

Rather than define justice simply in terms
Burke is subordinating prescription to

Respecting prescriptive authority is not the

essence of justice.

Before taking up the question of

justice and social criticism within Burke's thought, we
shall examine the critical space within what
be Burke's most significant concept,

I

consider to

that of inheritance.

Burke and the Concept of Inheritance

Inheritance is a concept that occupies a central place
in Burke's political philosophy.

It

links Burke to the

efforts of MacIntyre and Walzer to situate us in traditions.
It

is through the idea of

inheritance that Burke attempts to

evoke a sense of our dependence on the past in terms of a
moral obligation not to squander the gift given to us by our

parents and ancestors.

On a basic level our inheritance is

simply a set of prejudices that we have grown into.
"Inheritance" is more than the physical property passed down
from one generation to the next.

We shall see that Burke

understood our inheritance to include ideas and attitudes ot
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mind.

As we would for the sake of our children improve
our

property so must we improve our culture.
Burke described the English as a people of "untaught
feeling", who instead of casting away all the old prejudices,

"cherish them to a considerable degree", and even

cherish them "because they are prejudices.""^

Burke is

attributing to the English character a fondness for the
local and particular.

For it is only at the level of the

family and neighborhood where we can speak of untaught

feelings

— feelings

that grew into us, so to speak, as we

matured from child to adult.

Burke is affirming the

relation of affection and love with the particular and
local,

but within an argument that ties these "prejudices"

to broader publics.

To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little
platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle
(the germ as it were) of public affections.
It is the
first link in the series by which we proceed towards a
love to our country, and to mankind.
In other words,

the prejudice for the local is only the

beginning of developing an understanding of public things,
of a public philosophy.

Burke is not maintaining that local

understandings and concepts, what we might call our initial
prejudices, should never be altered.

Elsewhere Burke writes, "No cold relation is a zealous
citizen." Burke explains:
We pass on to our neighbourhoods, and our habitual
These are inns and resting
provincial connexions.
Such divisions of our country as have been
places.
formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority,
were so many little images of the great country in
which the heart found something which it could fill.

.
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Larry Adams has described this process of political
maturation which begins in the family and culminates in a love
felt toward mankind as "a series of enlarging affections".^
As we move from family and town to the inns which lie at
the

crossroads of towns our moral life is enlarged as it takes
in and considers the views of others who are at first

strangers but who become part of a place a "heart could
f

ill"

.

Prejudices ought to be thought of as building blocks of
involvements that take us beyond the "local", beyond our
first "home".

Political and moral education necessitates a

transformation of our initial political/moral moorings.
However, Burke, as we shall see, intimates that we must

never reject our birthplace nor break our initial bonds of
affection.

Any enlarged affections must give earlier

understandings due consideration and due respect.
"No cold relation is a zealous citizen" sums up Burke's

understanding nicely.

Political life depends on a love of

public things and respect for the laws and political
traditions that constitute political life.

Only someone who

has experienced the loving warmth of family life will

participate in politics with wisdom.

For the "warm rela-

tions", politics becomes a family affair requiring a defense
of the ancestral

inheritance and a series of enlarging

affections
There are several compelling reasons for why family

relationships ought to be important for the character of the

55

relationships we form in the world beyond the family.

If no

initial attachment is made in childhood one may find forming

affective relationships latter in life extremely difficult.
The family is an agent of socialization, a place where

morality is taught and individual desires are curbed.

The

political order is obviously dependent on the family in this
way.

However,

the family (we ought to be thinking of an

extended family) is no mere school for national politics.
The prejudice for one's family motivates one to see the past
as an inheritance.

The family is not just the place where

the individual's sense of self is enlarged;

it

is aiso the

place that nurtures a respect and love for the accomplish-

ments of one's ancestors.

The individual is lifted out of

the present to face the past by way of the emotional forces

constituting the family.

Moral development for Burke is not

just a matter of growing outward beyond the local and

particular.

Vital is the retrospective turn which by

putting us in touch with the world of our fathers involves
us in the complexity of our moral, political world which is,
of course,

a product of history.

As we elaborate Burke's notion of inheritance and

consider the political relevance of the

'family", we will

discover that Burke did not believe family life to be
innocent of internal conflicts.

Nor did he think that our

inheritance was somehow a "pure", unambiguous good.

We

may also add that binding politics to the emotional storms
and stresses of the family may prove to have liabilities for
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a

critical traditionalism.

criticizing the

These may range from a fear of

'fathers" to an overwhelming desire to be

rid of the fathers above all else.

Inheritance plays on the natural feelings we have
toward our family, our father and mother, our grandparents.

Inheritance evokes feelings that motivate responsibility and
an obligation to live up to what we have been given.

Minimally, we should not waste their gift.

Better, would be

to add to the gift for the sake of future generations.

The

love for one's parents may include an obligation to undertake actions which do justice to their memory.

The desire

not to be ashamed before one's parents may cause an in-

ability to depart from the ways of the ancestors, a paralysis before the "canonized fathers" as Bruce James Smith

noted in his critical commentary on Burke.

That Burke did

not hold this view is clear from his writings and from his
life.

Burke rejected the career his father preferred without

cutting himself off emotionally from his father.

Even as we

strike out on our own we find that our parents cannot be
ignored.

When estranged from them we seek reconciliation.

Burke, although he reportedly called himself a son fleeing
his father, never broke off his relationship and made

several efforts to obtain his father's consent to his choice
of

profession.^

Further evidence for the significance of

the family for understanding the concept of inheritance is

.

.
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found in a well-known passage in which Burke eontasts

relationships founded on consent from those based on duty.
Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into
the world.
The instincts which give rise to this
mysterious process of nature are not of our making.
But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps
unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able
perfectly to comprehend, we are bound indispensably to
perform ... consent ing or not, they (the parents) are
bound to a long train of burthensome duties towards
those with whom they have never made a convention of
any sort.
Children are not consenting to their
relation, but their relation, without their actual
consent, binds them to its duties; or rather it implies
their consent because the presumed consent of every
rational creature is in unison with the predisposed
order of things ... power ful instincts make this duty
40
clear
.

.

We come into the world not as individuals choosing our

commitments but as a member of a family, bound to a particular order of generation.

Our instinctual love--this

prejudice-- for our parents carries with
are in debt to them.

it

the sense that we

Our affection for our family reveals

that we have moral obligations and duties toward members of

our family.

These obligations bind and extend across

generations
Of course,

the introduction of familial affections as

the source of obligation opens many possible possible

orientations towards the past

— as

many as there are at-

titudes towards family relations.

In addition to the desire

to justify oneself to one's parents

— to

do one's name proud-

-there is the heavier burden of redeeming the sacrifices and

sorrows of the parents'

lives.

The feeling of guilt ior not

adequately paying back to the parents the gifts received and
the sacrifices made is not uncommon.

Treating traditions
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as an inheritance goes far beyond simply respecting the

elders to a deeper obligation (and entanglement), one which

extends to define an entire self, giving purpose (and

supplying burdens) that draws one into the past as it sends
one out into the future.

We might say that for Burke

receiving the gift of inheritance is the duty of a good son.
To give the gift to the next generation is the duty of a

good father.

But in fact the situation is hardly this

simple 41
.

For instance,

if

the ancestors were victims, their

children may believe that they have obligation to seek
revenge.

The politics of traditions would be colored by a

quest for vengeance.

If

the ancestors were, on the other

hand, guilty of some crime,

their children might seek to

acquit the debt of the ancestors.

They would be in the

difficult situation of acknowledging the guilt of their
parents while still loving them.

One can find support for

at least four different types of relationships in Burke's

writings.

In the "soft version",

respect for our inheritance

restrains us but never to the point of interfering with
justice.

The look backward to our ancestors means that we

seek always to improve upon the past in a spirit of respect
for the wisdom of what has passed the test of time.

The

habit of respect and deference to the world of our fathers
and mothers supports the habit of considering not our

immediate wants and desires but the future prospects of our

.

,
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children.

Our feelings towards are ancestors are rather

unambiguous
An exactly opposite interpretation of Burke has been

articulated by Bruce James Smith.

For him, Burke's fathers

are likely to be the "canonized fathers" and constitution

solely a "prescriptive constitution " 42

The fathers are

good and great (their portraits hang over us in the halls of
our rooms) and we are little--humbled

men— in

comparison.

A number of variations is obviously possible.

If

fear

replaces gratitude for the gift of our inheritance, we are
not simply humbled, we are enthralled by our great ancestors.

Again quoting Smith paraphrasing Burke, our freedom

tempered with an "awe-ful gravity"

is

.

In this interpreta-

tion the ancestors are part of the "great mysterium of
nature".

If

they are "sublime",

they strike terror into

us 43
.

A variation of the soft version would note that we

continue traditions so as not to disappoint the "old man"

.

Wanting the love and affection of our parents draws us into
44
defending their world and their understandings
.

Respect

might actually be tied to feelings of pity or the desire not
to abandon one's parents because they have so little.

In reading Burke one finds evidence for several of

these type of family relationships.

We know from Burke

s

private life that he took very seriously his obligation to
to
his son and keenly felt the burden of his relationship

his father.

Probably in reaction to the domineering

.
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influence his own father tried to exercise over him he

argued that parents are "made for their children and not

children for them"

.

After a certain time parents ought to

slide out of life, and let the children gradually into the

succession.

11

^5

Burke also felt how much children meant to their
parents.

The "tender satisfaction" of being a parent is the

"only indemnification" one has for "all his cares and

sorrows" 46

We can see how the look backward to the ances-

tors may include moral obligation to heal the parent of his

cares and sorrows.

Even if the father is not to be canon-

ized we would only with great reluctance alienate his

affections and deprive him of his only "indemnification".
That Burke willingly alienated his father when he gave
up legal studies shows he did not understand the obligation
to the past

to necessitate subordination of son to father.

One may flee the father's house without rejecting the

"inheritance".

Of course,

one must return home.

One will

return home to the house of one's father, love and duty
require no less, but never on terms dictated by the father.

Burke returned home only after intermediaries softened the
elder Burke's hostility and only after his father gave

symbolic approval to Burke's literary pursuits.
If we

treat Burke's relationship with his father as

paradigmatic for how we ought to relate to our inheritance,
then we can argue that although love and duty forces us to

look backward to the past, we nevertheless find that we must

.

.

.

.
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leave home

— we

cannot live for the past but only for the

present and for the future.

Finally, we must return home;

but this means finding a way of making good our obligation

without sacrificing our individuality.

Our world is

different from the world of our fathers.

In terms of making

wise policy decisions we can say with Burke that stale

precedent and case studies are a poor substitute for active
and living principles that address the uniqueness of the

present

Burke's most extended statement on inheritance supports
the view that our appropriation of our inheritance is in

fact an appropriation and not a repetition or imitation of
the father's world.

...it has been the uniform policy of our constitution
to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed
inheritance derived to us from our forefathers
...This policy appears to me to be the result of
profound reflection; or rather the happy effect of
following nature, which is wisdom without reflection,
and above it.
A spirit of innovation is generally the
People
result of a selfish temper, and confined views.
never
look
will not look forward to posterity, who
backward to their ancestors. Besides the people of
England well know that the idea of inheritance
furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure
principle of transmission; without at all excluding a
It leaves acquisition free;
principle of improvement.
Whatever advantages
but it secures what it acquires.
on these maxims, are
proceeding
are obtained by a state
settlement
family
locked fast as in a sort of
working after the pattern of nature we receive, we
hold, we transmit our government, and our privileges,
in the same manner we enjoy and transmit our property
The institutions of policy, the goods
and our lives
of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed to us
in the same course and order
.

.

.

.

.

The passage establishes that Burke conceived of the rela-

tionship to past in terms of family life.

By "following

62

nature" and acting on our natural feelings of
obligation we
look backward to our ancestors.
But looking to family

life

in ways that go beyond what Burke's explicit use of the
idea
is

also appropriate.

Literally "inheritance" refers to

physical goods like wealth and land.
the "goods of fortune,

When Burke says that

the gifts of providence, and institu-

tions of policy" are transmitted in the "same course and
order" as an inheritance from parent to descendent

,

the

concept of inheritance is stretched to include goods which
must be understood in order to be passed down from one

generation to the next.

One final quote illustrating the

connection between the family and inheritance testifies to
the extent to which Burke linked politics and remembrance to
the affections of family life.

...In this choice of inheritance we have given to our
frame of politics the image of a relation in blood;
binding up the constitution of our country with our
dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws
into the bosom of our family affections; keeping
inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all
their combined and mutually reflected charities, our
state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars 49
.

In this passage Burke allows for criticism,

but only within

the "family"--in other words, a restrained criticism which

seeks to perfect the inheritance.
Let us
Let us improve it with zeal, but with fear.
follow our ancestors, men not without a rational,
though without an exclusive confidence in themselves;
who by respecting the reason of others, who by looking
backward as well as forward, by the modesty as well as
by the energy of their minds, went on, insensibly
drawing this constitution nearer and nearer to its
perfection, by never departing from its fundamental
principles nor introducing any amendment which had not
a subsisting root in the laws, the constitution, and
usages of the kingdom 50
,

.

.
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As

I

have suggested the possibilities of criticism within

the family depend very much upon the character of those

family relationships.

If we take the soft version as our

guide we can say that Burkean social criticism requires that
we first seek to understand our ancestors before we commence

with criticism.

"Respecting the reason of others" denotes

an open attitude of mind and a willingness to suspend
disbelief.

Not surprisingly, Burke maintains we ought to

venerate where "we are not presently able to understand"
Notice also that the ancestors looked backward as well as
forward; they did not have an "exclusive confidence in

themselves".

Such men would not expect their sons to abide

without deviation to their decisions.
An examination of Burke as a social critic builds an

even stronger case for the soft version, or something close
to it.

However, whatever position we eventually ascribe to

Burke will not affect the more general question of the

character of a relationship to traditions which
through the emotive life of the family.

is

mediated

The specific

obligations such traditions convey will depend on particular
historical events.

To take a simple example, what if

Burke's ancestors had been Nazis?
tion

— the

look backward

— would

The relation to tradi-

be dramatically different.

The English chewing their cud around the great oak tree of
the constitution would receive a strikingly different

interpretation by a "guilty" son.^

.
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B urke as a Socia l Cr itic

We have seen how the space for the criticism of

traditions within Burkean traditionalism is threatened by
filial piety,

though we have also seen that standing before

the sepulchers of ancestors does not rule out improving our

inheritance nor reconsidering our inheritance.^

It

is

therefore time to look more closely at Burke the social
critic.

We can outlined Burke's concept of justice

2.
according
to the following precepts:
1

We cannot act wisely by acting according to

)

precedent.

"God forbid that we attempt to be wise according

to precedent".

Burke argues that case studies and the

precedents derived from them fail to address new situations.
Arguments for justice on the grounds of original

)

principles or original intent are generally speaking
3.

interminable.

We will never agree on who had first posses-

sion or on what original principle underlies a given
institution.

The search for "truth" is not to be confused

with justice.

Even if we could discover or settle on an

interpretation of original intent we must question whether
settling this issue has any bearing on justice.

We shall

see that Burke did nonetheless criticize "titles" and

specific property rights.
)

At the same time Burke speaks of the "principles of

original justice, meaning however, not a fixed standard but
rather the principle of an enlarged morality which is living
and productive yet constant--i

.

e

.

,

"original".

.
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4.

)

Essential to acting justly is a "troublesome

application",

the willingness to extend our sympathy to

5.

others, and an attentiveness to the conseguences of our own

feelings and prejudices.
)

Our judgment will be misled unless we must watch

the operation of our feelings (including our prejudices). 54

The rejection of the search for truth is part of

Burke's attempt to bring the quest for justice in close

alignment with the complexity of political reality.
The practical consequences of any political tenet go a
great way in deciding upon its value.
Political
problems do not primarily concern truth or falsehood.
They relate to good or evil. What in the result is
that
likely to produce evil, is politically false;
which is productive of good, politically true. 55

Truthseeking is a habit of mind that fails to grasp the

wisdom of compromising principles and working with mixtures
of good and evil.

It

tends towards extremes in order to

remain pure in concept

Questions concerning title, who really deserves to have
what and how much, detract from real, answerable questions
of abuse and evils. 56

When I first came into a public trust, I found your
parliament in possession of an unlimited legislative
I could not open the statute
power over the colonies.
exercise of it, more or
actual
the
seeing
book, without
possession passed
This
whatsoever.
less, in all cases
human affairs.
all
in
so
does
It
with me for a title.
to his
title
his
of
defects
the
into
No man examines
government.
established
his
to
or
paternal estate,
broad
Burke is objecting to criticism which begins with the

question of just title.

Burke would oppose any notion of

distributive economic justice which attempted to distribute
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income according to some ideal pattern.

But he is far from

rejecting a narrowly defined question directed toward a
specific abuse.

Burke's shift in attitude toward the East

India Company is a case in point.

When Burke first came into contact with the affairs of
the East India Company he let it be known that he had no

disagreement with the prescriptive right of the company's
charter.

However, after he became better acquainted with

the company's conduct he attacked the privileges set down in

the charter, arguing that the company abused the trust given
C

7

,-

Since all political power, including "every

to it.

species of political domination and every description of

commercial privilege",

"ought to be exercised some way or

other for their (i.e.,

those who are subject to the exercise

of power and privilege)

benefit", power is ultimately a

trust "to be rendered accountable
T
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he "Popery Laws" consisted of various pieces of

legislation designed to undermine the Catholic religion in
Ireland.

Although the "Tract on the Popery Laws" never

became a public speech it did circulate among politicians
who influenced policy on Ireland

.

Burke begins his

argument with a catalogue of the various harms Catholics
suffer because of the laws.

Burke is asking his audience to

consider or watch the effects of their prejudicial feeling
against Irish Catholics.

Catholics cannot obtain a univer-

sity education nor may they teach.

They are prohibited from

political office, from the professions of the law and the
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military.

rheir right to own property is interfered with to

the extent that farmers cannot obtain loans because
they

have no collateral.

Burke details the destructive effects the laws have on
the Catholic family.

"Paternal power is enervated" because

children are given the legal right to determine and obtain
portions of their inheritance.

Family relations are

poisoned by allowing the parent who gave up the Catholic
faith the right to deprive the remaining Catholic parent of
his or her parental rights.

Here we find Burke detailing

the effects of the English prejudice against Catholicism

noting their destructive impact on family relations.

Next

we find Burke justifying why closely attending to the

consequences of English policy toward Catholic Irish,

especially their moral effects,

is so critical.

His attack

on "moral platitudes" articulates an important principle of

justice.

Mere general truths interfere very little with the
passions. .until they are roused by a troublesome
appl icat ion ... when they know them only as barren
speculations, and not as practical motives for conduct,
it will be proper to press, as well as offer them to
the understanding; and when one is attacked by prejudices which aim to intrude themselves into the place
of law, what is left for us but to vouch and call to
warranty those principles of original justice from
whence alone our title to everything valuable in
society is derived 60
.

.

Burke realizes that nearly everyone recognizes "equity" as

central to justice, but few will see the Popery Laws as

inequitable unless they attempt the task of applying the

principles of justice.

Calling to account the principles of

68

original justice requires situating them in a context of
an
in just ice--relat ing them to present realities--f or
otherwise

principles are nothing more than "barren speculations".
Burke proceeds to relate the situation of Irish Catholics to

equity and public utility, showing how our respect for
justice requires the repeal of the Popery Laws.

Neither equity nor public utility are abstract principles of right.

"Equity grows out of the great rule of

equality, which is grounded upon our common human nature".

6

^-

Equity demands respect towards others; it does not describe
a precise set of goods that we owe to others.

We ought to

listen to grievances and seek mutual understanding.

Because we have a common nature mutual understanding is both

possible and a moral obligation.

We also deepen our own

sense of justice and our understanding of our nature by

opening ourselves to their grievances, by "extending"
Enlarging our sense of morality deepens

sympathy to them.

our understanding of human nature.

Burke concerned himself

quite often with the temper of politics.

He seemed acutely

aware of the importance of nurturing conditions favorable to
mutual understanding and sympathy.

In a letter on Irish

affairs sent to Sir Langrishe Burke criticized politicians
for "insulting the understandings" and "galling the feel-

ings" of Catholics 62
.

For Burke sympathy is the most significant social

virtue.

Sympathy is the way "by which we enter into the

concerns of others" and become moved as they are moved.

63

.
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We see from a review of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral

Sentiments the central importance Burke gave to sympathy.
..the author seeks for the foundation of the just, the
fit, the proper, the decent in our most common and

allowed passions; and making approbation and disapprobation the tests of virtue and vice and showing that
those are founded on sympathy, he raises from this
simple truth one of the beautiful fabrics of moral
64
theory
.

.

.

As to how we become "sympathetic", Burke adds that "it is

with the use of our imagination that we can form a conception of what others feel."

We do this by entering into

their situation and "by bringing the case home to our-

selves."

We enter into the situation of another in an

immediate way when a sad look suddenly affects us.

Most of

the time, however, we need to understand the occasion on

order to grasp the emotion 65
.

Bringing the case home to us

requires that we understand the situation of the other which

entails more than just a description of the plight of the
other
We might want to think of bringing the case home in a

literal way to mean we ought to consider the other as a

family member.

During the long and drawn out impeachment

hearings of Warren Hastings, Burke gave his servants Indian
names so he would be constantly reminded of Hasting's crimes

against the Indian people 66
.

In addition to detailing the

moral effects of the laws punishing Catholicism, Burke

provokes a "troublesome application" in his readers with

arguments that show how the Popery Laws assault widely

recognized social and political traditions.

If

"a law which

.
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shuts out from all secure and valuable property the bulk
of
the people",

can be made for "the utility of the party so

excluded", how will we ever distinguish tyrannical rule from
e<3

u ^^- a kle rule?

If we

maintain that the laws are "reform-

atory" and designed to bring Catholics over to a better

religion, what sense can we make of religious persecution?®®

Burke is appealing to the often acclaimed political prin-

ciples (their political inheritance) of his audience hoping
to strike

"home"

The argument against the Popery Laws in general depends
on the vitality of certain political principles or maxims
(take the threat of tyranny and religious persecution

seriously) and on a concern for family life.

The stress on

the problem of application indicates that justice must be

understood in terms that address the aspects of novelty in
the present.

Thus we see the commitment Burke mades to

being faithful to the uniqueness of the concrete and
immediate situation.

We can also assume that for Burke to

be effective in dislodging the English from their prejudice,

for his arguments to have even the possibility of hitting

home,

his audience must be capable of having sympathy for

Irish Catholics.

They must understand the English political

inheritance and feel an obligation to continue

prejudice is in conflict with it.

it

even when

Sympathy is obviously not

the initial reaction of the English to the Catholic ques-

tion,

but perhaps it can evoked by addressing the devoted

fathers of his audience (consider the effects the Popery
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laws have on their families), or by drawing
attention to the

wisdom of the English political tradition.
Burke did not always take the direct approach employed
in

the

speech against the Popery Laws"

.

As one might

expect of a politician moral aims were often related to the

political exigencies of the moment.

During a period of

difficulty for British military Burke recommended that a
division of Catholic soldiers be organized under their own
officers for service in Portugal.

Burke cited not only the

needed bolstering of military strength, but also argued that

organizing a Scottish brigand helped quiet discontent among
the Scottish Highlanders

.® 9

Burke's position on the slave trade shows the caution
of someone striving to add only benefits to the inheritance.

Gradualism in policy making has the advantage of permitting
a carefully calculation of benefits.

But the rationality of

developing policy and achieving justice incrementally

is

dependent upon the idea of partnership, specifically the
fact that descendants will pick up where one has left off.

Although Burke voted at least once to abolish slavery,
a

measure which failed to pass, his letter to Dundas

contained a proposal to regulate slave trade which included
provisions to provide for the education and medical needs of
slaves and also encouraged family life.

In his proposal

he argued that the "donation of freedom must be preceded by

dispensing the minds of the objects to a disposition to
71
receive it without danger to themselves or to us".
it

The
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restraint of slavery "cripples the minds of men"
do nothing for themselves".

they can

;

The conviction that the

"planter you must at once restrain and support; and you must
control, at the same time you ease, the servant" guides

Burke's approach.

Fundamental is the statement he makes at

the end of his proposal.

He describes his reform as "but a

beginning of a course of measures, which an experience of
the effects of evil and the reform will enable the Legisla-

ture hereafter to supply and correct."

Burke does not worry

that there may be only one historic opportunity to end

slavery.

His faith in future legislatures and in the

vitality of English political institutions is strong.

The

inheritance will be passed down to future generations.

The

relationship of generations, the partnership of mankind,
promotes more than a cautious approach to reform.

Political

action appears more rational, more compelling to take up,
when the context of politics includes homage to the dead, a

related obligation to future generations, and assurance that
even if

I

am forgotten my political acts survive in the

context of future political thought and deeds.

The concept

of inheritance is thus central to the arguments Burke makes

on behalf of justice.

Even the attempt to gain sympathy for

the Irish Catholic by describing their "pitiful" condition,

which might be construed as a reaching out for the heart of
the English in some immediate,

personal way, ultimately

hinges on dislodging the English prejudice.

To accomplish

that task Burke directs his reader to their political

73

inheritance,

their "bank" of wisdom.

Of course, as a father

one ought to be immediately affected by stories of
troubled

Irish families.

The protestant has a simple retort:

Irish need only give up their Catholicism.

The

The troubled

English father may take refuge in the thought that the
Catholics are deserving of their misery or that they must
suffer in order to be rid of Catholicism.

We find Burke

even responding to the view that the "preventive persecution" of a minority enhances public safety, calling it a

policy "rotten, hollow at bottom".

Eliciting sympathy and

enlarging moral sensibilities

is

argument for justice causes

"troublesome application" to

a

difficult unless the

our unreflective use of tradition.

Inheritance and the "Partnership"
The significance of accepting our inher i tance--of seeing the
past as something to which we are obi igated--f or political
life and for the historical sense of a community is force-

fully illustrated in a passage which echoes through the work
of MacIntyre and Walzer whenever they attempt to articulate
a historical community,
t

ime

a

community with the depth of past

.

the state ought not to be considered as nothing
better than a partnership agreement in a trade of
pepper and coffee. .It is to be looked upon on with
other reverence; because it is not a partnership in
things subservient only to the gross animal existence
It is a partnerof a temporary and perishable nature.
ship in all science; a partnership in all art; a
partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As
the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in
many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are
living and those who are dead, and those who are to be
.

.

.

.

3

.
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born.
Each contract of each particular state is but a
clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal
society, linking the lower and higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a
fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which
holds all physical and moral natures, each in their
appointed place.
1

The state,

the laws and the ins t i tut ions

inheritance

— is

ners"?

a

"partnership".

— our

political

But what makes us "part-

What experience or experiences lie behind and

motivate a partnership capable of binding past, present, and
future generations?

Since the ends of art, science, and

virtue cannot be attained in any one lifetime, we are, as
our fathers and mothers were, dependent on future genera-

tions to continue our work and carry on our life's projects.
It

would seem that the very rationality of our actions

depends on the vitality of the partnership and the expectation that our descendants will understand and choose to

continue our art, science, and virtue.

If there is no sense

of being in partnership with generations past and future,

then much of human action becomes senseless.

Only a

senseless death can follow a life of senseless acts.

The

son or daughter comes face-to-face with the question of how
the deaths in their family can have sense.

continue their projects, their work

— to

One answer is to

somehow take up

where they left off.
...As the ends or such a partnership cannot be obtained
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are
and those who are dead, and those who are to be
1 ivin
?4
born
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We are obligated to the dead and to those yet
to be
born.
is

The imperative lodged in the obligation to the dead

tempered,

think, by the obligation to those unborn.

I

Consideration of future generations forces us to "attend to
the train of things as they successfully emerge" and not
be

blinded or overwhelmed by the obligation to the dead.
The notion of each generation ("each particular state")

connected to the other according to a fixed compact set,
"each in their appointed place", belies any notion of deep

seated conflict.

The statement testifies to Burke's strong

belief in the essential unity of the partnership.

In

practical terms, the essential unity of the partnership
means that we have the power and the ability to fulfill our

obligations to the dead and to the unborn.

The divine

origin of all obligation enforces our duty not with the
threat of retribution in the next life but with the promise
that God has given us the wherewithal necessary to fulfilling our obligations.

If

we should, we can.

There is nothing that God has judged good for us, that
"The
he has not given us the means to accomplish."
divine author of our being has virtually subjected us
to act the part which belongs to the place assigned
us

75
.

Clearly, Burke understood the partnership of generations in

religious terms, though whether we must ultimately share his

religious metaphysics remains to be answered.

consecrates human history, calling
providence}."

7<

^

It

it

Burke clearly

the "known march of

may be the case that the notion of

providence helps to underwrite a tragic sense of life and

.
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make psychologically easier (by lessening the demand for

coherence)

the difficult task of meeting the dual obliga-

tions to past and to future.

In other words,

if

we are

assigned our place providentially, then we are more able to
care for the future of our children and remain good, dutiful
sons and daughters--no easy task 77
.

If we compare Burke's partnership to MacIntyre's

concept of the narrative unity of life, we find some

similarities.

Both speak of a partnership that runs through

history and unites generations in a common enterprise.

For

MacIntyre we ought to speak of separate common enterprises
and the common enterprise of the search for the good life
for man.

The desire to pursue a practice and realize the

good internal to the practice links us to the past because
we must,

if we are

to become violinists,

who are adept at playing the violin 78
.

learn from those

Virtually any

practice we desire to take up requires our subordination to
the standards governing the practice.
to mimic past masters;

tutelage.

We are not required

we must only begin under their

Today's standard evolves in history by the very

process of taking up yesterday's standard through constant

practice
When we turn to the common enterprise, the question of
linkage to the past is much more of an issue— we have

stepped beyond the craft analogy of masters and apprentices.
That we ought to subject ourselves to the authority of the

tradition of seeking answers to the question of what is the
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good for man and to those who speak most authoritatively on
the moral tradition is less apparent than in crafts.

MacIntyre himself shifts his discussion away from crafts and

practice to the concept of narrative, where the search for
intelligibility drives us backwards into history and into
the moral tradition.

After Virtue itself is an excellent

example of how MacIntyre conceives of narrative unity.

His

initial discussion of the failure of the enlightenment

project led him to write a history of the concept of virtue
that stretches back to Homeric Greece.

The drive into narrative history and thus the concep-

tion of partnership we find in After Virtue is very different from the Burkean notion.

The quest for intel-

ligibility is foremost in After Virtue whereas in Burke
moral obligation to the past predominates.

Moreover,

a

this

obligation to the past has the very human texture of family
life pervading it.

We can describe the difference in terms

of two different questions.

selves, how can

I

For MacIntyre, we ask our-

make sense of my life--what is the best

life for man generally and for me in particular?
ask,

Burkeans

how shall we act so as to improve and not diminish our

inheritance, bearing in mind that we stand before the

sepulchers of our departed ancestors?
The intelligibility of human action is less pressing
for Burke because of his religious belief in a divinely

sanctioned order.

Burkeans are immediately caught up in the

world of their fathers.

They are bound to the past by the
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strength of their love or fear.

MacIntyre is looking for

consistency; his quest (his exhuming of the past)

is

directed toward settling the issue of what is the right way
to live.

MacIntyre is without the assurances of

Providence.

Therefore, he must find certainty in his

interpretation of human action in the context of an narrative of history.

Burkeans endure their hardships because their place is
set in God's appointment book.

MacIntyre's traditionalist

plumbs the historical depths in order to be certain of the

rationality of his action.

The significance of the quest

for intelligibility is clear in a passage concerning the

narrative unity of life 80
.

The "central importance of the

concept of intelligibility" lies in its relationship to the
fact that we are accountable for that of which we are the

authors.

Since we are the authors of our actions we must be

willing to give an account of them.

We must do this by

placing our acts in the context of a history or

a

narrative

in which short-term intentions are related to long-term

intentions and our intentions themselves are embedded in the

narrative in which we find ourselves.

Only actions that can

situated in a narrative are intelligible and thus responsible.

What counts as intelligible is ultimately a matter

of social discourse.

Each of us holds the other to account

for the intelligibility of his actions.

For instance,

MacIntyre turns to a history of the concept of virtue
make sense of and defend his disagreement with the En-

to

.
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lightenment view of the self.

In his theoretical discourse

the drive to intelligibility requires addressing everyone

who holds or even held a position on virtue.

Indeed,

justification before all of human history is necessary.
Burke's rejection of theory and "rationalism" would
include rejection of MacIntyre's neo-Hegelian intellectualizing.

Burke's immediate attachment to traditions (our

emotional attachment to the world of our fathers) would
ideally sustain a practical politics in which we enlarge our
moral sensibilities and conrront emerging reality.
there are dangers here as well.

But

Devotion to the fathers

might go beyond reverence to a crippling subordination to
the mighty fathers

.

I

do not

intend my remarks here to be

read as a vote for Burke's approach versus MacIntyre.

shall have more to say concerning MacIntyre in the next

chapter

I
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brance
aesthetics as developed in Edmund Burke, The Subl ime snd _the
Beautiful is also cited in connection with his political
.

epistemology
29 Burke,

Works (Bohn), vol.6, pp. 415-422.

4

.

82

3

0 The

interpretation I give of the Burke's famous quotation,
'people will not look forward to posterity who never look
backward to their ancestors", is unusual. A much more common
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Burke

s discussion of the sublime is detailed in
The
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say in addition to or instead of being sublime, then our
relationship is not mediated by terror.
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of Warren Hastings, that Burke held that political rhetoric
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181.
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We must keep in mind MacIntyre’s "sophoclean self." A
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for consistency.
In his most recent book,
takes his discussion of Sophocles.
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past but rather is making a statement about how we ought to
These feelings of filial or
feel toward our ancestors.
familial devotion implicate us in a past which is the past of
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3, p. 274-275. Or
306-307.
vol.
France", Works (Bohn),
2, pp.
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CHAPTER

3

THE TURN TO TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

MacIntyre and the Turn to Tra di ti ons
I

After

shall begin my examination of Alasdair MacIntyre's

.Vi rtue

by taking a look at some prevalent criticisms.^

To what extent can MacIntyre meet the criticisms leveled

against his "communitarian challenge"?

2

More to my point,

can he meet the requirements of his project of reviving

traditions without sliding into a form of traditionalism

which denies the need to reflect upon, debate, and even
reinterpret the meaning of traditions?

My focal point

emphasizes the way in which traditions are grounded.
ties the individual to traditions?

What

What can the character

of that relationship tell us about the possibilities of a

critical appropriation of tradition?

MacIntyre is well known as a critic of liberalism who
refuses to be classed as a political conservative.

The

reception to MacIntyre has been conditioned by the fact that
an emphasis on traditions as a source of moral and political

theory and action, when conceptualized in connection with

criticisms of liberal political culture can easily be read
as validating a "self" that knows itself only as a manifes-

tation of society, who can neither act nor think indepen-

dently of the beliefs that society inculcates. In contrast
with liberalism's rhetoric of liberty and free sel f-development

,

talk of traditions seems not only anachronistic but

87

repressive and puritanical.

While discussing some recent

criticisms of MacIntyre's work, and offering a defense of
it,

I

will develop a criticism of how he grounds traditions.
In After Virtue

,

Alasdair MacIntyre argues that

Nietzsche was correct in his diagnosis of Western culture as
nihilistic.

Our highest values have devalued themselves;

in

fact, we are incapable of justifying our choices on moral

grounds(this

is

the "disquieting suggestion" mentioned at

the outset) because "the substance of morality has been

fragmented and in part destroyed ." 4

MacIntyre spends a

great deal of time and effort showing how various attempts
of the "Enlightenment Project"

for justifying choices fail,

but rather than follow Nietzsche he embraces Aristotle, or

better Ar istotel ianism

,

and specifically; the idea of a

teleology centered on the notion that life

is

centrally a

quest for living and understanding the good life for man.
This quest,

in MacIntyre's view,

is

grounded in the prac-

tices and the traditions we inherit.
On David Johnston's reading, MacIntyre departs from the

liberal concern with expanding life choices, a view which

holds that human beings flourish in a context whereby new

options and choices are possible, for an (traditionalist)
emphasis on the significance and solidarity the performance
of one's role imparts.

The sense of having a place, a

station, secures one's identity

and personal worth by

making plain and unambiguous who one is and the value of the
role one performs.

Johnston argues that according to tradi-
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t

ionalism

,

"human flourishing may be dependent upon the

provision of a certain degree of personal freedom and
choice", but human flourishing "consists also in the
feeling
of being an active,
of one's group."

important contributor to the well-being

This feeling can only be cultivated "with-

in a bounded environment that restricts freedom and

choice

." 5

Having "roots" and group obligations necessarily

limits freedom and choice, and hence the experiments in

living that one can entertain.

Johnston's major charge against traditionalism

is

that

its logical culmination is the questionable goal of elimina-

ting the tension between self and society, or self and

social structure.

Quoting Max Weber, Johnston suggests that

though tension causes discomfort it gives us the ability to
"lead an alert,

intelligent life

." 6

To this criticism we

may add that the activity of striving to attain an ideal

only makes sense when there is tension between actual social

structures and social ideals important to the identities of
individual selves.

However,

I

doubt whether MacIntyre is

vulnerable to the charge that he would deprive us of tension
in our lives.

ledges,

MacIntyre does not, as Johnston acknow-

state that the standards of conduct implied in

social roles cannot be modified and altered.
is rather how important are natural,

ted boundaries for MacIntyre?

The question

unconscious, unreflec-

He does in fact describe

pre — modern societies as containing individuals who

inherit

a particular space within an interlocking set of social
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relationships;

lacking that space,

best a stranger or an outcast

goes on to say,

." 7

they are nobody, or at
In contrast, MacIntyre

the modern voluntarist view of choosing

roles instead of inheriting them causes the self to lose
"its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity

and a view of human life as ordered to a given end."®
the traditional view,

in

the boundaries are highly inelastic.

His criticism of voluntarism may suggest his dependence upon
the pre-modern view, but

would be a mistake.

I

think to draw such an inference

As we shall see, MacIntyre is not

intent on denying us the possibility of choosing new roles

and modifying old ones.

Rather, he argues that one ought

not cavalierly reject an inherited role.

Nor in the

hypothetical choice of new roles can one wholly escape the
influence of what

is

inherited.

A traditionalist reading of MacIntyre appears well

founded because MacIntyre states that we cannot step outside
of our own social identities without losing the sense that

human life has a telos.

Non-arbi trary choice must therefore

be a choice made from within particular social identities,
or rather from an identity already in place about which we

do not deliberate or question.

citizen of the United States,

If
I

I

Of course,

I

am a

lose any deep personal

connection with American traditions.
reference point.

doubt whether

America is no longer

a

in an obvious and uninteresting

sense we are unlikely to doubt that we are

Amei icans

We
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shall want to consider whether MacIntyre can explain how we
are in a strong sense part of the American tradition.
We may, of course, question what it means to act out

our roles.

MacIntyre expects this.

Our choices and delibe-

ration will take place within a context set by the roles we
have inherited.
in our social

We discover our goals in our social roles,

identity.

Human life can have a "given end"

only if we do not choose our social identity.

To what

extent this perspective restricts or liberates us cannot be

settled until we know the basis tor the link to traditions
and whether that link with the past supports a critical

traditionalism or not.

MacIntyre's talk of inherited roles

and personal identities suggests

a

la Burke that personal,

family relationships may have importance.

Below is

MacIntyre's strongest statement about the power of our
inherited identities in determining the content, or the

boundaries of the self :9
I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the
virtues only qua individual ... it is not just that
different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own
circumstances as bearers of a particular social iden3ome one else s
I am someone's son or daughter,
tity.
cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a
member of this or that guild or profession, I belong to
Hence what is good
this clan, that tribe, this nation.
for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
As such, I inherit from the past of my family,
roles.
my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of duties, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations.
These constitute the given of my life, my moral startThis is in part what gives my life its own
ing point.
moral particularity.
.

.

1
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The language here appeals to common sense
in the name
of a rather uncommon perspective.

Of course,

we are our

father and mother's son, a citizen of a state, and
a member
of a profession at

least according to census data.

But in

what sense do these biographical facts constitute my
"moral

starting point"?

To the contrary,

it

is

obvious that most

of us are not automatically and unquestionably involved
in

this inheritance of rightful expectations and obligations.
If

we were,

there would be presumably no audience for the

abstractions and flight from particularity of modern liberal
political theory--and MacIntyre would not be engaged in an
argument.

No one would speak of a flight from history or

of a paucity of remembrance.

So we may ask and must ask,

how is my inheritance invoked or conveyed to me?
that

I

carry with me

— "bear"— a

How is it

particular social identity?

MacIntyre does not appear to have a Burkean conception.
However, MacIntyre's reliance on a core Burkean concept

raises the issue of what distance MacIntyre can place before
his view of tradition and that of Burke's.
it,

On the face of

MacIntyre seems to allow for a more critical approach.

In defense of MacIntyre,

the term "boundary" as in "boun-

daries to the self" is perhaps too restrictive, too suggestive of limits the self cannot see beyond.

For it can be

argued that inherited roles and identities merely give

a

direction to our deliberation, a "moral starting point" and
nothing more.
point.

A starting point

is

after all not an end-

Nor does the notion of a starting point suit the
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image of a boundary one may never cross and within which one

must remain within and not reason beyond.

Nevertheless,

assuming the moral questions and dilemmas of the past, which

Maclnytre claims to be part of our inheritance, is a responsibility that is no mere starting point.
With respect to Johnston's criticism, MacIntyre is not
forcing us to choose between the satisfactions of acting for
the group or acting for oneself.

Actions that may con-

tribute to the group range from acts subservient to the

group's expressed goals to acts of disobedience designed to

awaken the group to what the group's traditions really
require.

Fulfilling a role does not entail blind loyalty to

the expectations of the group.

dividualism of a special sort

—a

Indeed,

it calls

for an in-

loyalty to the standards of

conduct implicit in traditions, a willingness to understand
these standards

,

and the courage not to conform to the

interpretation dominant within the group.

Therefore,

the

restriction involved in acting from a social identification
is not one

which requires the abrogation of our ability to

think and judge at least in terms of pressures exerting by

dominant social groups 10
.

Of course,

we are not delibe-

rating from an archimedean point outside of traditions.

We

are acting from an obligation to perform our roles well and
to carry on the traditions that have been handed down to us.

MacIntyre states that when

I

"subject my own attitudes,

choices ,... to the standards that currently define the practice"

,

and confront and learn from the entire history of the
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practice up to the present,

Tradition ."

11

I

I

am not prostrating myself to

am engaged in a debate about the goods

the practices and traditions were meant to realize.

acceptance (but why do

I

My

accept this?) of my moral starting

point in the roles that have been handed down to me requires

my engagement in a discourse with the past, with my predecessors, over questions of identity such as

— what

mean today to be a citizen of this nation?

does it

MacIntyre urges

us not to blindly follow the footsteps of our parents but to

take up the challenges they have left for us.

The dif-

ference between Burkean conservatism and his own view, ac-

cording to MacIntyre, lies in the significance of argument
and debate for a living tradition.

"When a tradition is in

good order it is always partially constituted by an argument
about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition
its particular point and purpose."

The point on which MacIntyre most clearly departs from

Johnston's concept of traditionalism

whether his

is on

traditionalism offers us psychic security and feelings of
repose.

Quite to the contrary, MacIntyre seems to demand

that we accept and live unrelieved conflict among goods.
Our situation is filled with tragic oppositions like that

between Creon and Antigone each of whom for their Greek
audience embodied a commendable principle

1
.

"1

MacIntyre

adamantly rejects what he believes to be the view of
Aristotle.

Tragedy is not simply caused by character flaws

14
that could be eliminated
.
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MacIntyre sums up his position with the statement that
the radical choice between a belief "in the existence of

incompatible goods or belief in some determinate conception
of the good life for man"

is mistaken.

It is blind to the

possibility that there may be better or worse ways for
individuals to live through the tragic confrontations of
good with good ." 16

Confrontations betweem rival traditions

and conflicting roles will force us to leave "undone what

I

ought to have done" because "choosing the one [role/tradition]

does not diminish the claims of the other

."

16

MacIntyre's turn to traditions and our inherited roles

is

not likely to promote the kind of psychic security achieved

when fulfilling one's roles fits one into an interlocking
set of harmonious relationships.

In Sophoclean tragedy,

although we are saved from the anxiety of the thought that
our choices are completely arbitrary, we must endure the
fact that we face a situation in which more than one good

choice is demanded of us.

A "self" capable of meeting

these demands is a "sophoclean self

." 17

As we shall see,

the tenability of the sophoclean self is very important to

MacIntyre's project.

Without it, his traditionalism is

likely to become less critical and less likely to face up to
the debates generated by the turn to traditions.

Amy Gutmann questions MacIntyre's assertion "what is

good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these
roles"

[roles similar to my own].

She argues that the

"Aristotelian method of discovering the good by inquiring
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into the meaning of roles is little help in a society
in

which most roles are not attached to a single good ."

18

If

most roles do not have single goods attached to them in the

way the role of nurse is attached to caring for the sick or

searching for wisdom is attached to the role of political
philosopher, then to turn questions of choice (what ends

should

I

choose?)

into questions of identity (Who am

do my roles require of me?) will be futile,

answer is possible.

a

choose ?

1

"

for no clear

working-class Italian,

Catholic family had asked 'Who am I?'
I

what

Gutmann asks, "what if Geraldine

Ferraro who had been born into

should

I,

19

instead of 'What ends

Gutmann implies that the answer to

"who am I" would in the case of Ferraro lead her to pursue
the life of a housewife instead of choosing a career in

politics.

That is what working class,

women traditionally do.
to Ferraro.

If

Or,

it

Italian-Catholic

would prove to be of no help

action embedded in traditional roles requires

doing exactly what had been done in the past, Gutmann

1

s

example would be extremely damaging to MacIntyre's project.
However, we have seen that for MacIntyre inquiry into the

meaning of a role, of an identity, requires us to confront
and engage in discussion those standards our predecessors

attempted to live.

The obligations we incur by inheriting a

role do not demand blind obedience to the past, nor imitation of the past.

They require that we justify our depar-

ture from the prevailing understandings of what the role

entails in terms of the goods the traditions and roles were
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meant to realize.

Ferraro could argue, without rejecting

ner identities of being an Italian mother and a
Catholic,
that her political identity as a citizen requires her
par-

ticipation in politics, and that previous Italian, Catholic

women neglected to understand the importance of the political arena for concerns important to women or that political

opportunities were previously unavailable to women.
“Citizen" is a traditional role albeit not a role assumed by

women until this century.

It

is a role

with a rich history

and an equally rich set of problems that is the inheritance
of every adult American.

When Ferraro asks "Who am I?" she

must turn to at least two roles with at least two correspon-

ding streams of traditions.

Her identity as a citizen turns

her toward the traditions of American politics,
the debate generated within those traditions.

including
The questions

provoked in her confrontation with our political past include: What does it mean to be a citizen?

others?

What do we owe
Her involvement

What is the purpose of politics?

in the answers Americans have given to these questions and

the debates those answers have engendered would give her a

deeper understanding of the choices confronting her.

Her

identity as an Italian-Catholic woman turns her towards the

traditions of the Catholic Church and the
community.

I

talian-American

The questions raised may include:

What are the

justifications for the role women play within the Catholic
Church?
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The task of justification in this case may compiicate
the issue.

One may object that Ferraro has been forced to

be "reactive"

(rather than visionary) by being placed on the

defensive.

believe that if Ferraro took seriously her

I

background, her inherited identities, far from being put on
the defensive and undermined in her search for a new sense
of being a woman,

her search would be greatly facilitated.

Understanding previous attempts to live up to the roles,
including the debate over the meaning of the roles and the
goods the roles (the practices of the role) were meant to
realize, would enable Ferraro to give reasons for her
choice.

Her sense of the available possibilities would be

heightened as would her ability to refashion the role to
She would be better able to

meet her particular situation.

articulate her own dissatisfactions with the prevailing
interpretations of her roles and thus be more able to

reinterpret her roles.
At the same time reinterpreting a role may lead to

conflict with those who continue to insist upon the correctness and wisdom of the old ways.

Ms.

Ferraro may find

herself in a conflict with her parents and grandparents--and
that, as

I

have been arguing,

critical traditionalism.

If

is highly significant for

the attachment to traditions is

mediated through the family as in Burke,

then overbearing

ancestors may cause Ferraro to pull away from the debate
over traditional roles.
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The second issue of significance touched on by Gutmann
is

the matter of whether MacIntyre's project fails if single

goods are not attached to roles.

MacIntyre is quite willing

to concede that conflicts among goods are inevitable.

The

measure of a successful life is how well we handle conflicts
among competing goods.
the mark.

So it appears that Gutmann is off

On the other hand, MacIntyre may have to limit

the degree to which there are multiple, competing goods.

Too much conflict among too many goods might make choice

seem arbitrary.

Yet if we take seriously his contention

that the chief moral problem is not finding the truth which

reconciles all goods and eliminates all conflicts but rather

meeting the challenge of living unrelieved conflicts among
goods in a better rather than worse way, then the "deter-

minate conception of the good life for man" is really a set
of virtues that enable us to live well our life of fundamen-

tal conflicts.

These virtues, as we shall see, include

character traits that permit us to participate in social
lif e-- truthfulness

,

a willingness to learn from others and

to let traditions challenge us,

and so on.

For MacIntyre the danger that arbitrariness poses to

morality is not solved via a theory that reconciles differences in some sort of higher universality, or determinate
order for man.

The nihilistic view that my choice makes no

difference when choosing among goods that cannot be placed
in an order of preference is countered by MacIntyre with a

theory that stresses the importance and centrality of our
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involvement in goods.
^I1 * igone as an example,
-

To take the conflict in Sophocles'
a

deepening of our attachment to the

perspectives of both Antigone and Creon would put us in the

position of not being able to reject either perspect ive-they both would become ours

.

In place of arbitrary choice,

MacIntyre would have us choose from within an enlarged and
tension filled perspective.

Choice would never be simple

but it would always be made within an ethically constituted
world, a morally perceived world.
tasks,

if not the major task,

One of MacIntyre's major

is to show our relationship to

moral reality and how we are grounded in it.

Such an argu-

ment would make the "Sophoclean self" and the notion of

tragedy it suggests, a more likely possibility for us.
The notion of life as an enacted narrative brings into
his theory the conception that a coherent life has a narrative order.

Given the willingness to embrace conflicting

goods as inevitable, we may ask, what constraints does the
idea of narrative order invoke?

Narration emphasizes the significance of conversation
and dialogue as the basis for living the good life.

It

is

another attempt on MacIntyre's part to make seeking the good
a public matter and thus put distance between his Aris-

totelianism and the liberal image of the essentially private
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.

We are only the

co-authors of our own narratives and in turn we are the co
authors of the narratives of countless others.

Who we are

is determined in our collective story-telling.

The most
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significant way in which narration may work to limit or
resolve conflicts of goods is in how narratives have a

certain teleological character in addition to their unpredictability.
This unpredictability coexists with a second crucial
characteristic of all lived narratives, a certain
teleological character. We live out our lives, both
individually and in our relationships with each other,
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible
future, a future in which certain possibilities beckon
us forward and others repel us, some seem already
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. There is no
present which is not informed by some image of some
future and an image of the future which always presents
itself in the form of a telos or a variety of ends or
goals-- towards which we are either moving or failing to
move in the present. Unpredictability and teleology
therefore coexist as part of our lives; like characters
in a fictional narrative we do not know what will
happen next, but none the less our lives have a certain
form which projects itself towards our future 20

—

.

It would seem possible that the conflicts among some

goods at least could be made less inevitable and that the
future we seek is one which lessens their intensity.

Or,

and perhaps closer to MacIntyre's understanding, in the

— in other
tension — than we

future we live out the tension more adequately
words, with less desire to transcend the
at present.

do

MacIntyre adds that our narrative is structured

by a quest for a "conception of the good which will enable
us to order other goods".

At the same time,

for us is realized along the way,

the good life

that is, not in the final

attaining of the good, but in how we conduct ourselves in
the search.

We never find the good which orders and

resolves the conflicts among goods.
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The idea of a collectively determined narrative
order
to

life carries with it the weight, or the structuring
power

of history.

Because our lives are "always embedded in the

story of those communities" from which we derive our idenwe are always implicated in a morally charged

world 22
.

History grounds us in moral reality.

As individu-

als bearing particular social identities we participate in a

collective narrative, in "our" history.
In summary,

MacIntyre does not offer us an easy way of

making moral choices.

His traditionalism will not enable

someone to rid himself of the tension that results from

conflicts among goods and moral ambiguity.

MacIntyre is

attempting to deepen our "historicity", our relationship to

history and the inherited roles and obligations shaped

within it, and thus defeat the threat of "arbitrariness"
without promising the end of moral conflict. The goal is the

affirmation of conflict by way of an awareness of the moral
demands of our inheritance.

Getting us to assume our in-

heritance and see the past as our past

is

therefore the

central task of MacIntyre's critical traditionalism.

His

turn to traditions quite obviously depends on making per-

suasive our "standing in" traditions.

Collective story-

telling presupposes a sense of belonging to a collective and

especially to the history/narrative of that collective.
...From the standpoint of individualism I am what I
if I wish to, put
I can always,
choose myself to be.
in question what are taken to be merely contingent
I may biologically be
social features of my existence.
my father's son; but I cannot be held responsible for
what he did unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to

.
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assume such respons ibi 1 i ty
the Englishman who says,"!
never did any wrong to Ireland; why bring up that old
history as though it had something to do with me?" or
the young German who believes that being born after
1945 means that what the Nazis did to Jews has no moral
relevance to his relationship to his Jewish contemporaries, exhibit the same attitude, that according to
which the self is detachable from its social and historical roles and s tatuses
The contrast with the
narrative view of the self is clear. For the story of
my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity.
I am born
with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that
past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

Why should we see ourselves as embedded in a narrative that
we must take up?

It is certainly possible that we may

choose to reject identities.

Although the rejection of a

role implicates us in the past, a negative relation is

hardly one which confronts tradition.
the claims of traditions.

One is hardly open to

More troubling to the the notion

that we must turn to traditions is the possibility that

I

can be unaware, even uninterested in my social identity.
I

may reject my social identities.

Or

Modern culture may

neglect traditions as a matter of principle.

MacIntyre's

response has the character of the bold assertion, you are
your roles 24
i

Certainly, his arguments against the "Enlightenment

Project" are meant to provide support for his contention
that a turn to traditions is our only possibility for an

ethical life.^^

Edmund Burke would agree with his statement

that our inheritance carries with it obligations and rightful expectations.

The argument against the enlightenment

project and the various attempts to develop a liberal

(.on-

.
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cept of self hardly establishes the necessity of affirming

inherited social identities.
how,

say,

It

is

difficult to imagine

the fear of nihilism could open up the past in a

positive way.

On the other hand, one can easily imagine how

desperate clinging to the ways of the past in the manner of
a conservative traditionalist results from the threat of

nihilism and the madness

it suggests.

Like Burke, MacIntyre insists we cannot understand the

present unless we understand the past

disagree with this statement as

it

.

Yet no one would

reads because merely

affirming a causal relation between past and present carries
it

with no automatic sense of moral responsibility.

The

German born after 1945 may indeed see the connection between
the creation of the Bundesrepubl ik and the Second World War,

but he need not consider himself responsible for the results
of the war.

I

see no warrant for asserting some sort of

necessity here.
On a similar note, MacIntyre complains that we are

without a real patriotism, we have no "patria" that requires

defense because the state does not represent the moral
community. 26 "Patria" is obviously a term with a strong

emotional resonance,

linked as it is with the world of the

fathers; but MacIntyre does not notice the connection and

seems uninterested in exploring what may enliven our presum-

ably undeveloped sense that we do indeed have

defending 27

a

patria worth
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MacIntyre does recognize that a turn to traditions
requires the "virtue of having an adequate sense of the

traditions to which one belongs or which confront one."
is

quick to add that he

ant iquar ianism

28
.

is not

He

recommending a conservative

However, he is not clear on how we cul-

tivate what is surely the single most important virtue for
his project.
is a

If having an adequate sense of the traditions

"kind of capacity for judgment", what develops that

capacity?

Moreover,

if

that capacity is not simply

knowledge of the past and of the traditions, what can

it be?

What else does it include?
The turn to traditions must distinguish trivial and

self-serving appeals to the past from a relation to the past
which puts the meaning of the identity of the self at risk.

Traditions cannot become rationalizations tacked on to
positions unquestionably assumed to be true, without losing
their positive relationship to the act of judgment.

The

emphasis MacIntyre puts on the relationship of our identity
to our inherited roles prevents the self from "using" his-

tory.

Instead, MacIntyre has it that the self truly under-

stands itself within the obligations and roles shaped in

history--at least initially 30
.

The historicized self is

open to the possibility of learning something about what

it

means to be an American, a teacher, a family member, a

resident of Amherst, or a first-generation American of

German parents from history.

By contrast,

if we

look to the

past in order to add the weight of the past to positions on

.
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issues with which we unquestionably identify we
are not open
to the past nor can we say that we are "standing"

past.

in the

History does not exist; we are simply using the past.

Drawing lessons from the past in this way merely surveys
traditions as a source of support, just one of many possible
tools for d isputat ion

3 ^

Since we are not learning any-

thing, we are most certainly not sharpening our capacity for

judgment.

Our relationship to traditions must include a

ground for respecting traditions.

The challenge facing the

turn to traditions is to ground respect in a manner com-

patible with the criticism and revision of traditions.
Embedded in After Virtue is an explanation of how we
become educated into traditions of social practices 32
.

if

we look to MacIntyre's understanding of this process of

education we may find an explanation of our connection to
traditions.

Moreover, we can see what giving traditions

respect involves 33
.

To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of
those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.
It is to subject my own
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the
standards which currently and partially define the
practice. .the standards themselves are not immune from
criticism, but none the less we cannot be initiated
into a practice without accepting the authority of the
If, on starting to
best standards realized so far.
listen to music, I do not accept my own incapacity to
judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone
In the realm of
appreciate, Bartok's last quar tets
and standards
goods
both
of
authority
the
practices
all subjectivist
out
rule
to
as
way
a
operates in such
judgment.
of
and emotivist analyses
.

.

Unless

I

.

.

grant the tradition of social practices authority

will never be able to participate in social practices.

A

I

—
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certain attitude of mind is a prerequisite for action governed by standards.

The desire to act correctly and par-

ticipate in a social practice with proficiency motivates a

willingness to subordinate oneself to the tradition of the
social practice.

According to MacIntyre, all artists begin

by submitting to the traditions relevant to their activity.

They may appear to make a break with tradition, but that

break is really a creative extension of the tradition.

The

"starting point" for the would-be artist or social actor are
the traditions.

The chief weakness of this approach, taking the wouldbe artist as an example,

lies in the fact that the novice

artist's willing subordination to his craft already assumes
an identification with the role/ ident i ty of the artist.

The

novice already knows, or believes he knows, that he is an
art is t- to-be

.

The "starting point" in the artist's tradi-

tion is already in place befo re any decision is made con-

cerning what a novice must do in order to become a proficient artist.

The rationale for the subordination of

oneself to the tradition fails to explain how one becomes
ini t ial ly situated in the tradition.

So,

we cannot spin an

explanation of our location in tradition from MacIntyre's
"craft analogy".
Is it simply a question of what motivates one to turn

to the traditions that one is?

can highlight who we are?

What argument

— what

speech

Burke taps "natural feeling

,

sentiments located and nurtured in the "small platoon" to

the
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which we belong.

These feelings of love undergird a respect

for the traditions that structure and provide the setting

for our local attachments.

Familial love extends to include

the world that has been handed down to us from our ances-

tors.

Burke's turn seems on the face of it more compelling.

MacIntyre mostly argues in

a

negative way, hoping that

criticism of the Enlightenment and the posing of Nietzsche
as the dreadful alternative (that we ought not dare embrace)

makes Aristotelian traditionalism seem our only real pos-

sibility tor an ethics.

is not the approach taken

However,

by MacIntyre too intellectual and despite the scare tactic,
too detached from our emotional life?

Perhaps there is

something to Burke's view that the consideration of the
needs of persons beyond our small circle of intimates must

build on the emotional attachments nurtured in the family
and community 34
.

We find additional evidence for the significance of the

problem of location

in,

or attitude toward,

traditions in

the prominent place given to friendship by MacIntyre.

Friendship "embodies a shared recognition of and pursuit of
a

good."

3^

is therefore essential to the exercise of all

It

O

traditions and social practices.
...the recognition of authority and of achievement,
respect for standards and the kind of risk-taking
characteristically involved in practices,
demand. .fairness in judging oneself and others. .wilachievelingness to trust the judgments of those whose
judge
ment in the practice give them an authority to
which presupposes fairness and truthfulness in those
judgments
.

.

.

.

.
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MacIntyre approvingly quotes Aristotle's argument that
lawgivers rank friendship higher than justice because "justice is the virtue of rewarding desert and repairing fail-

ures in rewarding desert within an already constituted

community;
tion"

OO
.

friendship is required for that initial constitu-

Friendship is not just a virtue.

It is as well a

social form inextricably related to the exercise of virtues

including the virtues of truthfulness, fairness, and "having
an adequate sense of the traditions"

there can be no turn to traditions.

.

Without these virtues
On this point

I

have

argued that the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer lends

considerable support.

Gadamer shows that only when we

relate to traditions and the conversation in and about

traditions as if we were in a relation of "I-thou" is the

otherness of tradition affirmed 39
.

In the terms of our discussion of whether or not

MacIntyre persuades us that we really do stand in traditions
the significance of the classical Aristotelian ideal of

friendship poses a problem.

First,

there is the obvious

absence of notions of classical Greek friendship in modern
politics.

MacIntyre admits that friendship has become a

private relationship and therefore not very Greek at all.
If

it is also the case that in our private

(or privatized)

friendships the recognition and pursuit of a shared politi
turn
cal good makes little sense then it would seem that the

community necesto tradition is bound to fail because the
traditions and
sary for a politics of the good (the goods of
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social practices)

is

unavailable.

Unless the mutuality

found in friendship has a source somewhere in society, the

attempt to revive traditions as embodiments of debates and

arguments over the point of practices, will produce few
shared conceptions and very little community.

The past will

be mined for the weight it can heap on essentially private

and self-serving positions arrived at independently of any

understanding of our history.

Debates over the meaning of

traditions will be lost in the antiquarian quest for lineHaving an adequate understanding of the traditions is

age.

crucial for the success of the turn to traditions and the

desirability of a politics of goods.
Walzer: Self-Respect, Traditions, and Justice

Similarly, for Michael Walzer understanding traditions

correctly

is

central to the achievement of justice.

Michael

Walzer puts self-respect at the center of Spheres of Justice

;

and the self-respect of individuals

is

dependent upon

everyone respecting the traditional standard that govern the
various spheres of social life.

We shall see whether Walzer

fares better than MacIntyre in explaining our relationship
to traditions.

Walzer argues that whereas self-esteem tends to rest
almost entirely on the opinions of others who in turn compete with us for recognition in a zero-sum game (being foremost cannot be shared)

,

the basis for self-respect and

respect for others rests on membership in

a

cooperative

activity and living up to the standards defining that ac-
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tivlty.

For example,

respect among doctors Is predicated

upon their shared commitment to medicine-- let
commitment to the Hippocratic oath.

s say,

'

Of course,

become more distinguished than others.

their

some doctors

The standards defin-

ing the activity of medicine are standards that all doctors

meet to some degree.

Distributive justice has its ultimate

justification in making self-respect possible 40

When

.

distributive justice does its work of policing the boundaries which distinguish the various spheres of social
goods, social life takes place according to the shared

understandings underlying each particular sphere.

Justice

occurs when social goods of one sphere are not used to

dominate the social meanings of another sphere.

For ex-

ample, wealth will not buy love, or a doctorate in philosophy, or a medical degree, or political influence.
larly,

Simi-

in the sphere of politics citizens respect other

citizens on the basis of the standards defining the activity
of citizenship.

Citizens are allowed "social space" so that

41
they may act out their role of being a citizen
.

When

self-respect and respect for others depend on a willingness
to adhere to standards that underlie the activity of citi-

zenship, social position is unimportant.

In an important

sense the traditions which characterize this activity must
rule

.

Self-respect must compete with the tendency for wealth
or power

(citing just two possibilities)

to cross boundaries

and
and undermine the operation of shared understandings

Ill

frustrate the achievement of self-respect.

Where wealth

makes my participation in politics irrelevant, that is, when
the only voices heard are those who command a respect foun-

ded on their accumulation of wealth, not only is my self-

respect attacked but the ground of respect and equality for
all members of the polity is similarly undermined.

It

is

easy to see how respect for others and the dignity made

possible by that respect undergirds relationships of mutuality.

Central are the shared understandings and standards

that make social life and mutual respect possible.

The

ground of mutuality lies in a shared life or shared activity.

It is for this reason that Walzer comes up with an

interpretation of the autonomous individual

precisely

in

these terms of sharing.
His argument goes this way:

Self-respect demands

"self-possession", that we own and own up to our "character,
qualities, and actions".

Given the relationship of our

identity to the task of living up to a set of social meanings

(shared standards),

it

is

this self-possession which

makes our personal acts psychological possible.

handle the pressure of medical emergencies?
never practice medicine.

politics?

Unless

active citizen.

I

If

Am

I

willing

am able to do so
I

am

I

unable to say

intimacy with another is not possible.

Ef

Can
not,

I

I

could

risk an opinion in

to

will never be an
I

love You?

,

MacIntyre would

readily agree that participation in social practices
person as an
requires the conception of a self -responsible

.
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autonomous person

— autonomous

however, as Walzer puts it,

in his community" as a "free and responsible agent," as
a

"participating member

."

42

Much like MacIntyre, Walzer insists that we indeed are

situated in a particular social and historical place--in the
cave of Plato's Republic not out beyond it where philoso-

phers are known to lurk.

We must stay inside the cave

because whatever we fashion outside of the cave "can never
be fashioned for ordinary men and women"

.

The moral philo-

sopher must understand that "the problem justice poses is

precisely to distribute goods to a host of Xs in ways that
are responsive to their concrete,

However,

integrated selves."

the "terrain of everyday life" which Walzer bids us

to keep to is not simply everyday life.

There are superfi-

cial understandings of our shared meanings and there are

understandings that are the results of reflective thought
engaged in revealing what may be hidden in our concepts and
categories.

4

His arguments about concrete identities

'^

demand that we see our identities in an open and flexible
way within a discourse about the social meanings that structure the spheres of existence.

Everyday life as normally

lived does not bear witness to a fluid concept of identity
and self, nor is discourse over social meaning a common

occurrence.

Like MacIntyre, Walzer faces the difficulty of

situating the self in a relation to tradition that

traditionalist

is

not

.
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Walzer understands the self In a way that stresses both
a passive and active relation to social meanings and
tradi-

tions.

Walzer avoids the traditionalist reduction of the

self to its inherited roles by imagining human action as

necessarily involving an awareness of history and an active
and creative appropriation of that history. 44
.goods with their meanings--because of their meanings are the crucial medium of social relat ions ... one
might almost say that goods distribute themselves among
people.
"Things are in the saddle/And ride
mankind ."... of course, we make the things--even the
saddle.
I don't want to deny the importance of human
agency, only to shift our attention from distribution
itself to conception and creation:
the naming of
goods, and the giving of meaning, and the collective
.

.

making
...Men and woman take on concrete identities because of
the way they conceive and create and then possess and
employ social goods ... in fact, people already stand in
a relation to a set of goods; they have a history of
transactions, not only with each other, but also with
the moral and material world in which they live.
Without such a history, which begins at birth, they
wouldn't be men or women in any recognizable sense...
... it is the meaning of goods that determines their
movement ... al 1 distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake...
.

.

Two points are interesting to note.

The conceiving of the

meaning of a good is also a creative act.

Appropriation of

the past contains a moment of application to the present.

Also, we "take on" concrete identities because of "the way

we conceive and create and then possess and employ goods."

Walzer is giving the notion of living in our everyday world
of concrete particularism an unusual twist.

It

is not at

all a mere taking up and living the practices that come down
to us,

accepting what was good for our fathers as good

enough for us.

To do that is not to be concrete at all;
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conception and creat ion-- " the naming of goods, the giving of
meaning, and the collective making" --are integral aspects of

having a concrete identity.
But do people ordinarily experience their concreteness
in this way?

Is

there not perhaps something extraordinary

about grasping the concreteness of the world and the moral

relations embedded within in it.

If so,

then there is

something extraordinary about the task of addressing others
as they are concretely oriented in Walzer's understanding.

Only if we are creative interpreters of traditions can

Walzer's traditionalism be critical.

Like MacIntyre,

getting the right relationship to traditions is a difficulty
Walzer must face up to.
Another way of looking at this problem of the location
of the self

is

to see the significance of a narrative for

Walzer's understanding of history.

Few people, ordinary or

otherwise, see themselves standing in a "history of trans-

actions" with the "moral and material world".

To see our

moral obligations as intimately related to a personal history which is part of a social history, and then to argue
that history places before us obligations that we m ust

assume comes very close to leaving the "cave".

Again, my

point is that references to a concreteness we supposedly are
fail to address what we actually are, or usually are.

Walzer must address the problem of our situatedness
to get his project underway.

if he

is

Both must focus on the ques-

community
tion of what constitutes a historically minded

a

.
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community in which individuals can understand and grasp
themselves in the traditions of their community.
Social Criticism and th e Historical Com mun ity
We can see the importance of a historical community, a

community bound by a history, if we examine Walzer's problematic conception of social criticism.

If we pursue the

question of the basis and the possibility of social criticism within Walzer's thought, we end affirming the existence
of a historical

criticism.

"people" as central to the enterprise of

In other words,

we will see the presence of a

"people" as a prerequisite to the functioning of effective

social criticism.

Unfortunately for Walzer, the issue of

what creates and sustains a "people"

,

a group of

individuals

with a common memory--with a common tradition--is ignored by
Walzer.

As a consequence we are inclined to find his notion

of social criticism highly suspect.

It will

appear that

Walzer values solidarity too much and individual freedom not

enough
To show why this is so, we shall begin by ascertaining

what the possibilities of internal criticism

are— a question

which must delve into the notion of the "shared understandings" constituting the spheres of justice.

After discussing

shared understandings we will look at an example of their
critical power in Walzer's interpretation of the Pullman
Strike.

Finally, we will examine the issue of criticism

across societies when we discuss whether, according
Walzer, Indian Caste society can be just.

r

o
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Walzer

is

committed to the value of internal debate

within each social sphere because there is no other way that
the spheres of

justice could then be shaped and structured

by shared understandings.

"Men and women are free when they

live within autonomous institutions
in the hands of believers,

a free

." 46

A free church is

university

is

governed by

academics, and the workplace does not subject workers to an

unquestioned authority.

The key to our freedom within these

settings (our freedom in community) is to make political and
economic power (the two spheres of goods most likely to be
used to dominate the distributions of other spheres) un-

available for settling disputes over the meaning and consequently the distribution of the particular social good in
question.

Walzer faces the problem of satisfying the re-

quirement for a critical traditionalism and assuring that
the discussion of each sphere remains true to the particular

social meanings and traditions that underlie the spheres.
As we shall see the requirement that we keep discourse

focused on the concrete and particular seems to conflict the

critical requirement that traditions be subject to the

strongest possible criticisms under conditions that encourage such criticisms.

Walzer is attempting to shift our attention away from
the institutions of the state and toward the social areas of

life

— work,

play, worship,

47
family, and so on
.

It

is

in

the areas of concrete life where we can effectively exercise

our judgment and critical powers.

State power is not dis-
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missed,

its role however important,

is

secondary to the

process of deliberation among the participants in the various social spheres 48
.

...political power is the regulative agency for social
goods generally.
It is used to defend the boundaries
of distributive spheres, including its own, and to
enforce the common understandings of what goods are and
what they are f or
[P]olitical power is always dominant at the boundaries, but not within them.
The
central problem of political life is to maintain the
crucial distinction between "at" and "in".
.

.

.

The state enforces socially determined distributions and

prevents society from using coercion or power in determining
the meaning of social goods.
the spheres.

It maintains the integrity of

wealth, another danger to the

Of course,

autonomy of the distributive spheres, has to be hemmed in by
the state.

Walzer cites as examples of state interventions

the legal prohibition of prostitution and bribery.

Bribery

violates the sense that officeholders are not to be swayed
by monetary inducements.

Prostitution turns sexual rela-

tionships into a commodity 49
.

Walzer wants to avoid a politicization of social practices which ends up turning over the determination of the

spheres to the state.

The process of interpreting tradi-

tions and elaborating the spheres of justice is primarily a

social process because only within the particular social

context can the distribution of social goods be adequately
discussed.

Since each sphere has its own distinct prin-

ciples of distribution, the political language of the state
could only clumsily address the particular traditions of

.

—

.
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each sphere.

Norman Daniels has argued that Walzer ignores

the problem of authenticity. 5 ®
.a culture may reflect a history of class struggle
and domination by a ruling class, or external cultures. .[where] shared meanings are acquiesced in by
dominated groups... If the effects and artifacts of such
history are now reified into a shared social meaning we
seem to be finding right when there is only a history
of might
.

.

.

.

.

Walzer would argue that if the church, for example,
cannot call on the troops, religious doctrine must rest on
the willingness of believers to accept the doctrine as true.
But even in this case,

if

our believers never argue doctrine

among themselves, should we accept their declarations of
belief as authentic?

Put slightly differently, would we

want to say that they sha re in an understanding (i.e., have
Walzer agrees that

an understanding of the doctrine)?

sharing understandings requires participation in their

determination (we conceive and create social goods",) and
that even politics has a role that may go beyond what is

allowed by the "at/in" distinction
Nevertheless,

51
.

the value given to debate as a means of

our coming to share understandings puts pressure on prac-

tices to legitimate their authority directly in discourse
not just any discourse but discourse modelled on the demo-

cratic idea of a citizen forum in which all participate.
The defense of industrial democracy makes this strikingly

clear
Walzer' s discussion of the attempt of George Pullman to

create a model factory town allows Walzer to compare

1

he

.
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authoritarian politics of the town with the structure of
authority in the factory.

He states that although early on,

almost at its inception, the town of Pullman was seen as
a
tyranny, as undemocratic and unAmerican,

the conventional

understandings of the time ignored the power relationships
within the factory.

The relative newness of the factory

system explains this ignorance according to Walzer.

Soon

however, we find a movement for industrial democracy develo-

ping in response to the coerciveness of the factory (and not
just in response to demands for higher wages and shorter

hours, so-called "business unionism"). The key to Walzer

's

argument for treating the town and the factory as places
where power is manifested seems to be that both are places
of

"cooperative activity" and hence,

"places of decision".

"Property should have no political currency ... it shouldn't
convert into anything like sovereignty, authoritative command,

sustained control over men and women."

The discharge

of workers and the enforcement of rules without the pos-

sibility of appeal and opposition are exercises of power.
According to our shared understandings and traditions power
in our society must be democratized.

Entrepreneurs have no

right to rule over us "unless they can win our agreement
As a piece of argument Walzer depends heavily on the

purported relation between his argument and the beliefs held
on the political side of the labor movement.

Walzer can

maintain that he is both arguing from a tradition (the naked
exercise of political power must be resisted say the wor-
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kers) and furthering the debate by taking on the
compelling
view,

also current in our political culture,

that an indivi-

dual's property is his own to do as he pleases.

Walzer sees

himself as attempting to redraw the boundary between politics and the economy in a way responsive to the new forms of

economic activity the meaning of which workers in the industrial democracy movement first discerned.
How far would Walzer extend the democratization of
social institutions?

According to his definition of power

relations democratic discourse would play an important role
in every area of society because the conception and creation

of social goods is defined as a "collective making".

other words, each of us helps to make social goods.

In

The

process of making and creating social goods is essential to
our achieving self-respect,
is

the sine qua non of justice.

It

for that reason that the exercise of power over us is

abhorrent and potentially so pervasive.
The question about the proper role of the state in

policing the spheres of justice raised at the outset of the

discussion can now be roughly answered.

In the case of

industrial democracy for example, the state ought to require
factories and other places of work to institute more

democratic procedures of decision making.

Now there are

strong reasons for suspecting that Walzer is willing to
adopt relatively "loose" criteria for what counts as par-

ticipation in the creation of meaning because his vision of
a

democratic society does not lead Walzer to reject non-

.
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democratic societies as tyrannical.

Thus,

there may be

grounds for thinking that his criteria for participation in
the creation of meaning is not identical with the democratic

ideal of equal participation.

Walzer maintains that when we are just to persons of
foreign cultures we respect them as "culture-producing

creatures
.By virtue of what characteristics are we one
another's equals? One characteristic above all is
central to my argument.
We are (all of us) cultureproducing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful
worlds.
Since there is no way to rank and order these
worlds with regard to their understanding of social
goods, we do justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular creations.
And they claim justice and resist tyranny by insisting on the meaning of
social goods among themselves.
.

.

Can one insist upon the meaning of a social good if
there is no public space that allows one to insist upon and

defend one's interpretation of the meaning of social goods?
In addition,

how can he claim that we produce culture unless

we participate in the making of culture?

How is that pos-

sible unless a discourse articulated within a public space
(where each values the contribution of the other no matter

what social position the other occupies) shapes culture?
To the extent that Indian Caste society lacks a public space
for discourse there is a reason for doubting whether justice

prevails.

Put more strongly, arguing this way must lead to

the rejection of certain forms of society and elevate a

democratic society as an ideal
it

is

.

^

Walzer must clarify how

that Indians "shape" their culture.

Does Walzer

's

f
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argument that the presence ot a profession of teachers
or
prophets and an audience free to listen hold water?

Although he resists out of respect for the social
meanings of foreign cultures elevating democratic societies-a respect based on the alleged fact that the culture was

collectively produced--Walzer qualifies his support of the
possible justness of caste society.
.Perhaps the lower caste members were angry and
indignant (though they repressed their f eel ings
I
that were so, then it would be important to seek out
the principles that shaped their anger... [and they]
must have their part in village justice...
...Assume now that the Indian Villagers really do
accept the doctrines that support the caste system.
A
visi tor ... might try to convince them it is an entirely
respectable act ivi ty--that those doctrines are false.
He might argue, for example, that men and women are
created equal not across many incarnations but within
the compass of this one...
.

.

)

.

.

.

—

The process of seeking out and shaping critical principles

even if it does not necessarily require the institutions and

practices of a democracy for articulation (we can imagine
slaves conspiring among themselves against their masters)
can find its way into village justice only

respected by the dominant castes.

if

criticism is

How can that be if equal-

ity holds only across incarnations and not within the com-

pass of this one?

First of all, the idea that each person

from whatever social position can contribute to the under-

standing of what doing justice demands seems at odds with a
hierarchical order in which authority
located at the top.

is

assumed to be

A collective process of articulating

meaning requires a sense that social position has little to
do with one's potential contribution.

In other words, we
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are all equally permitted to speak of justice.

Of course,

upper caste members might respond pragmatically to
dissent
issuing from below.

Pragmatic adjustments designed to quiet

the articulation of critical principles is hardly
a picture
of distributive justice.

Social goods in this case would

not be distributed according to shared understandings of
the

meaning of social goods.

Rather, a politics of revolt and

accommodation would determine the distribution of social
goods

.

Furthermore, the image of visitors coming to villages
and discussing the justice of the caste system presupposes a

public space in which mutual discourse has a lively part to
play, which in turn demands a concept of equality.

In

conclusion, Walzer has not argued very forcefully for the

possibility of the justness of caste society.

It

is hard to

imagine what the notion of "creating and shaping culture"

means in the context of caste society.
But in fairness to Walzer it should be note here that

I

have tacitly assumed that culture and meaning are produced

and created only within a kind of adversary proceeding in

which differing accounts compete for justification.

I

have

both ignored the obvious vitality of Indian culture and

uncritically recommended concepts of discourse and equality
despite the actual dearth of social criticism in our culture

.

It

is for a good reason that Walzer would want to

defend the possibility that

a

society radically different
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from our own may be just
to traditions,

In order to persuade us to turn

.

he must address the fact that traditions

often do not have their origin in a rational decision or

a

process of deliberation that included more than a select
number of participants.

If we disrespect cultures and

historical periods and the traditions emanating from them

because of their origin in a "dark age"

,

then we are effec-

tively excluding the possibility that traditions can be

sources of our identity and important terms of understanding

political and moral reality.

With a suspicious glance cast

all around us and with hope in the reasoning of an autono-

mous individual freed from the past, we avoid the task of

conceiving traditions because it requires that we permit
"things in the saddle to ride us". Once we reject standing
in traditions we take ourselves out of our particular,

historically conditioned situation, and render ourselves
incapable of making, producing, or interpreting culture.
In short,

55

the defense of caste society helps us to see how

social criticism and talk of justness functions in a different cultural context.

Ultimately Walzer needs an argu-

ment explaining how critical discourse is conceivable within
a society that seems inhospitable to critical discourse.

Walzer faces the following problem:

Emphasis on the cre-

ation of meaning when coupled with the importance attributed
to a public realm of discourse for the creation of that

meaning casts suspicion on traditions that come down from
less than democratic past.

Given that no tradition can

a

.

.

|
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claim to have been created or shaped by a broadly conceived

public discussion, we are tempted to dismiss the past and
look elsewhere.
a

For example, we might be tempted to invent

morality de novo or "go to the mountain top" to discover a

moral i ty
But in a recent work,
c_ism,

Interpretation and Social Criti-

Waizer argues against invention and discovery by

defending what he calls interpretation 56
.

Interpretation

works on an already existing morality and depends on the

vitality of our relationship to traditions.
discovery of our moral world
we have always lived there."

is

Invention or

really unnecessary "because

Here Waizer again treats our

relationship to moral traditions simply as

a

matter of fact.

...No design procedure has governed its design and the
result is no doubt disorganized and uncertain.
It is
also very dense... like a home occupied by a single
family over many generations, with unplanned additions
here and there... The whole thing ... lends itself less to
57
abstract modeling than to thick description
.

Yet,

Waizer asks the important question:

.

why are we

bound to look only in the already existing moral world?
is this existing morality,

Why

"the product of time, accident,

external force, political compromise, fallible and particularist intentions"

,

authoritative ? 56

...morality is authoritative for us because it is only
by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral
Our categories, relationships,
beings that we are.
commitments, and aspirations are all shaped by, expressed in terms of, the existing moral i ty ... Discovery
and invention are efforts at escape ... [which are
The critique of existence begins, or can
unnecessary.
begin, from principles internal to existence itself.

.
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I

n Interpretation and Social Criticism we do find an argu-

ment for how traditions support social criticism and how

perhaps criticism can begin from principles internal to

existence
Walzer begins by casting doubt on the need for inventions and discoveries.

Inventions and discoveries when

closely examined turn out to be similar to the morality we

already hold.

They are really interpretations of existing

morality and not real discoveries or inventions
ly,

.

^

Second-

truly novel arguments are not as compelling as moral

arguments rooted in the existing morality.

For a novel view

to be effective it must rely on acts of coercion or it must

interpreted in the terms, categories, and experiences of the

existing morality.

heuristic value.

Walzer allows that invention can have
it cannot supplant the inter-

However,

pretation of the existing morality.
Cited as evidence for the first claim is Thomas Nagel's

discovery of the principle, "don't be indifferent to the
suffering of other people"

.

Nagel claims to derive the

principle from "no particular point of view".

And indeed it

sounds as if it were a product of a detached mind, someone
who had stepped back and found objective truth.

Walzer

comments that the discovery is not at all a discovery (we

already knew it), but rather
existing morality.

It

it

is a

flattened version of

is a weak principle in comparison

with "love thy neighbor as thyself."

It

is

furthermore an
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uncertain principle, because how we would apply it
from a
position of nowhere in particular is unclear 60
.

Walzer shows that the method of argument found in Rawls
is akin to interpretation.

The correction of our moral

intuitions "by reference to the model we construct out of
those same intuitions", the process of reflective equilibrium,

is a process that

focuses not an objective morality

but on our "own principles and values

." 61

It becomes impor-

tant then to understand how social criticism takes place

within the existing moral framework.

The urge to find a

universal corrective for social practices will not otherwise
be set aside.

Walzer goes on to discuss what

gredients of social criticism.

I

would call the in-

Here we find an outline of

an argument that might clarify why social justice is pos-

sible in caste society and how social criticism is possible

within the existing moral framework.

Walzer clearly rejects

the view that democratic institutions are absolutely neces-

sary for the practice of social criticism.
is

"cultural elaboration and affirmation",

As long as there

teachers, story-

tellers, priests, sages, and so forth, an opening for social

criticism exists.

*

Walzer then discusses the conditions that favored the

emergence of prophecy in ancient Israel.

The emergence of

prophets as social critics required a relatively weak

priesthood and bureaucracy.

Some freedom from the inter-

ference of political and religious authorities was neces-
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sary.

Secondly,

the principle ot solidarity,

"the idea of a

people as an organic whole united by election and
covenant"

characterized prophetic teaching 63
.

This is also an impor-

tant condition social criticism because without the sense
of
a people uniting the past and the present,

the prophets'

references to the past and their interpretations of the

heritage of Israel would have been lost on their audience.
The prophets could share a universe of discourse with their

audience because both the audience and the prophets participated in the historical community of Israel.

In this

case at least social criticism depends upon the existence of
a historically defined people.

According to Walzer social

criticism existed in ancient Isreal without democracy.
There must be among some sense of connection to the
past for references to traditions to have an impact on the

audience.

Without the notion of connectedness to a past

which is represented in the idea of a people the search for
core values in our existing condition,

in our particular

historical and cultural location, would be impossible.

The

very notion of a core value or an ideal that can juxtaposed
to actual social practices depends on social practices

having an historical depth.

Therefore the presence of a

historical community, a "partnership" seems essential to any
social criticism that turns on the notion of a "core" value
64
or the notion that a "people" have a mission.

Walzer clarifies the character of the criticism of the
prophets.

The history lesson the prophets gave did not
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implore Israelites to return to a golden past or to a set
of

standards that had been enunciated in antiquity.
ample,

For ex-

the prophet Amos altered the meaning of oppression by

substituting the term "ashok" for the term
used in Exodus.

"

lahatz" commonly

The standard of what counts as oppression

shifted from political coercion to maltreatment and exr*

ploitation.

p

The prophets connected the tradition and

interpreted it in accordance with the experience of their
own contemporaries.

Therefore,

if we

understand that the turn to traditions

depends on both freedom from interference and solidarity-- a
"people", an "immortal society", an attachment to tradi-

tions--then we cannot dismiss the possibility that caste

society may be just or that traditions may be worth recalling.

Although caste society may lack the degree of freedom

of expression we enjoy,

the sense of solidarity it may have

might make social criticism a more likely possibility there
than in our own democratic culture.

The formal guarantees

of free speech and assembly although vital to us may not be

more important to the practice of social criticism than an

audience capable of following, articulating, and judging
social critique.

a

Freedom of expression is obviously impor-

tant because without it participation in social criticism

would be impossible.

So perhaps there is within caste

society enough of a public space for expressing criticism.
Caste society seems to fulfill the requirement of being

historical community.

a

Walzer's thinking on this question

is
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extremely provocative and challenging to our own
prejudices
concerning social criticism.
However, Walzer himself must
face up to the challenge of clarifying the nature of a

historical community.

We have witnessed just how important

such a concept is for his conception of social criticism.
Like MacIntyre, Walzer pays insufficient attention to the

constitution of a historical community.

If we push his

example of prophecy in ancient Israel we must consider the
importance of the Hebrew religion.

Walzer' s apparently

secular appropriation needs to consider the fact that

Israelites believed the prophets to be the voice of God.
God was at the center of prophetic discourse and not "shared

understandings"

.

God commands a respect that human ar-

tifacts cannot--unless they are the artifacts of our beloved

ancestors.

Walzer has not revealed the entire set of condi-

tions at the root of prophecy.

Even the Burkean notion of

inheritance and the immortal community it supported was not
a secular concept.

cal community

— is

Our place in existence-- in our histori-

providentially ordered.

MacIntyre mentions the idea of inheritance, but has no
sense of the term's emotional resonance.
sent to us a purely secular theory.

He seems to pre-

As we have seen his

concept of a community bound by a common narrative— a common
set of open-ended traditions
tion.

— is

without a cogent explana

It behooves us to pursue further the issue of the

character of our relationship to a community that stretches
back to the past.

,,,,,
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NOTES
My discussion will be largely limited to the following
works:
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Vir tue (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) and Michael
Walzer Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
,

2t

Recent critics include Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics
of Liberalism", Philosophy and Public Affair s, XIV, no 3
(Summer, 1985),
David Johnston, "Two Concepts of Community"
(paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September,
1987) and Seyla Benhabib, "Autonomy, Modernity, and
Community:
An Exchange between Communi tar ianism and
Critical Social Theory" (paper presented at the 1987 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington D.C., September, 1987).
.

See his Against the Self Images of the Age
History
Ethics.
'

4

,

and A Short

t

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue

p.5.

,

r

’David Johnston, "Two Concepts of Community", Paper Presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of APSA p.7.
,

^Johnston,

"Two Concepts of Community", p.17.

^Quoted in Johnston,

"Two Concepts of Community", p.7.

^Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p.84.
'^MacIntyre,

A fter Virtue

pp. 204-205.

(1981),

°This leaves open the possibility of subservience
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MacIntyre
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(
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)

2 MacIntyre
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)
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optimism, but I think his working through of the competing
traditions is relative iy even handed.
A strong expectation
that the disagreement must end or else does not emerge in
the text
7

1

The Sophoclean self transcends the limitations of social
roles and is able to put those roles into question, but it
remains accountable to the point of death and accountable
precisely for the way in which it handles itself in those
conflicts which make the heroic point of view no longer
possible.
Thus the presupposition of the sophoclean self's
existence is that it can indeed win or lose, save itself or
go to moral destruction, that there is an order which requires from us the pursuit of certain ends..." MacIntyre,
After Virtue (1981), pp. 134-135.
18 Amy

Gutmann

"Communitarian Critics of Liberalism"

p. 316

‘^Amy Gutmann
"Communitarian Critics of Liberalism"
These are examples she gives.

p. 316

1

20 MacIntyre
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See the Chapters
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through

MacIntyre, After Virtu e
27 His hope for small

6

in After Virtue

(1981)

.

p.236.

communities practicing virtues is one

suggestion
2®

"..an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a
grasp of those future possibilities which the past has made
Living tradi t ions cont inue a
available to the present.
MacIntyre, After Virtue
"
not-yet-completed narrative.
.

.

.

.

1981

(

)

,

p. 207

^As we shall see MacIntyre agrees with Burke that a proper
sense of traditions is a "kind of capacity for judgment,
rather than a knowledge of precedents that one mechanically
applies. What kind of understanding of the past must one
have in order to exercise practical judgment? MacIntyre,
Afte r Vir tue (1981), p.207.
2

50 0ur

"moral starting point".

.

,,, .

...

.

133

3 1

The issue of the capability of the turn to traditions
to
truly look toward and stand in the past is extremely important.
The turn to traditions promises the awakening of a
politics of the common good along with the relationships of
mutuality without which a politics of the good would become
viciously contentious. According to William Sullivan:
...At its best, a public philosophy could provide
expression for the meaning and worth of the political
commitments embodied in republican institutions and
mores.
The social task of a public philosophy is
critical in a highly differentiated society in which
common consensus is always in some measure the achievement of an active process of discussion and persuasion
among involved citizens.
At its deepest level, a
public philosophy is a tradition of interpreting and
delineating the common understandings of what the
political association is about and what it aims to
achieve
Without a "shared sense of poiitical meaning and direction" we can expect further declines in our capacity to act
collectively.
The realization of our moral starting point
in our social and historical identities is tied to reviving
the civic republican traditions that lie at the base of
democratic government.
Sullivan sees mutual concern as part
of this tradition.
One can also argue that mutual concern
is also a consequence of sharing a sense of political meaning and direction, that is, of sharing traditions.
In
either case, the turn to the traditions of civic republicanism promises and requires the revival of mutuality in
order to have a politics of common goods.
Sullivan maintains that the republican tradition
teaches that political understanding develops "only through
In other
the moral maturation of mutual responsibility."
words, without the experience of politics, mutual concern
and respect cannot be taught, but at the same time without
an awareness of our footing in republican traditions there
can be no civic republican experiencing of politics.
Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy p.9, p.21.
,

o2 Mac Intyre,
’

^MacIntyre

,

After Virtu e (1981), pp. 176-181.
After Virtu e (1981), p.177.

34 Edmund Burke,

Reflection s on the Revolutio n in France
Conor Cruise O'Brien, p.135.
After Virtue

(
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)

"^MacIntyre
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(
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)
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o7 MacIntyre
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39

Hans-Georg Gadamer

One above

,

Truth and Method, p.321.

See Chanter
*

.

40 Michael

Walzer Spheres of Justice:
A D efense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp.276279. See also chapter 11.
Complex equality in contrast with
simple equality recognizes distinctive spheres of meaning
and hence of distribution.
Therefore, no single
principle desert need, or free exchange for instance)
suffices as a principle of distributive justice. Harold
Bloom makes an argument for a version of deconstruction
which turns on a conception of dignity. See "The Sorrows of
Facticity", The Raritan Quarterly Review Ill, no 3 (Winter,
1984
3
,

(

,

.

)

4

.

.

,

Walzer

^Walzer

,

43Walzer

Spheres of Justice

p.277

Spheres of Justice

p. 279

Spheres of Justice

p xiv
.

.

.

,

p

.

261

,

p 320
.

44Walzer

Spheres of Justice pp.7-8.
"Things are in the
saddle/And ride mankind" is a quote from Emerson, "Ode", in
The Complete Essays a nd Other Writings ed Brooks Atkinson
,

(New York,

1940),

.

p.770.

4R

Michael Walzer, "Liberalism and Separation", Political
Theory XII, no 3 (August, 1984), 324.
.

,

4R

Michael Walzer,

"Liberalism and Separation", p.326.

4^

See Walzer, Spheres of Justice Chapters
Equality" and 11, "Political Power".
,

48 Walzer,

1,

"Complex

State power will be
Spheres of Justice p.l5n.
dialogue, making
the
policing
if
secondary
far less than
according
to truly, shared
done
are
distributions
sure that
an atmosphere
created
in
and
conceived
meanings meanings
If
undertaking.
major
to
be
a
out
turns
free of dominat ion—
and
precisely
member
is
participating
being
a
what counts as
stringently defined, then the state may have considerable
policing to do. Clearly, the scope of procedural questions
concerning the process of formulating meanings can become
quite wide, leaving the state not only in the position of
the final arbitrator but also involving the state in regulaOnce the
ting the intimate details of social discourse.
becomes
particularism
concrete
state becomes significant our
seek
must
it
that
finds
less significant as political speech
out a more universal language.
,

—

49Wal zer
rj0

,

Spheres of Justice

,

p.9.

Norman Darnels, Philosop hical Review XCIV
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Questions about the Internal logic ot institutions
are
questions that "have to be debated, first in the
particular
institutional settings and then in the general setting
of
the state."
it is not clear whether Walzer has a means
preventing the debate from becoming centralized, despite of
the
alleged local character of justice.
In defense of Walzer s
reliance on social discourse which we see is not complete,
we might ask, does he need to insist that churches
become
seminars on achieving salvation, or that spouses turn their
relationship into a seminar on the meaning of marriage?
Perhaps, it is enough that there is space for discussion of
shared understandings somewhere in society? As long as
discussion emerges and finds support in some social institution (say in the print and news media) dissent can find
expression and questions can be raised concerning social
distributions.
Husbands, wives and church ministers must
meet challenges to their relationships or risk their dissolution.
The state fulfills its obligation to operate "at"
the boundaries of the social spheres by preventing husband,
wive, and minister from forcing others to remain in a relationship.
Walzer, " Liberalism and Separation p.328. The
emphasis is my own.
1

,

52 Walzer,

Spheres of Justice

,

p.300, p.298, p.303.

53Wa 1 zer

Spheres of Justice

,

p

,

.

314

.

54

Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. Downing make the interesting
argument ["Beyond Shared Understandings", Political Theory
,

XIV,

no. 3

(August,

1986), p.456, p.457, p.459.]

that

Walzer s work contains a move beyond shared understandings
that nevertheless lies implicit within particular communities.
The critical perspective is derived from the idea of
a common life which Walzer gives a normative power by tieing
respect and dignity to the act of creating and shaping
social meanings. I have argued similarly but one must wonder
if the notion of a particular community has not been given a
special definition by Walzer.
In other words, to what
extent do real communities have a critical spirit that is
reflected in self-conscious attempts within the community
at-large to form culture? Thigpen and Downing see the
critical power of the "common life" as a standard capable of
measuring the extent to which actual communities are formed
by citizens.
They avoid the potential political consequences meaning can only be legitimately shaped in a democraShared
tic, participatory forum-- in an unsatisfactory way.
understandings or social meaning cannot be determined in
politics because... "a good defines itself. The nature of a
A
good is not determined simply by societal conventions.
good has a life of its own as it deve Lops in accord with its
internal meanings, .and these meanings can function as a
corrective to societal beliefs..." The problem here, one
that Walzer shares, is that with respect to language and
1

—

l
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,

.
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are several possible relationships.
f **
suggested
that one can use language as a tool for I have
oneself
and against another or one can be situated
within language
and traditions so that the past can confront us.
The fact
that there are options means that language
or traditions^
cannot step in .and regulate our relationship to them
Therefore, we cannot simple say that social meanings
cannot
be determined in politics because meanings are
autonomous,
or that they define themselves.
If shared understandings
are to be determined in a manner separate from politics
so
that they can regulate politics then we must either
clarify
how meaning is created in the community outside of politics
(something Walzer seems to want to do) or diminish the
emphasis on man, the maker of his own meaning, and allow
that the community constitutes the individual (something
Walzer is reluctant to do)
’

55

This is not only the view of Walzer but one shared with
Harold Bloom, someone whose position on literary theory is
quite close to deconstruction.
["Criticism, Canon-Formation, and Prophecy:
The Sorrows of Facticity", Rar i tan III
no 3 (Winter, 1984)]
Bloom maintains that criticism functions like "an agonist wrestling with facticity."
Facticity
is a state of affairs in which facts are seen as inalterable.
When "the text or event reads us more fully and
vividly than we can hope ever to read it" we are caught up
in "facticity".
Overwhelmed by the force of the past we
lose the position of freedom and our dignity.
Nevertheless,
a precondition for the agon (say, for a real, bonafide
wrestling match) and for revisionism is the canon's exercise
of authority over us.
Great critics "perfect and extend the
canon, while simultaneously prophesizing changes in the use
and understanding of the canon." The agon is a struggle
against "and yet withi n facticity." Emphasis in the
original
,

.
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Michael Walzer, I nterpretation and Social Criticism
(Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press, 1987).
Wa 1 z e r

,

58Waizer
,<5

Walzer

,

h0Walzer
r)

^Walzer

,

Interp r etation and Social Criticis m

,

pp

.

1

9-20

Interpretation and Social Criticism

pp. 20-21

Interpretation and Social Criticism

Chapter one

Interpretation and Social Criticism

pp 6-9
.

Interpretation and Social Criticism, pp. 17-18

.

62 He also makes several generalizations about morality which
Social practices are
seem to be true at least for us.
What we do falls short of the
"morally recalcitrant".
principles that justify our practices. As to why justific-

ation should be so important Walzer states:

"Morality takes

.

.
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shape as a conversation ... our everyday morality is critical
from the beginning:
it only justifies what God or other
people can recognize as just " Holding a moral point of
view brings forth the demand for justification because moral
insight requires recognition by others.
In short, we distinguish social practices from our social ideals which in
turn must be justified in conversation.
These generalizations seem very appropriate in a our context, one which is
partly informed the principles and positions of democratic
self-government.
Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism p 40 p 47
.

,

.

.

,

Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism p.72, p.80.
See Johannes Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Isreal (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1962), p.344.
,

A

The partnership in virtue of Burke, or Hooker's immortal
society
fi5

Walzer

,

Interpretation and Social Criticism

,

p.86.

CHAPTER

4

LIVING OUR INHERITANCE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Forgetting Over Rememberin g

Kundera begins The U nbearable Lightness of Being with a

discussion of Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence.

He

finds the idea of recurrence squarely opposed to the light-

ness of being.

If every

second of our life recurs an in-

finite number of times then "we are nailed to eternity just
as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross."

Under an assump-

tion of an eternal return, history has substance or

"weight."
I

What happens is not lost; when

I

am about to do or what is about to happen

contemplate what
I

must under-

stand that not everything is pardoned in advance because of
forgetting.

In other words,

immortality attached to them.

my actions have a kind of
As Kundera puts it,

the myth

of the eternal return stated negatively (and this obviously

informs our situation) means that in the absence of

recurrence things are "dead in advance."

No matter how

beautiful or horrible, that which does not return means
nothing.

If

the French Revolution were to occur eternally

("a Robespierre who eternally returns,

chopping off French

heads") we would have to form a judgment on it.

"einmal ist keinmal"
"

[

t

]

However,

(what happens once is nothing)

then

he bloody years of the revolution [will] have turned

into mere words, theories, and discussions" capable of

"frightening no one." 1

Through our forgetfulness the past

suffers a loss of reality.

if
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It

is not

kundera

ly light or that

's

contention that being is unavoidab-

the weightiness of the eternal return must

be preferred without question.

Being nai.led to eternity is

also an "unbearable responsibility
is

." 2

What puzzles Kundera

why we should be so quick to think that the lightness of

being is preferable.

Sheldon Wolin has raised this puzzle

in terms of our tendency to prefer "new beginnings"

that

erase the past over affirming our inheritance and birthright.

He too seems puzzled by the predilection for the

lightness afforded by an escape from history.
Obviously,

if

the lightness of being is our destiny a

turn to traditions is hardly a possibility.

Speeches honor-

ing and remembering the dead would amount to nothing.

In a

"light" world the dead can find no rest among the living.

They will not have the "whole earth for their tomb ."
course, our own actions can have little weight.

4

Of

Our "in-

heritance" cannot provide us with a "moral starting point"
if

it

exists merely as baggage from the past and not as the

lived, and therefore morally compelling world of our fathers

and mothers.

Nor can inheritance provide a moral starting

point if it exists solely as an object of nostalgia.

When

the past becomes simply material for pleasant childhood

reminiscences, history is easily betrayed.

Kundera has an acute understanding of how nostalgia

conspires with kitsch to drive out history, politics, and
criticism.

Kitsch presents to us a world which

without reservation

5
.

is

accepted

In a world dominated by kitsch criti-
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cism is only directed against those who would expose the
shit

'

in the

world.

kitsch inquisitions.

In totalitarian societies one finds
In more democratic states kitsch

manifests itself in more subtle ways.

Criticism of existing

practices is rejected as being merely negative or
culed as unpatriotic.

ridi-

Kitsch rests on a desire for the kind

of solidarity represented in a May Day parade,

Fourth of July parade.

is

or in a

In these celebrations reality is

irreproachable and criticism is useless against the march of

happy believers

10
.

For Kundera what distinguishes kitsch is the second

"tear."

We observe our children playing in a field, we

smile and perhaps shed a tear of happiness.

second tear because of how nice
ther with all of humanity,

it

is

If we shed a

to be so moved toge-

then we have entered into kitsch.

For kitsch, solidarity as such is the vital thing, and the

non-existence of individuality or disharmony is the essential ingredient.

Kundera describes reading a book on Hitler's youth and
being struck by feelings of nostalgia for a lost period of
his youth.

Hitler as he actually was recedes into the back-

ground to be replaced with a pleasant sense of having
touched a lost period of the reader's youth.

It

seems that

our desire for a fundamental agreement with being, and the

denial of "shit" such an agreement entails, fosters forgetfulness and encourages nostalgia.

But let us examine the

characters Milan Kundera presents in The Unbe arable

L i g_h t_Z
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I

l®-§s

of Being in order to understand whether kitsch and

nostalgia can be defeated.
Sabina is a painter with a single idea:

Reality is a

double-exposure, a confluence of two worlds.

She explains

her first cycle of paintings,
ing "on the surface,

unintelligible truth
of past and present,

"Behind the Scenes", as show-

an intelligible lie; underneath,
." 7

the

Her art does not express a blending

but rather the sense that truth and

beauty are found only behind the scenes, away from the
crowds, and in opposition to all public conceptions of
truth, beauty and goodness.

Smash the scenery, reject the

happy May Day parade, and then we may find beauty

8
.

Sabina

must reject her lover Franz precisely because he is good and
kind.

Her "truth" and "beauty" must be always uniquely her

own and they must deny what others would have her value and

betray what she herself values.
Sabina's adult life begins with a betrayal of parental
authority.
love.

She marries the man her father forbade her to

Later on she leaves her husband,

again in flight.

finding freedom once

When she finds out that the secret of her

affair with Franz will become public the beauty of their

relationship is diminished and her emotional involvement
with Franz weakens.

As she grows older she drops her Czech

origin from her biography (one more betrayal) and eventually
moves to America.

There she experiences the melancholy of

one whose burden is the unbearable lightness of being.
time to time she yearns for a return to a happy family

rom
ife
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with the bonds of affection "home" suggests
but she realizes
that she is thinking of a mythic family only.
She has the

melancholy of one who must never keep ranks but who nevertheless yearns for home.
She brings her life to a consistent end by forsaking
the confinement of a coffin and tombstone for cremation and

the spreading of her ashes.

She will die under the sign of

lightness; her ashes will be lifted up and away by the air

currents.

In death she will achieve pure lightness.

For Sabina,

insofar as the past presents moral obliga-

tions the past must be betrayed.

Her originality is a sign

of having smashed the scenery and the commonplace and found

truth and beauty.

Generalizing some, we can say that the

flight from our birthright, or from history, or from our

inheritance, can be motivated by this desire for flight and
betrayal.

The Underground Man of Dostoevski is motivated by

a rejection of himself that is very similar to Sabina's

betrayal.

Kundera shows us that betrayal has a logic that

is difficult to avoid once one is caught up in it.

He

claims that we cannot betray our betrayal; we cannot betray

ourself back to the point before the first betrayal.

g

Sabina has a bowler hat which once belonged to a great

grandfather who had been

a mayor of a small

town.

For

Sabina the hat is a reminder of that great grandfather and
her father (who had at one time owned it) but more sig-

nificantly,

the hat is a prop for love games with Tomas and

a monument to their love affair.

The world of her great

3
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grandfather survives only as one of the semantic streams, a
rather minor one at that, coalescing in the bowler hat
A more complicated character,

1(1
.

one who eventually

chooses for "heaviness" after tasting considerable "lightness," is Tomas.

Tomas interests us because he also shows

signs of having a conscience or of having integrity, both

qualities in short supply in a world ruled by forgetfulness.

Kundera describes the character of Tomas as born of the
phrase "Einmal ist keinmal" and as having the "Devil's gift"
of compassion.

1

It seems that the key to Tomas'

continued

involvement with Tereza is his feeling of compassion for

her--a feeling he cannot flee even when his compassion costs
him his chosen profession, what he thinks of as his life's
calling.

The education of Tomas consists of the working out

of the struggle between his gift/curse of compassion and his

sense that if something occurs only once
rence without necessity)

it

(a

chance occur-

means nothing at all.

What

Tomas eventually overcomes is the idea that life must have
at its center an "Es muss sein"

,

a sense of necessity,

or a

directing mission in order for there to be meaning to life.
Tomas does not lose himself in the transitory when he gives
up the idea of a necessary mission.

Relinquishing the "Es

muss sein" allows Tomas to fully love Tereza; their love
The dream-

carries Tomas beyond his need for necessity.
12
ideal love (for our necessary missing half

)

which kept

Tomas from fully loving Tereza gives way to an acceptance of
his love for her

—a

love "born of six fortuities.

1
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The relationship generated by love between two people
is an example of one type of obligation.

From this rela-

tionship we might be able to generalize about our moral

starting point.

A political counterpart to an ideal love is

in Kundera s words the fantasy of the "Grand March
1

."

14

The Grand March is the movement of history toward

justice and brotherhood in which all members of the political left participate.

This necessity is a piece of kitsch

which has found favor among those who would otherwise refuse
to be in agreement with being.

As the silliness of the

march on Cambodia indicates, the Grand March, like the
dream-ideal of love,

is a detour from reality

which blinds

one to the actual relationships one is part of and the real

possibilities that exist 15
.

Is not Kundera saying perhaps that what undermines the

sense that we have an obligation to someone or something is
our mistaken belief that an obligation or relationship

requires the backing of an "es muss sein"?

Dissatisfaction

with the fortuitous nature of events and of our lives, and
thus our inability to live this life without an inner necessity,

is a result of

ordering principle.

searching for a necessary mission or
Real and satisfying relations are close

at hand if we give up the search for a necessary mission and

learn to live with relations born of fortuity.

This would

seem to be a way of accepting our moral starting point

a

way by which we can overcome our reluctance to take on the

burdens that we have been born into.

.
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The resistance of the young German who refuses respon-

sibility for the Holocaust or of the Englishman who refuses

responsibility for Northern Ireland may well be based in

a

rejection of any necessary link between themselves and the
events of years ago.
(show me how
ever,

Their demand for necessary connection

am involved) obviously cannot be met.

1^

How-

if we accept our lives as ruled by fortuity of being

born German or English, we must then find our "mission", as
it were,

in the fact of our birth in a particular country

containing a particular set of obligations which are crucial
to our country's identity.

tion's history.

(A

informed history.)

This obviously includes a na-

nation's real history; not the kitsch
We may thus conclude, paradoxically,

that in Kundera's necessity-less world, where eternal return
is only myth a moral starting point in social identities is

possible
However,

it

is clear that for Tomas his personal rela-

tionship with Tereza is his greatest concern, determining
his political choices on several occasions.

When asked to

sign a petition protesting the treatment of political prisoners he hesitates until the image of Tereza being hounded by
He then decides for

the secret police comes to his mind.

Tereza's safety over the symbolic importance of signing the
petition.

Tomas is not apolitical.

He has several oppor-

tunities to return to his profession of medicine, all of

which he rejects on political grounds.

In one instance he

resigns his position at a clinic so that statements falsely
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attributed to him could not be used against an editor.^®
Kundera describes him as "bound by an unspoken vow of
fidelity,

so he stood fast."

When asked to retract a letter he

wrote in order to stay on as a surgeon at a hospital he

eventually decides against retraction because he could not
bear the smiles" of all those who would have expected him
to retract his letter.

sumption of necessity

^

Here he fights against the pre-

— that

of course,

he will retract his

letter and join the ranks of the politically silent.

He has

his profession to lose and seemingly very little to gain.
His letter in itself was trivial and not only that, the

editor who published it, distorted it by cutting out crucial
portions.

He has no attachment to the letter.

But he does

have integrity; he cannot act out of what he clearly recog-

nizes as cowardice.
The letter that eventuates in his new profession of

window washing is a response to the heated debate during the
time of Dubcek over whether members of the Communist Party

knew or did not know of the atrocities committed in the
1950s.

Using Oedipus as his example, Tomas argued that the

question of whether ignorance confers innocence was
one.

a

false

They are irreparably guilty; they ought to feel the

irreparable guilt of Oedipus rather than protest their
innocence.

Here we see both how important remembering is

for reminding the guilty of their responsibility and how

difficult it is to make the claim of responsibility stick

147

when guilt

is

narrowly defined, allowing "forgetfulness" to

take hold.
The last character we will discuss is Tereza, who ex-

emplifies the strange twists an "inheritance" can give a
life.

In Tereza we find a woman both debilitated and in a

way enabled by the life led by her mother.

She clearly

shows the problems an inheritance may bring as it is passed

down to us.

mother

Tereza lives out her life in the shadow of her

Her inheritance from her mother conditions her

.

entire life, affecting her perception of herself, how she
moves and walks, and what she seeks in life.
The portrait Kundera draws of Tereza's mother is un-

flattering.

A

beautiful and vain young woman (the very

"image of Raphael's madonna" according to her grandfather)

who made foolish choices in love, she aged into a vindictive

woman proud of vulgarity and resentful of Tereza's existence.

Tereza,

the result of an accidental pregnancy,

blamed for her unhappy marriage.

is

Tereza is taught right

away that being a mother means sacrificing everything.

Tereza becomes, of course,
redress.

"

^

"Guilt with no possibility of

The consequences for Tereza are immense.

She

drops out of school in order to help her mother, to lighten
her burdens and somehow atone for the crime of being her

daughter.

salvation.

"Guilt" sends Tereza looking beyond her home for
Her relationship with Tomas carries that burden.

And as one would expect Tereza does not desire a child of
her own.

.
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The most significant influence of the mother is her

boastful vulgarity 21
.

Tereza's mother blew her nose noisily, talked to people
in public about her sex life, and enjoyed demonstrating
her false teeth.
She was remarkably skillful at loosening them with her tongue and in the midst of a broad
smile would cause the uppers to drop down over the
lowers in such a way as to give her face a sinister
expression
Her behavior was but a singie grand gesture, a
casting off of youth and beauty...
In her household the mother declared a state of war on

modesty and beauty.

Having lost her own beauty, she sets

off to show that beauty itself is worthless.

Since all

bodies are the same, modesty shown about one's own body
indicates a false pride (what makes you think you're so
special!).

Rather than object to Tereza's father taking a

prurient interest in her nightly bath, the mother objects to

Tereza's attempt at having some privacy.

The immodest

mother gives way to a very modest daughter.

O O

(And if Tereza has a nervous way of moving, if her
gestures lack a certain easy grace, we must not be
surprised:
her mother's grand, wild, and self-destructive gesture left an indelible imprint on her.)
It not

only affected how she moved, her mother's crass way

of life led her to "yearn for something higher."
a

She became

reader of books and an avid listener of classical music.

Led by her rejection of her mother's life Tereza leaves her

small town for the city becoming a photographer for
zine.

a

maga-

The desire for something higher helps Tereza compen-

sate for her lack of formal education.

From the overall

picture we have of Tereza we must conclude that ^he mother
influence plagued her throughout her life.

What enables

s

.
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Tereza to get past her inheritance is not any insight into
her mother's power over her.

stand unconditional love.

Her pet dog helps her under-

This insight enables her to

overcome her overwhelming need to receive love and thus be
cleansed of her guilt.
In summary,

remembrance faces the difficult challenge

of combating the joint forces of kitsch and nostalgia.

It

is easy for the linkage to the past to be a sentimental

recollection.

We see Adolf Hitler, not the author of the

Final Solution whom we should fear and loathe, but, as

Kundera testified, as a reminder of our nearly forgotten
childhood.

We seem to want to grab hold of what is past but

only as kitsch--only shitless 23
.

...In the sunset of dissolution, everything is illuminated by the aura of nostalgia, even the guillotine.
If political action requires for the sake of rational-

ity that our deeds live on past us Kundera seems to offer

little hope 24
.

.Before we are forgotten, we will be turned into
Kitsch is the stopover between being and
kitsch.
.

.

oblivion
How we will be remembered, if we are remembered at all, will

have little to do with what we experienced and what we were.

Those who survive us understand us according to their own
designs.

A nonconformist poet

communist official.

is given an eulogy by a

Tomas is given an epitaph by his son

the
that confirms the son's religious beliefs but violates

sense Tomas gave to his own life.

In death Franz cannot

5

.
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defend himself against his wife's claim that
loved and not his mistresses.

it was she he

The only accurate epitaph is

given to a dog by Tomas and Tereza.

Ironically,

"he gave

birth to two buns and a bee", is so personal (it is from

a

dream of Tereza) and true, so precisely tailored to Karenin,
that it can carry no historical weight. Only Tomas and

Tereza understand it.
on seems unavailable;

The immortal society in which we live

instead a display room of kitsch

awaits us
In the Afterword to The Book of Laughter an d Forget-

ting

,

Kundera sheds additional light on the problem of

forgetting

2
.

The metaphysics of man is the same in the private
sphere as in the public one.
Take the other theme of
the book, forgetting.
This is the great private problem of man: death as the loss of the self. But what
is this self?
It is the sum of everything we remember
Thus, what terrifies us about death is not the loss of
the future but the loss of the past.
Forgetting is a
.But forgetform of death ever present within life.
ting is also the great problem of politics... A nation
which loses awareness of its past gradually loses its
self.
.

.

In the Unbearable Lightness of Bein g Kundera tells us that

kitsch curtains off death 26
.

In other words,

I

would argue

that kitsch meets the threat of death only by obscuring the

real self,
tory.

the self spun from the experiences of its his-

Perhaps, Kundera is suggesting that

real history

— shit

and all

— we

if we

reclaim our

will not be tempted by the

simple world of kitsch.
Our reading of Kundera showed how nostalgia, a form of

remembrance,

threatens accurate and honest remembei mg.
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Critical traditionalism, criticism itself, is impossible
in
a world dominated by nostalgic yearnings.

With Tereza we

see the double-edged nature of an inheritance.

The past

generation passes down more than its wisdom.
Alfred Doeblin: Serving the Dead
Sophocles'

tragedy Antigone has a central place in this

novel about political life in Germany after the First World
War.

Antigone's lament for her dead brother--her willing-

ness to lose her own life for the honor of her dead brother-

-serves as a leitmotif reminding readers of the significance
of the question,
It was

dead,

what do we owe the dead?

suggested earlier that an obligation to the

to our dead ancestors can locate us in traditions by

making the world of the dead--their hopes and dreams, their
ways of

1i f

e— mat ters

of great significance.

Mourning their

deaths requires that we take seriously their world, who they
were and what they lived for.

Karl and Rosa shows us some

problems that serving the dead may bring.

Friedrich Becker, a veteran of the war who has returned
to teaching classics after recovering from war injuries both

physical and emotional, finds himself in conflict over the

meaning of A nt igone with the students in his class.
departs from the theme of universal

,

He

higher truth versus the

politically and legally correct judgment, the theme which
interested his students and led them to derisively dismiss

Antigone as naive and self-righteous.

In their minds she

neglected to think of the common good which Creon and the

—
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state represents.

silly

To the class Antigone is just plain

a silly woman,

a girl.

Becker is shocked at their

unwillingness to criticize the state.
that knows nothing of the war,

Here is a generation

the very event which has so

changed his own life and which continues to dominate

it.

Finding his class unwilling to accept the idea of

a

higher authority, Becker gives the talk they requested the
first day the former First Lieutenant walked into the classHowever, his war remembrance was not at all what they

room.

wanted.

Rather than celebrate the German state and criti-

cize her enemies, especially those internal enemies respon-

sible for Germany's defeat, Becker announced that we, the

entire German nation, are at fault for the war and have been

punished by God 28
.

The class rebels,

blame the people for?"

"What is there to

Becker cannot give a firm answer.

The punishment is obvious,

just as it was obvious to

Similarly, as with Oedipus' guilt,

Oedipus.

committed is not clear.

the crime

The young students persist and

Becker, who thinks that the fact of Germany being punished
is obvious,

29
takes up Antigone one last time.

Behind the question "state versus individual" or "duty
to the state and to unwritten law" there lies the
hidden question of death itself. And that brings us
i
directly to the central theme of the tragedy of Ant
Some of you have taken offense at the notion
gone.
that a whole tragedy should be built upon the question
To you
of whether a dead man should be buried or not.
a
concerning
argument
it seems absurd that such an
to
But
consequences.
funeral should have such massive
Anti_gone
of
theme
the
formulate it precisely for you:
the world
is. .How is the world of the living to treat
of the dead?
.

.
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Becker goes on to argue that the real hero of the play
is
Polynices, the dead brother of Antigone.
The subject of the play is the claim of a dead man upon
the living.
A warrior has fallen.
He has left behind
no unsullied memory.
This dead man does not become
visible, nor palpable, nor even audible in the play,
but he forces his way into the world of the living and
finds an advocate in his sister Antigone.
A woman
takes up his cause.
Just as it is a woman who receives
the unborn, those who are not present among us.
Polynices is held back and cannot speak for himself,
but he works through her uses her body and soul and
she cannot escape him.
Nor does she want to escape him
either
,

,

And Becker has precisely these same feelings toward the dead
of the war;

they are his dead.

"Just as Antigone takes up

the cause of her dead brother, so have
the many who fell,
so totally unaware.
them.""

I

taken up that of

the many who died too young, who departed
I

know

I

serve them,

I

shall not forget

At issue is not the validity of this interpreta-

tion of Antigone

.

Doeblin has given us a clear and plaus-

ible picture of the power of the dead over the living.

We

can well imagine a response to the horrors of WWI which

refuses to let it slip away into forgetfulness.

When Becker

wonders why he was spared, we understand his sense of having
an obligation to do something for those who were not.

As

Becker's story proceeds the obligation to the dead helps him
make some courageous choices.

He becomes sensitive to all

who suffer and adamantly rejects arguments calling for

suppressing personal feelings for the sake of political
goals.

We need to ask whether Becker truly lives out the

analogy he draws between himself and Antigone, a woman, who
can serve those yet to born as well as those who have passed
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away.

Does Becker neglect the future because of his
obliga-

tion to the dead?

Is he blinded in any way by his pas-

sionate avowal of the rights of the dead?
Before answering that question we shall turn to another
major character, Rosa Luxemburg, who we find in prison in
the final year of her life.

as Becker.

Hannes

,

She faces the same predicament

Upon hearing that her friend, a would-be lover,

has died in combat near Stalingrad she becomes

overwhelmed with grief

31
;

And now I’ll have to die right along with him from
morning till evening, .and on through the long nights.
...locked in like Antigone in her bridal chamber ... who
will save me?

Rosa makes up for the minimal involvement Hannes had in her
life while he lived.

companion.
Hannes,

A fantasy of Hannes becomes her daily

She no longer lives for herself--"to perish for

to die that new life may grow

." 32

In a way Hannes

becomes the lover she dreamed of but never had time for
because of her politics.

More significantly, Hannes is a

dead man she feels obligated to in the same compelling way
of Becker's.

Her devotion to Hannes seems very natural and

reasonable to her.

Serving the dead is self-evident; can

something that exists become nothing?

Rosa wants to help

Hannes become human again and she begins to treat him as a
real lover.

They have a wedding and honeymoon; they take

trips together.

Doeblin indicates that there is

to Rosa's devotion to Hannes.

a

dark side

J

The song had begun with cruel pain, with desperation
Then the fantasies had become part of it,
and longing.
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conversations had developed, the courting, the bliss, a
wedding grew from it--and now?
Rosa admits she speaks with Hannes in tongues of angels or
devils.

Indeed,

soon Rosa grows frightened of Hannes; he

wants some of her warm blood 34

Hannes and Satan become

.

intertwined until Rosa rejects Satan,

"the warrior,

the

defiant one, the seeker of revenge, the one with the poisonous soul."'q

C

Doeblin compares Satan to a corpse outside the

heavenly gates that no one will bury.

Satan has some inner

connection to a death that refuses to be buried--like the
death of Hannes.

It seems

that Rosa's remembrance of Hannes

was in part a refusal to accept that he was dead.

This

refusal grew into a singleminded pursuit of life for Hannes

which threatened Rosa herself.
Becker's obligation to the dead at first seems to have
purely salutary results.

When the director of his school is

under attack Becker works hard at finding some just solution.

Even when the personal costs are great Becker stands
However, Becker ends up involving himself

by the Director.

in revolutionary politics for extremely questionable

reasons.

His personal code of ethics gives way to "letting

go" and "following his heart

."

36

The reason for Becker's

collapse is the seeming impossibility of making good his
debt to the dead 37
.

Do I owe to them to sit at their graves like Antigone,
Am I doomed
to bring them flowers and prey for them?
[or the
lament
to Antigone's fate simply to raise a

—

dead?

.
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Obviously Becker cannot be content with merely lamenting
their deaths,

just as he refuses to be satisfied with per-

forming any "last rites" for the dead.

The reason for this

lies in the responsibility he feels for their deaths.

His

responsibility is not unique to himself; he thinks that
everyone has that responsibility.

Nevertheless, with a

responsibility so great one must ask, what action or actions
on his part could possibly make good his obligation?
I

think the answer is simply that there is nothing that

Becker could do which would atone for their deaths.

Becker

points to the dark side of his loyalty to his dead friends.
He announces that he will also go down their same path for

"he loved their death because God had sent it to them." 08
In other words, what Becker can do is join them in death.

Or put slightly differently,

the one thing the responsible

and guilty can do is put out their eyes:
on themselves.
I

Inflict punishment

oq

take Doeblin to be arguing that death can destroy us

well before we meet our grave.

Upon the death of an in-

timate we move from overwhelming grief to an incapacitating
and se 1 f -des t rue t ive responsibility and guilt.

We "Prome-

40
theans" ought to be able to do something for the dead.

we cannot

,

If

then we deserve the severest of punishments

However, we all can appreciate the situation Becker and Rosa
find themselves in.

We can also plainly see the difficul

ties that face a critical traditionalism that is mediated

through a remembrance of the dead.
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Instead of bringing us closer to the world the dead
left behind,

that is,

their traditions,

ideals and self-

understandings, speaking and living for the dead can lead us

away from the task of engaging traditions within an open

political conversation to politics that has self-destruction
as its end.

8

.

..

.

.

158

NOTES

Milan Kundera, The Unbearab le Lightness of Being (New York
Harper and Row, 1987), pp.1-5.
2

"Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being

p. 5

,

.

See Chapter One, n.14.

3

4

See Chapter One, n.9.

5

Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being

pp. 252-253.

,

r-

Although criticism of the enemy is permitted the major
focus is on the unambiguous good of national values.

7

Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being

^Kundera

p.63.

,

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

p.110.

^Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

p.92.

,

10Kundera,
1

'Kundera

,

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

p. 88

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

p.21.

^Kundera wants us to think of Plato's Symposium

.

.

’^Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

p.219.

14 Kundera,

,

p.257.

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

^Kundera The Unbearable Ligh t ness of Being pp. 259-269.
The doctors march on Cambodia accomplished absolutely nothing despite the high expectations and emotional commitment
of the doctors.
1

,

,

16 Kundera,

If he
The Unbearable Lightness of Being p.192.
statea
fabricated
had not resigned the police would have
However, because he was on his way down
ment from him.
(from clinician to window washer), no fabrication would be
,

believable
1 7

Kunde r a

,

The Un b earable Lightness of Bein g

Kundera

,

The Unbeara ble Lightness of Being

1

,

p

,

pp

1

.

.

83
1

76- 1 77

4
^The inheritance in question here are the lessons and
self-understanding taught and inculcated in us by our
parents during our childhood.

2

°Kunder a

2 1

Kunder a

,

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

,

The Unb earable Lightness of Being

,

p 44

,

p 46

.

.

3
44

,,,, ,,,,,,,,

,,
,,,

. .

,,,,

.

..

159

2 2

2

2

Kundera

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

p 46

Kundera

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

p

Kundera

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

p 278

25 Milan Kundera,

York:

.

4

.

.

.

The Book of Laughter and Forgettinq
1981) pp 234-235

Penguin Books

26 Kundera

.

.

,

The Unbearable Lightness of Being

p.253

2

^Alfred Doeblin, Karl and Rosa: November 1918. A German
Revolution (New York: Fromm International Publishing, 1983)
p.7, pp. 193-194, p.337,
28

p.360, and p.504.

Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

28 Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

30 Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

p. 194

3 4

Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

p.7.

32

Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

,

Karl and Rosa

,

33 Doeblin,

p. 193

pp. 193-194

,

p 68

.

p 76

.

.

.

.

We are reminded of
Doebl in Karl and Rosa p 8 1
See Doeblin, p.352.
Odysseus journey to the underworld.
3

.

.

1

35 Doebl in

Karl and Rosa

^^Doeblin

Karl and Rosa

37 Doebl in

,

pp. 450-451.
p.

460

"How can
Karl and Rosa p.504.
p.530.
Doeblin,
them empty handed?"

38 Doeblin,

I

appear before

,

Karl and Rosa

,

p.504,

p.530.

'^Becker tells his friend Krug that what he wants "to
He
plunge into action, into total and real action.
p.511.
Rosa
and
Kar
1
Doblin,
wants to lose himself.
,

Becker's guardian angel, tells us that Satan imis
planted in us "primal guilt" --to suffer for humanity
3.
p.54
Rosa
d
an
1
Kar
not the job of man. Doeblin,
40 Tauler,

,

CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION
The turn to traditions must obviously face the dif-

ficulties Kundera and Doeblin illustrate in their novels.

Doeblin presses the argument that

I

developed from Burke.

I

argued that the acceptance of our moral and political in-

heritance need not entail subservience to the traditions of
our ancestors as long as we recognize that the present is

never identical with the past and that our fathers did not
have an "exclusive confidence in their reasoning.

1,1

Attend-

ing to the train of events as they emerge demands more than

careful observation of contemporary events.

Burke argued

that justice cannot be understood unless we penetrate the

stale language of moral platitudes with a "troublesome

application" of the concepts of justice.

I

take Burke to be

noting the importance of placing our concepts of justice
under the pressure of questioning in order to know them
correctly.

Only by closely attending to "events as they

emerge" can tradition be a "living tradition."
for this is simple.

The reason

When our attention is focused on injus-

tice and the political issues of the day, we do not approach

traditions with an attitude of nostalgia.

Expanding on the

Burkean notion, we can say that the focus on contemporary
events problemat izes our moral notions, forcing us to consider the meanings of our traditional values.

Now,

the

question has been: Is involvement in traditions compatible
with a critical understanding of them?

Too often the criti-
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cism of traditions shows little understanding of
them; and
the traditionalist perspective pays insufficient
attention
to the debates and disagreements at the root of
traditions.

Harold Bloom's idea that we ought to struggle against being

completely defined by the canon from a position of intimate

acquaintence is not exactly a Burkean view
ever,

2
.

it is,

how-

in fundamental agreement with Burke's understanding

that we will be blind to the present if we treat our in-

heritance in the manner of "historical patriots" --as a

collection of platitudes.

In comparison with Nietzschean

deconstruction, where traditions (texts) have no standing as

objects worthy of respect, Bloom's appropriation from within

traditions acknowledges their significance.

Although Bloom

does not directly address the problem of our location in
traditions, the fact that his essay stresses that we must

struggle from within the canon by extending the canon tacitly recognizes the prevalence of interpretations of tradi-

tions which attack them from the outside.

These interpreta-

tions make insufficient contact with traditions

motivates interpreting traditions from within?
oneself within the canon?

3
.

What

Why locate

The artist chooses to subordinate

himself to traditions of his craft in order to become proficient as an artist.

Shall we say that a Professor of

English must subordinate himself to the canon in order to

practice textual criticism?

If one approaches the canon

doubt if one

is

with the anticipation of criticizing

it,

then working from within the canon.

Gadamer is instructive

I
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on this point

4
.

We must ask, what attitude or motivation

supports interpreting traditions from within?
The power of Burke's concept of inheritance (the extent
to which it is morally compelling)

seems to depend upon

emotions developed within our "small platoon" --that place
where intimate relations grow.

For nearly all of us in-

timacy is first experienced in a family. Although comradesin-arms,

friends, and lovers are intimate relationships the

family is a place where generations meet and where therefore
the present has the opportunity to meet the past

5
.

It

is

in

the family where intimate relations can actually represent
5

certain traditions

.

An Aunt may personify the Baptist

faith, a mother the traditional role of housewife, and the

father may come to represent a particular profession or a
set of strongly held opinions.
"the image of

One clear problem to giving to politics,
a relation

in blood,"

is

whether criticism "within the

family" supports a critical traditionalism, or whether such

criticism is apt to be muted out of deference.

Deference to

wise ancestors might be motivated by respect of the type
Burke recommends

(

who did not have

"men of uncommon wisdom

Deference to

an "exclusive confidence in themselves").

traditions motivated by fear of offending ancestors would
place a severe constraint on criticism.

If

Gadamer is

correct deference has a positive value in so far as

allows traditions an opportunity to speak.

it

Much depends on

the precise character of family relationships.

An author-

.
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itarian family

,

to take

just one example, might inculcate a

traditionalism characterized by tear of departing from the
letter of the tradition.

A family with a more democratic

ethos might support a traditionalism that is open to criticism

.

7n Karl and Rosa Alfred Doeblin explores what happens

when an intimate relationship is shattered by death.
Becker's act of mourning drives him to his own destruction.
The view that the war dead can become "powerful sacred

symbols which organize, direct, and constantly revive the

collective ideals of the community" must be qualified

7
.

We

must somehow bury the dead before our memorials can act as

"symbols."

Doeblin points to the Christian belief in Christ

the redeemer as a solution to the overwelming sense of

responsibility and guilt the living feels toward the dead.
The impact on a turn to traditions is clear.

Our act

of mourning for our ancestors or friends can obliterate

traditions, push them aside as we seek to bring the dead

back to life.

Unless we make peace with death the past will

come down to us only in the form of painful memories.

Avoiding the threat of an overwelming sense of obligation to
the dead by fleeing from the past becomes an attractive

option
For Kundera "kitsch" masks death and mediates a for-

getting of the past.

Despite the near irresistable quality

struggle
of kitsch Kundera recommends and believes that a
for memory is nevertheless possible.

Kundera illuminates

.
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how a self might be willing to assume a
role or identity
that resulted from a confluence of "fortuities."
The elimi-

nation of the demand for necessity (the demand that
either

experience an "es muss sein,

"

I

or my life has no purpose)

opens the way to accepting our accidental location in history.

In terms of our theme of how we are located in tradi-

tions Kundera adds another insight into how we may accept

and find compelling our standing in traditions.

Both Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre need a
concept of a historical community.

Without a sense of a

community persisting over time it makes no sense to speak of
a collective narrative that

I

belong to.

Similarly,

the

prophets of Walzer are inseparable from an audience capable
of relating to the traditions the prophets claim to speak
for.

And the relationship of a prophet to his audience can

only occur in a community with a memory of its past.

But

how does the individual come to feel a sense of belonging to

history?

Although not without its problems as we have seen,

Burke's notion of inheritance does support a concept of an
"immortal society", of a historical community.

The family

genealogy ties us to the collective narrative.

The idea

that our place in existence has been divinely ordained helps

solidify the narrative by guaranteeing sense (God has a plan
even if we cannot discern

it)

MacIntyre can say very little to the young German who
has no interest or sense of concern for the Holocaust or to
the Englishman who feels no responsibility for Northern
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Ireland.

If

they admit to having a "moral starting point"

it will not be found in "their"
It has

nation's history.

been an assumption throughout this dissertation

that the turn away from abstract modes of political theori-

zing and the turn toward traditions actually enhances political rationality.

The young German who reflects on the

Holocaust will better understand himself and his culture.

A

German politics that squarely faces NAZISM will be informed
of the dangers latent in the German polity.

The Englishman

who acknowledges responsibility for Northern Ireland and

understands the historical context will be both motivated to

work on a political solution and more able to understand the
terms of the debate over Northern Ireland.

A polity with a

history can build on the wisdom and folly recorded in its
history.

Political action itself will seem more attractive

because one can assume that future generations will at least
attempt to understand the traditions and values that are

presently argued about and acted on.

"

.

,
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NOTES
^See Chapter Two,
2

p.62, n.50.

See Chapter Three, n.55.

'^Michael Shapiro, a contemporary proponent of genealogy,
describes genealogical criticism as "disruptive", as committed to an inquiry that "seeks endlessly to dissolve the
coherence of systems of intelligibility that give individual
and collective identities to persons/peoples ... by recreating
the process of descent within which subjectivities and
objectivities are produced." (Shapiro pp 14-15.)
What the
genealogist discovers is that "all modes of intelligibility
are appropriations, the momentary fixing of the resultants
of contending forces that could have spawned an endless
variety of versions of the real." Our self-conception and
the corresponding social order are always an imposition "on
a set of forces which constitute both a yearning for accommodation to an order and a resistance to it." (Shapiro p.5.)
The genealogist assumes that the self is always more than
any substantive account of it, and that any substantive
account is always an imposition. This rather negative way
of describing the situation of the self who seemingly must
be an amorphous nothing in order to be true to itself is
counterbalanced with the optimistic sense that genealogical
inquiry can shatter the imposed order and provide access to
possibilities which "go beyond the scripting of the instituOf course, any
tionalized modes of control." (Shapiro p.4.)
transgression towards a new possibility for the self can
only be an imposition that will provoke internal opposition
within the self
Neither MacIntyre nor Walzer would agree that all
social orders and sel f-concept ions are impositions on basicMacIntyre sees Nietzscnean celebraally anarchic material.
a sign of the decay of moral life.
as
arbitrariness
tions of
A less radical
area
of agreement.
important
But there is an
to traditurn
the
with
compatible
is
version of genealogy
steadfast,
"stiff,
of
a
idea
the
Genealogists attack
tions.
order
prevailing
the
that
notion
single individual" and the
possibilities
the
of
"exhaustive
represents an ideal order
of value
Walzer is obviously committed to the idea that core
values and social structure, including the institutionalized
More importantly, Walzer I
means of control, are at odds.
the core values contain an
that
think would resist the idea
of which would send
realization
ideal social structure the
is always
Interpretation
social critics into retirement.
Jnless
developments.
with the past in terms of contemporary
as
such
developments
economic
history ends--there is no new
ions
example--interpretat
the factory system to take but one
of the tradition will always vary.
is
Walzer 's self who seeks to attain self-possession
dowever
conception.
definitely oriented towards a unified
.

.

.

.
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the concept of distinctive spheres of meaning allows for
a
pluralist account of the self.
MacIntyre's narrative order is committed to intelligibility, but not in such a way that conflicts of value
must be eliminated, or denied to be real. The Sophoclean
self is Nietzschean to some extent. In short, neither Walzer
nor MacIntyre are interested in the project of persuading
modern selves to either identify with the social roles
presently validated by the dominant institutions or with
self -concept ions dug up from the past.
If genealogy would substitute for its celebration of
arbitrariness the idea that we should seek more appropriate
formulations of the self and the corresponding order in
light of its history and the contemporary nature of social
and political life, then the turn to traditions would differ
little from genealogy.
Of course, the arbitrary nature of
the self and the social order is a central tenet of genealogy.
It motivates inquiry to be disruptive of continuities
with the past (history is a weight bearing down on the self)
and allows for a sense that new possibilities are being
revealed.
For when the self is deconstructed the collection
of forces that truly are the self can take a new form.
The
new possibilities revealed are very unlike those that are
achieved in the critical traditionalism of Walzer and
MacIntyre.
In genealogy the "new" must be a radical departure, it must bear the marks of resistance to any relationship to past. Continuity of any sort denies the arbitrary
nature of the self.
Accordingly, Bloom's struggle against
facticity from within traditions, a struggle which extends
the canon, might be thought of as too accommodating, too
willing to allow traditions a power over us.
Michael J. Shapiro, "Writing, The Self, and the Order:
Rationalistic, Critical, and Genealogical Approaches",
(Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington, D.C.
1987)
,

4

See Chapter One, n.22, n.23.

^Friendship may certainly prepare one for the "I-Thou"
relationship Gadamer thinks best describes our location
in traditions.
^Lovers and friends are too much like us; they tend to be
They are less likely to implicate us in
our contemporaries.
a past
^See Chapter One,

p.8 and n.10.

,

.
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